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                                                    Abstract. 
 
 This thesis is an analysis of the initial responses of the British government to the 
Holocaust focusing on refugee policy. In particular, it seeks to re-examine the role of anti-
Semitism as an influencing factor on government decision-making and argues that current 
historiography underplays that influence. It will argue that the government’s fear of anti-
Semitism itself betrayed some anti-Jewish assumptions. These fears were used as a means to 
counter demands for rescue, as the government wanted to ensure that its immigration policies 
were unchanged and continued to be exclusionary. The thesis also examines how the leaders of 
the Anglo-Jewish community responded to, and engaged with, these policies.. 
This study is based on extensive archival research and makes a detailed analysis of both 
government and private papers including correspondence from Eleanor Rathbone, William 
Temple, The  Board of Deputies of British Jews and Rabbi Schonfeld. Other resources have 
included newspapers – The Times, The Jewish Chronicle and the Guardian – contemporary 
accounts in books and magazines, parliamentary speeches as well as material fron the 
Parliamentary Committee on Refugees.  
The thesis is arranged into a series of case studies that exemplify the complexity of 
responses to Nazi anti-Jewish policy but also  draw attention to significant continuities in 
exclusionary thinking. The first chapter considers the Evian Conference and argues that the 
government only ever intended that the conference should end with no change to its 
immigration policies. Chapters Two and Three consider the government response to schemes 
for the rescue of children in France in 1942 and Bulgaria in 1943 and argue that such rescue 
schemes were little more than a charitable façade. The thesis ends by looking critically at the 
Bermuda Conference and its aftermath in 1943 and ultimately concludes that the government 
remit at  Bermuda was similar to the Evian Conference: public expression of noble sentiments 
with no intention of easing the immigration laws or providing assistance to Jewish refugees 
trapped in Nazi Europe, the approach which defined British government attitudes throughout. 
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Introduction 
 When the news of the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination in occupied Europe was 
publicly acknowledged by the government in 1942, it was faced with a growing demand 
for aid and rescue to be provided for the European Jews. The various campaigners 
presented a series of proposals which included easing the prevailing rigid immigration 
laws thus granting access to Britain for any Jewish refugees who had reached the 
comparative safety of the neutral European countries Spain and Portugal; the offer of 
settlement in the Empire and finally the lifting of the quota system for entry into the 
Palestine Mandate which had been implemented in 1939. These demands presented 
the government with a major problem. On the one hand it was adamant in its 
determination to adhere to the stringent immigration laws and maintain the Palestine 
White Paper quota, but it also wished to maintain a façade of humanitarian response to 
the plight of the refugees. The resolution of these conflicting objectives was to exert a 
strong influence on its response to the campaigners’ demands. 
The arrival of the German Jewish refugees, after Hitler gained power in 1933 
and instigated his policy of Jewish persecution,  was greeted with a display of wariness 
by the government. This thesis will analyse how far the influence of historic anti-
Semitism was used as a political tool which influenced the government attitude and 
policies towards the Jewish refugees, as the news of the Nazi policy of Jewish 
extermination  became known after July 1942. This influence has been overlooked in 
recent historiography appertaining to the European Jews both prior to and during the 
Second World War. In current historiography, minimal consideration is given to this 
concept of anti-Semitism when examining the attitudes and responses of the 
government, the public and the various campaigners to the plight of European Jewry, as 
the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination became known. 
 
 The government response  was not one of welcome. Throughout the Thirties 
and Forties, the government was determined to maintain its rigid control of the prevailing 
immigration laws which ensured that all potential immigrants were considered on an 
individual basis as laid down in the laws of 1914, 1919 and 1920.1 Whilst there was an 
alleged fear of increasing anti-Semitism by providing asylum and assistance to Jewish  
                                                          
1 House of Commons, Aliens Restrictions, 5th April 1914 (London; H.M.S.O 1914), pp.121-123 
Vaughan Bevan, The Development of British Immigration Law (Beckenham Kent: Croom Helm,1986) 
pp.72,73 
 
 
2 
 
refugees, there was also an element of anti-Semitism still prevalent in certain areas of 
government in particular the Colonial Office, which continued to exert a degree of 
influence on government policy. In contrast to this attitude within government circles, 
there was a determination to display a public façade of humanitarianism to the world, 
which resulted in a series of political manoeuvres as exemplified by government 
manipulation of the agendas  at both the Evian  Conference in July 1938 and the 
Bermuda Conference in April 1943 which were allegedly held in order to resolve the 
growing refugee problems of the period. 
The reaction of the Anglo-Jewish community to the plight of the European Jews 
was strongly influenced by the fear of any action contributing towards the growth of anti-
Semitism which was becoming more prevalent across society. This fear was to have a 
lasting impact on their subsequent reaction to the extermination of European 
Jewry.Their response towards the arrival of the Jewish refugees during the Thirties was 
governed by two main factors. The community wished to maintain its tradition of offering 
assistance to their co-religionists but they also wanted to ensure that only Jews who 
were deemed as being acceptable – educated, professional and prepared to assimilate 
rapidly were welcomed.  This initial response may be attributed to the determination to 
ensure that the problems of a housing shortage, severe unemployment and limited 
assimilation, which had occurred upon the arrival of the Russian Jews at the turn of the 
century, did not re-occur.2 In their support of the government determination to adhere to 
the immigration laws, the Jewish leaders, fearing  the growth of anti-Semitism which had 
become more visible during the Thirties, wished to demonstrate their loyalty to the 
country.3  
This acceptance of the refugee policy pursued by the government placed a 
considerable strain on their efforts to provide assistance to the refugees and much of 
their efforts during the early years of the war were focused on the creation of various 
strategies to dismiss the accusations of profiteering and domination of the black market 
by the Jews.4 This approach  gradually splintered the initial unity of the  various Jewish 
organisations as the community broke down into factions with differing objectives in 
                                                          
Cmd.172 1919, Aliens Draft of an Order in Council to Regulate the Admission of Aliens., pp.299-308 
House of Commons, Expiring Laws Continuance 20th October 1920 (London: H.M.S.O.,1920) pp.643-649 
Vaughan Bevan, The Development of British Immigration Law., pp.72-75 
House of Commons, Aliens restriction 5th April 1914 (London: H.M.S.O. 1914), Pp.,121-123 
2 Bernard Gainer, The Alien Invasion. The Origins Of The Aliens Act 1905 (London:heinemannEducational 
Books,1972) 
3Geoffrey Alderman, Modern British Jewry  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.274,278   
4 Todd M. Endelman, The Jews of Britain 1656 to 2000 (Berkeley and Los Angeles California: University of 
California Press, 2002), pp.211-213,225 
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respect of the resolution of the refugees crisis, thus weakening the overall influence of 
the Jewish community on government policy.5  
In contrast to this disunity, the campaigners maintained a strong united front in 
their demands that the government should provide assistance to the Jews trapped in 
both occupied Europe and the neutral countries of Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and 
Sweden. The unity of the church leaders, which in many ways was far more influential 
than the Anglo-Jewish leadership, was demonstrated publicly in a variety of ways. They 
lobbied the government on behalf of the Jews in letters to the press and to members of 
the government, in meetings with various government ministers and in statements, 
questions and active participation in debates in the House of Lords on behalf of the 
various organisations working to provide aid to the European Jews. 
The general population was, to an extent, influenced by the perception of the 
Jews as a separate group who did not conform to the mores of society.6 They were 
accused by a number of right-wing groups and organisations, of controlling the press, 
the financial markets and exerting a considerable influence on government policy.7 
Lesser charges included the accusations that they were loud, demanding, overbearing8 
and after war was declared, cowardly, profiteers and controlling the black market.9 The 
government, well aware of these attitudes towards the Jewish refugees, through the 
weekly reports produced by the Ministry of Information, was determined to avoid any 
action which might lead to an increase in the underlying anti-Semitism, which they were 
convinced, existed throughout the country.10  
 This fear was reflected in various government decisions relating to the 
European Jews under Nazi domination.  Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, publicly 
acknowledged the policy of Jewish extermination being implemented in occupied 
Europe by the Nazi regime, although this was not mirrored in various War Cabinet 
meetings during 1943.  The Eden speech to the Commons on December 17th 1942, 
                                                          
5 Meier Sompolinsky, The British Government and the Holocaust. The Failure of Anglo-Jewish Leadership 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press,1999),pp.56;65-70 
6 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.,1994), p.34 
7 Colin Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939 (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1979), 
pp.141-149 
8 Gisela C. Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918-1939 (London: The MacMillan Press 
Ltd.,1978), p.147 
9 Sonya O. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.94-104;Todd M. Endelman, The Jews of Britain., pp., 224,225 
10 INFI/292 Ministry of Home Information reports. 
FO371/32681, A.W.G. Randall Foreign Office Minutes of Meetings 8/9/42,221/9/42, p.1 
PCR/HC/LB1/122, Mary Sibthorp, Secretary of the friends Alien Protection Committee memorandum (from 
memory) 28/10/42, pp3-4 
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which became known as the UN Declaration, not only condemned the Nazi policies, but 
also stated that the perpetrators would be punished as war criminals.11 In contrast to 
this public declaration in January 1943, it was agreed that the Committee for the 
Reception and Accommodation of Jewish Refugees, created in December 1942 to 
consider the possibilities of providing facilities and aid which could be offered to Jewish 
refugees who were able to escape from the Nazis through either Portugal or Bulgaria, 
should broaden its remit to encompass all refugees. The reference to Jews was omitted 
from its title and it was agreed: 
“That no differentiation should be made between Jewish   
   and non-Jewish refugees, and that the refugee problem  
   should be dealt with as a whole.”12  
 
This decision to create an inclusive approach to the refugee problem was to have a 
major influence on all future policy decisions involving the Jewish refugees.  It was now 
official government policy to classify Jews as nationals of their country of birth rather 
than as a separate nationality, thus eliminating any reason for preferential treatment or 
assistance, thereby discrediting any suggestion that the war was being fought on behalf 
of the Jews. 
 In order to analyse these observations, there are a number of questions, which 
need to be considered. Why was there an element of anti-Semitic views in the 
government and civil service?  Was anti-Semitism used as a political expedient to 
support the official government policy of rigidly controlling immigration legislation? Were 
the government policies towards the refugees influenced in any way by the various 
campaigners during this period? Why was the government adamant that there should be 
no differentiation between the plight of the European Jews and the rest of Europe under 
Nazi domination? Why was the response of the Anglo-Jewish community influenced by 
the need to provide support for the refugees? What were the aims of the various 
campaigners? Was their primary aim focused on rescuing the Jews or was it based on 
providing assistance for Jewish refugees resident in neutral countries? How far were 
their overall aims united and how practical were they? The purpose of the introduction is 
to provide the historical context in order to consider the answers to these questions. 
 
                                                          
11 HC Deb, United Nations Declaration, 17 December 1942, vol 385 cc2082-7, pp.1-3 
12 CAB/65/28/42, War Cabinet Meeting Conclusions, December 23rd,1942., p.246 
CAB/66/13/13Committee On The Reception And Accommodation Of Refugees, Memorandum by the 
Secretary OF State for Foreign Affairs. January 9th.1943., p.73 
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Differing historical perspectives 
The government reaction to the Jewish refugees from 1933-1945 
 The historiography of the period has examined various aspects of the Jewish refugee 
problem, from the initial arrival of the German Jewish refugees in 1933 through to the 
creation of Israel in 1948. The first comprehensive survey of the period from 1933-1939 
was produced by A.J.Sherman in 1973 in a detailed analysis of the newly released 
government documents appertaining to the period. In his examination of these records, 
Sherman traced the reaction of different government departments and the leaders of the 
Anglo-Jewish community to the growing problem created by the arrival of the German-
Jewish refugees. He concluded that the overall policy of the government was 
predominantly compassionate in its acceptance of the refugees. 13 This survey by 
Sherman was followed by a series of detailed studies into various aspects of the period, 
notably by Amy Zahl Gottlieb, Louise London, Bernard Wasserstein, Tony Kushner, 
Pamela Shatzkes, Geoffrey Alderman, Richard Bolchover, Meier Sompolinsky and 
Harry Defries.14 These historians have produced valuable studies which offer a range of 
insights into the formulation of government policy, the response of the Anglo-Jewish 
leadership and the significance of Palestine in respect of the British reaction to the 
refugees. The predominant themes in their studies have centred on the extent of anti-
Semitism in British society and related issues, as to whether British policy towards the 
refugees should be seen as overly restrictive or essentially generous in its response to 
the growing refugee problem. 
 In his detailed study of the Jewish refugees between 1933-1939, Sherman 
traces the reactions of both the Anglo-Jewish leadership and the response of the 
government towards the arrival of the refugees with a strong focus on the Evian 
Conference and the proposed settlement schemes in Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and 
                                                          
13 A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge Britain  and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-1939 (London: Frank Cass 
& 1194)Co.Ltd.) 
14 Geoffrey Alderman, Modern British Jewry (Oxford: Clarendon Pree,1198);Amy Zahl Gottlieb, Men of 
Vision Anglo-Jewry’s Aid to Victims of the Nazi Regime 1933-1945 (London; Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
1998) 
 Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948. British Immigration policy, Jewish refugees and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of 
Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p.2;Tony Kushner, The Persistence of Prejudice. Anti-
Semitism in British Society during the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1989);Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination;Pamela Shatzkes, Holocaust and Rescue. 
Impotent or Indifferent? Anglo-Jewry 1938-1945 (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2004);Richard Bolchover, 
British Jewry and the Holocaust (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2003);Meier 
Sompolinsky, The British Government and the Holocaust;Harry Defries, Conservative Party Attitudes to 
Jews 1900-1950 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) 
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British Guiana.15In her detailed analysis of government documentation between 1933-
1948, Louise London examines all facets of government policy and attitudes towards the 
arrival of the Jewish refugees. She emphasises that, without the financial assistance 
from the Anglo-Jewish community, very few refugees would have been granted 
permission to enter the country.16 She notes the underlying anti-Semitism which exerted 
varying degrees of influence in some areas of the government and the civil service, 
particularly in the Colonial and the Dominions Offices. 17 She maintains that, since the 
officials advising the government, did not view the rescue of the European Jews from 
Nazi-occupied Europe as a British problem, a policy of inaction was advocated.18 In her 
overall assessment of the period, she argues that government policy, whilst attempting 
to maintain a façade of humanitarianism towards the refugees, was dominated by 
opportunism, self-interest and a total determination to maintain control of immigration. 19  
 In a totally different approach, Bernard Wasserstein examines the attitude of the 
government towards the Jews from the perspective of settlement in Palestine. He 
suggests that the initial reason for promoting the possibility of large-scale settlement in 
Palestine during the First World War, was based on the belief it this would influence 
Jewish opinion in Russia and America, thus ensuring support from both countries at a 
crucial point during the war.20 He notes that this perception changed dramatically during 
the Thirties and by 1939, the attitudes and policies towards the Jews were dominated by 
the politics of the Palestine Mandate and the appeasement of the Arabs. He considers 
the refusal of the government to regard the Jews as a separate entity.21He analyses the 
government response to the various proposals that entry into the Mandate should be 
eased during the war years and he argues that the immigration policy relating to 
Palestine was a vital pillar towards maintaining British power in the Middle East. 22In his 
conclusion, Wasserstein suggests that it was a lack of imagination which influenced the 
response of government officials, who were unable to comprehend the enormity of the 
Nazi scheme for the destruction of European Jewry.23 
In his analysis Tony Kushner argues that the government did not fully appreciate 
the reasons that drove the German Jews to flee Nazi Germany, since, although Nazi 
anti-Semitism in Germany was blatant, in a liberal democracy‘…cultural and ideological 
                                                          
15  Sherman, Island Refuge .,pp.259-264 
16  London, Whitehall And The Jews p.25 
17 Ibid.pp.38,43,44,45,59,102 
18 Ibid., pp.206,207  
19Ibid., pp.,14,15, 273,274,281  
20  Wasserstein. Britain and the Jews., p.2 
21 Ibid., pp.352,352 
22 Ibid., p.352 
23 Ibid.pp.356,357 
 
 
7 
 
factors acted as a barrier to the full assimilation of the available evidence.’24 
Furthermore, the political agenda was dominated by national and international problems 
which were compounded by the domestic difficulties of the period.  He expands this 
theory by highlighting the attitude of government towards the Jews after Kristallnacht, 
when the entry of Jewish refugees into the country was eased, but, as he states, those 
granted entry were expected to assimilate into society, rather than maintain their 
individuality as a minority group. 25 He examines the reaction of government officials to 
the mounting evidence of the anti-Jewish policies being pursued by the Nazis and their 
reluctance to accept the concept of planned Jewish mass extermination and he agrees 
with Wasserstein it was a lack of imagination that influenced their response to the 
events in Europe.26 He considers the need, in the eyes of the government, to promote a 
face  of compassion and liberalism and suggests that this stance was necessary in 
order to impress America with the morality of its fight against Nazism.27 He concludes by 
suggesting that the insular policies pursued by the government came under pressure 
due to the prevailing influence of the liberal ethos in society, but, in reality, the 
assistance offered was directed at a very narrow proportion of the European Jews who 
were viewed as being acceptable in British society.28 
In his analysis of the period, Harry Defries focuses on the Conservative Party 
attitude towards the Jews from 1900 -1950. He argues that, although some 
Conservatives viewed the Jews as foreigners, due to their belief in Englishness, this did 
not signify that Jews were subject to deliberate anti-Semitism. He suggests there were a 
variety of responses to the Jews and for many Conservatives, their ideas of Empire 
created a bond with the Jewish desire to have a national home.29 He implies that the 
view of the Jews as being a separate people in British society became more 
pronounced between 1900-1930, although he stresses that there were contradictory 
attitudes towards the Jews across the entire Party spectrum during this period.30 He 
notes that there was an inherent streak of anti-Semitism in some sections of the Party 
but very few members held extreme views of fascism.31 In his final remarks, he cites 
part of a letter sent by Austen Chamberlain to his sister, in which he describes Benjamin 
Disraeli as follows ‘though an English patriot he was not an Englishman’ and it may be 
                                                          
24  Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination., p.59 
25  Ibid., p.59 
26 Ibid., pp.136-137 
27 Ibid., p.146 
28 Ibid., p.60 
29  Defries, Conservative Party Attitude.,s p.7 
30 Ibid., pp10-11 
31 Ibid., p.204 
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argued that this one remark encapsulated the ambivalent attitude of the Conservative 
Party towards the Jews throughout the first half of the Twentieth century.32 
Perhaps the dominant themes in these accounts of the period is the 
determination of the government to maintain a rigid control of immigration, thus limiting 
the entry of the Jews, but at the same time displaying an aura of benevolence to both 
the British public and the world. However, little consideration is given to the reasons for 
the the creation of the immigration laws at the turn of the century. The major influx of 
Jews between 1880-1905  resulted in the creation  of the first immigration act, the 1905 
Aliens Act,33 which was  passed in a determined attempt to control the entry of  ‘Aliens’ 
Russian Jews into the country. The various immigration laws created between 1905 and 
1924 were directed primarily at one particular group of people - the Jews. The law of 
1914 was further restated in 1919 and amended in 1920.34 The later acts were aimed at 
restricting entry to the country as a refugee and the right to either political or religious 
asylum was not acknowledged. The new acts gave complete control to the Home Office 
in granting entry permits. In the case of the Jewish refugees, they were not granted 
permission to enter the country unless they could prove they had either guaranteed 
employment or visible means of support.35 The adherence to the immigration laws was 
employed by the government as a barrier against granting entry to a substantial number 
of Jewish refugees, unless they could demonstrate their usefulness to the  war effort. 
 
The divisions within the Jewish Community 
 
 In their detailed studies of the period, Geoffrey Alderman, Meier Sompolinsky and 
Richard Bolchover argue that from the Jewish perspective, the leaders of the Anglo-
Jewish community achieved very little. Alderman examines the attitudes of the British 
Jews towards the refugees and demonstrates the level of antipathy towards them as 
foreigners. He cites the actions of the Jewish Aid organisations in their determination to 
ensure that many of the refugees would not remain in London, since the German and 
Austrian Jews were viewed as aloof in their attitude towards immediate assimilation.36 
Bolchover concludes, that because of the growing divisions in the community caused by 
Zionism and various groups insisting that they represented the community, the 
                                                          
32 Ibid.,p.209 
33 The Secretary of State for the Home Department, The Administration of the Aliens Act,1905 (London: 
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leadership lacked unity. He suggests, as a result of their emancipation, the Jewish 
community subscribed to the prevailing liberalism in the country, thus maintaining that 
the only major difference between Jews and non-Jews was religion. The leaders feared 
an increase in anti-Semitism, which they ascribed to the behaviour of the Jews 
themselves. As a result of these ideas, they believed that non-Jews were better 
advocates on behalf of Jews than the Jews themselves.37 
 These arguments, are supported by Tony Kushner who subscribes to the same 
theory that the Anglo-Jewish leaders were determined adherents of the prevailing 
liberalism that dominated British society during this period. He maintains that the liberal 
ethos which underpinned society, was instrumental in ensuring that the government 
demonstrated a semblance of humanity towards the growing Jewish refugee crisis, all 
be it in a restricted manner, prior to the declaration of war in September 1939.38 He 
extends this view by suggesting that the liberal ideology of Britain was intertwined with 
an exclusionary policy formulated on the theory of Englishness, which created a fear 
that certain alien groups would be incapable of assimilating.39 He suggests that the 
emphasis placed on assimilation by the community was a result of the fear that they 
would be subject to further anti-Semitism.40  Meier Sompolinsky argues that the 
leadership of the Anglo-Jewish community failed to utilise the support of the Gentile 
protesters in Britain in order to alleviate the plight of the European Jews. He attributes 
this to the internal division within the community and the lack of leadership. He suggests 
that the leaders did not possess the necessary requirements to provide a powerful 
stimulus during a time of abnormal circumstances.41 
 In contrast to this, Pamela Shatzkes states that, prior to the war, the community 
achieved a considerable amount of success in difficult circumstances. This clearly 
demonstrated a large degree of self-confidence in the face of adversity.42She suggests 
that the main problem facing the community during the war was a lack of skill on the part 
of the leaders in negotiating with the government. In her assessment of Selig Brodetsky, 
the President of the Board of Deputies, she argues that, as an academic and a 
committed Zionist rather than as a businessman such as Neville Laski or Otto Schiff, he 
veered towards a more idealistic view of the problem and the solution. She argues that 
this approach ensured the government officials who came into contact with him, were 
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able to accept the different proposals of the leaders, secure in the knowledge that they 
could ignore them.43 Contrary to these perspectives, Amy Zahl Gottlieb traces the 
history of the Central British Fund for German Jewry (CBF) from its inception in March 
1933. She charts its liaison, through Otto Schiff, with various members of the 
government and his contacts with the Home Office. She emphasises that, at all times, it 
directed its efforts in providing both financial and practical assistance for the incoming 
refugees.44 She examines how its financial assistance influenced government policy 
towards accepting the entry of refugees prior to the war.45 It was instrumental in 
organising the successful Kindertransport after Kristallnacht, which rescued 10,000 
children.46 On the other hand, its offer to fund the rescue of children from Vichy France 
was doomed to failure.47She concludes that the contribution of the organisation was 
invaluable in aiding many refugees to settle in Britain and as she stresses, there was a 
section of the Jewish leadership able to build a working relationship with the government 
which would prove to be beneficial to both parties. 
It may be argued that the division of opinion in these accounts clearly illustrates 
the dichotomy within the Jewish community which would hamper their response to the 
growing refugee problem. However, much of the focus is on the divisions created by the 
Zionist movement, rather than the gradual weakening of the traditional leadership of the 
community, which may be considered to be a further contributory factor to the lack of 
communal unity. In essence, though the primary cause for the lack of an effective 
response to the plight of  European Jewry, was their continued acceptance of the 
government insistence that an increase in the number of Jewish refugees in the country  
could encourage the growth of anti-Semitism. 
The Campaigners 
The people who campaigned on behalf of the European Jews compromised a diverse 
group of individuals and organisations. The most prominent members of the former 
included Victor Gollancz, the left-wing book publisher, Eleanor Rathbone, Independent 
M.P. Combined English Universities and Victor Cazalet, Tory M.P. for Chippenham who 
was designated as the liaison officer between the British Government and General 
Sikorski. They were both founder members of the Parliamentary Committee for 
Refugees. The work of Eleanor Rathbone, on behalf of the Czech refugees after the 
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Munich Settlement in September 1938, 48 may be seen as a fore-runner to the creation 
of the Parliamentary Committee in January 1939.   It had been established with the 
initial aims of lobbying the government to provide financial assistance for the refugees 
coming from Europe; the setting up of temporary reception areas while schemes were 
organised to settle them, both in and outside the Empire and the acceleration of the 
process appertaining to the issue of visas particularly for seriously endangered 
refugees.49 Rathbone continued to campaign on behalf of the Czech refugees after the 
declaration of war,50 but as a result of the government policy of interning  all foreign 
refugees, her attention turned to the conditions which prevailed in the internment camps. 
Consequently, she campaigned strongly against the policy of these camps, which had 
been implemented in 1940 and she produced a series of reports for the committee 
outlining alternative measures for the treatment of the foreign refugees.51  As the news 
of the Nazi atrocities reached Britain, Eleanor Rathbone focused her campaigning on 
rescuing Jews in Europe.  
Another influential group composed of the religious leaders in Britain was the 
Council of Christians and Jews, which had slowly evolved through the work of various 
secular and non-secular bodies including a Youth Council on Christian-Jewish relations 
formed in 1934, an International Aid Committee founded in 1936 and affiliated to the 
Save the Children Fund,52 the Refugees Children’s Movement created after Kristallnacht 
in 1938 and the Christian Council for Refugees.53 The Council was founded in March 
1942 under the leadership of William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, together 
with the main religious leaders including Cardinal Hinsley, Dr.Hertz, the Chief Rabbi and 
the Moderators of the Church of Scotland and Free Church Federal Council.  
The campaigners’ response to the government argument that the arrival of 
Jewish refugees could act as a stimulus to the latent anti-Semitism in certain areas of 
society, was, to a degree, somewhat ambivalent. Whilst they were prepared to 
acknowledge there was a degree of it, they argued that, if the focus of rescue were 
directed towards Jewish children, the public would provide support for their efforts. They 
further maintained that anti-Semitism could be combated through  propaganda and 
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education, thus dispelling the government fears that an increase in the arrival of Jewish 
refugees would encourage anti-Semitism. 
 
The public perception of Jewish refugees 
The public perception of both the indigenous Jews and the refugees is examined by 
Sonya O. Rose in her analysis of the numerous accusations levelled against the Jews 
during the war and she concludes that they were viewed as a threat to the morale of the 
community. She argues that the belief they were totally selfish and self-aggrandizing, 
supported the idea that the Jews would always be Jews and would never be acceptable 
to the heroic nation fighting a major war.54 In his examination of anti-Semitism, Geoffrey 
Field argues that anti-Semitism in Britain was mainly a social phenomenon rather than a 
political movement, with an emphasis on the foreign appearance of the Jews and their 
seeming alien way of life.55 This argument is supported by Brian Cheyette who argues 
that the popular perception of Jews was and can be influenced by the individual bias of 
authors which he suggests emanated from the depiction of Jews by Matthew Arnold  in 
Culture and Anarchy and was still apparent in literature of the post-First World War  
period.56 George Orwell suggests that many ordinary people viewed the war as “a 
Jewish War,” since they were convinced that the Jews would benefit from an Allied 
victory. He states that little mention was made of the Jewish war effort, thus reinforcing 
the common view the Jews were evading military service; the accusations of black-
marketing, overcharging and favouritism were inevitable, since Jewish traders tended to 
trade in food, tobacco, clothing and furniture, all of which were strictly rationed; the final 
common accusation was that Jews were cowards during the air raids.57 
In examining the causes of anti-Semitism during this period, the primary reasons 
are based on the common perceptions of Jews deriving a benefit from the 
circumstances prevailing; however, little mention is made of the similar response which 
occurred during World War One when the newly-arrived Russian Jews faced identical 
accusations.58 It may, therefore, be argued that the accusations levelled against the 
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Jews during the Forties bear a striking resemblance to the accusations levelled against 
them during World War One.  
The major considerations arising from the analysis of the period is how far the 
responses of the government, the public and the Anglo-Jewish leadership were 
influenced by the anti-Semitism which had been apparent in both 1905 and 1917. May 
their response to the influx of Jewish refugees from 1933 onwards be viewed as a 
pattern of reaction emanating from the public outcry of 1905? Did the perception that the 
Jews were outsiders and who did not fully assimilate, influence their decisions? In order 
to answer  these questions which form the basis of this study, a primary requisite is to 
define what anti-Semitism is.  
 The rise of Anti-Semitism in Western Europe during the Nineteenth 
Century 
The official definition of anti-Semitism is given as ‘a hatred of Semites especially 
Jews.’59 It may be argued that the pamphlet published by Wilhelm Marr in 1879, The 
Victory of Judaism over Germanism, created the modern template of anti-Semitism with 
its virulent hatred of the Jews.  In his definition of anti-Semitism, Marr focused on the 
alleged differences in the racial characteristics of the Jews rather than the traditional 
religious differences. He emphasised this difference with his creation of the new term 
antisemite in place of Judenhass, which implied religious connotations.  The main points 
of his pamphlet stated that the Jews were dominating Germany. He argued that they 
were a displaced people who refused to assimilate into society and he insisted that they 
were determined to become a world power by any means available to them. The use of 
the word ‘antisemitism’ in the widespread and predominantly secular anti-Jewish 
political campaign across Europe towards the end of the Nineteenth century, resulted in 
the Jews being termed as Semites, thus stressing the alleged racial differences rather 
than the religious ones. 60  
Various historians have considered the reasons for the exacerbation of anti-
Semitism from the Nineteenth century to the present day. James Parkes argues that the 
growth and employment of political antisemitism towards the end of the Nineteenth 
century provided a useful tool for the reactionary groups in Europe who opposed 
‘Liberalism’, ‘Secularism,’ ‘Industrialism’ and any other aspects of modern society which 
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they objected to, since the electorate could be easily influenced by citing the Jews as 
the cause of all the problems resulting from the rapid modernisation of Europe.61 In his 
analysis of Germany and Austria during this period, he cites the use of political 
antisemitism by Bismarck in Germany and the President of the Council in Austria-
Hungary, to discredit the progressive movement in order to maintain the support of the 
conservatives and the Roman Catholic Centre Party, thus ensuring that the power of the 
Monarchy did not pass to the Parliament. 62 
In his examination of the period, Zygmunt Bauman defines anti-Semitism as 
standing for the resentment of Jews. ‘It refers to the conception of the Jews as an 
hostile and undesirable group, and to the practices that derive from and support, such a 
conception’;63 he considers the  various factors which may be viewed as major 
contributions towards the transformation of anti-Semitism from religious to secular. He 
suggests that because the Jews were viewed as supporters of capitalism, industry and 
modernity, they were considered to be actively destroying the individual craftsman and 
undermining the influence of the nobility.64 He argues that the liberal theory of 
assimilation collapsed due to ‘the essential incompatibility between nationalism and free 
choice.’65 He maintains that, with the disappearance of segregation, the Jews were no 
longer a separate visible group and it was feared that they would assimilate and become 
both socially and culturally indistinguishable from mainstream society. Thus, new 
boundaries were required which still provided a clear definition of Jew and non-Jew, 
ultimately creating a new form of anti-Semitism based on racism.66These arguments are 
supported by Hannah Arendt who observed that ‘Jews had been able to escape from 
Judaism into conversion: from Jewishness there is no escape.’67  
In his analysis of the causes and ideas which ultimately produced The Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion, Norman Cohn supports the arguments of Baumann. He suggests 
that the roots of modern political anti-Semitism may be traced to the emancipation of the 
Jews by Napoleon Bonaparte. This resulted in the Jews embracing all aspects of 
modernity during the Nineteenth century, which was a period of rapid and exceptional 
change; this created the basis for a bourgeoisie focused on creating wealth and 
                                                          
61 James Parkes, Antisemitism (London: Vallentine Mitchell & Co.Ltd., 1963), pp22,23,24 
62 Ibid., pp.26,29,30,33 
63 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 2000),p.34 
64Ibid., p.47  
65 Ibid., p.55 
66 Ibid.,pp.58,59,60 
67 Hannah Arendt, Antisemitism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968,), p.87 
 
 
15 
 
increasing its rights.68  A main beneficiary of these changes was the Jews. In a 
changing society, as they obtained their freedom from the ghettos, they came to 
represent every facet of modernity – journalism, industry, commerce and politics, all of 
which were detested by the conservative elements in society. As a consequence, the 
ultra-conservative groups portrayed the Jews as a threat to the stability and long-held 
traditions of life, thus creating a new political form of anti-Semitism.69  
 Walter Laqueur considers the effects of emancipation and assimilation by the 
Jews as they moved away from the ghetto into the mainstream of modern society. He 
argues that this movement away from their traditional occupation of finance into the 
professions, which had originally been barred to them, gave rise to the accusation that 
they aspired to world domination through money and politics. He points out that Jewish 
support was given to the predominantly liberal and left-wing parties for two reasons: the 
right or the confessional-religious parties did not want them as members and many 
Jews were strong supporters of human freedom, progress and internationalism. He 
examines the accusation that the alleged Jewish participation in finance was based on 
the exploitation of non-Jewish labour and financial speculation, although, as he argues, 
Jews were successful due to their ability to adapt to changing circumstances.  He 
suggests that this was a legacy of their precarious situation when they had been 
confined to the ghetto with minimal security. He maintains that the general belief that the 
Jews would achieve power through their possession of great riches, was influenced by 
the perceived power and visible wealth of the Rothschild family which dominated 
European banking and finance.70 The citing of the Rothschilds to demonstrate the desire 
of the Jews to achieve world domination is supported by Hannah Arendt as she 
considers the growth of the Nation-State in Europe and the financial power that this one 
family wielded in co-operation with England, France and Austria.71  
 Albert S. Lindemann argues that the conspicuousness of Jewish activity in the 
stock market, the financing of railways, journalism and the retail trade, together with 
their strong participation in the public professions, were further contributory factors 
towards the rise of modern anti-Semitism. He extends this argument by suggesting that 
the liberalism  of the period was seriously undermined by the European economic 
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depression which occurred between the mid 1870’s and the early 1890’s and was a 
further stimulus towards the rise of the nascent growth of anti-Semitism.72 
Barnett Litvinoff supports this argument in his analysis of the same period in 
France citing as an example, the reaction to the collapse of the Catholic bank Union 
Generale which was blamed on the Rothschilds. The demise of the bank brought 
financial ruin to 40,000 small investors and it created a receptive audience to La France 
Juive which was published by Edouard Drumont in 1886.73 He maintains that this 
publication may be viewed as a major force behind the growing anti-Semitism of the 
period in France, which culminated in the Dreyfus case in 1894. 74 Livitnoff maintains 
that race could be employed as a political tool in times of difficulty and he suggests that, 
since a proportion of the population still viewed the Jew as being an ‘outsider’ in 
Christian society, they presented the ideal image to be designated as a scapegoat.75 In 
accepting this viewpoint, it may be argued that throughout history, the Jew had always 
been used as a scapegoat, although prior to the emancipation of Jewry and the growth 
of industrialisation, the role of scapegoat had been driven by religion.76 
 
 The historiography of British Anti-Semitism 
 
In contrast to the political anti-Semitism prevalent in Europe during the Nineteenth and 
the early 20th Centuries, British anti-Semitism tended to manifest itself in the social 
mores of the country through exclusion, quotas and the class system.  The passing of 
the 1905 Aliens Act which had been driven by demands from the right-wing elements of 
the Conservative Party, had been supported by  mounting social protest, fuelled by a 
shortage of housing and unemployment rather than as a particular political policy. The 
only political movement of any real impact associated with anti-Semitism, was the British 
Union of Fascists, founded in 1932,77 which followed in the wake of various extreme 
right-wing groups established during the Twenties. The original groups had all 
demonstrated a distinct attitude of anti-Semitism towards the Jews78 and, as Mosely lost 
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his initial support, he moved towards an anti-Semitic stance to retain and increase the 
membership of his movement.79  
In examining the historiography of British anti-Semitism, it is important to note 
that since the early 1970s, there have been a variety of publications analysing its 
numerous aspects from 1876 onwards.  In 1979, Colin Holmes broke new ground with 
his detailed history and analysis of British anti-Semitism from 1876-1939.80 Bernard 
Gainer analyses the causes and effect of the arrival of the Russian Jews at the end of 
the Nineteenth century on the general population in the East End of London. He traces 
the roots of the anti-Alien movement, its growth and its goals through to the passing of 
the 1905 Aliens Act.81 In similar fashion, John A. Garrard examines the same period 
with the emphasis on the political aspects of the anti-Alien movement.82 On the other 
hand, Bryan Cheyette discusses the influence of anti-Semitism through the portrayal of 
‘the Jew’ in literature by various authors from 1875 to 1945,83 whilst Alyson Pendlebury 
examines the alleged influence of anarchy and the Russian Revolution on the public 
perception of the East London Jews.84In her analysis of anti-Semitism, Gisela C. 
Lebzelter examines the political anti-Semitism that was prevalent between 1918-1939 
with a detailed assessment of the right-wing groups who were active during the 
Twenties and the Thirties.85 I.Rennap considers the rise of anti-Semitism from a 
Communist perspective.86 Gavin Schaffer examines the reactions of the country from 
the perspective of racial science,87 whilst Tony Kushner analyses the anti-Semitic 
attitudes prevalent in society between 1939-1945.88 
It may be argued that, before the arrival of the Eastern European Jews from 
1880 onwards, the Jewish community, which had mainly originated from Germany and 
Holland, was comparatively small (approximately 35,000 in total). The predominantly 
middle class Jews involved in trade, banking and the professions, maintained an 
unobtrusive presence, thereby avoiding the common accusation of being outsiders in 
society.89 In his detailed analysis of anti-Semitism between 1876 and1939, Colin 
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Holmes argue that, whilst the emancipation of Jewry in 1858 clearly displayed the 
magnanimity of liberal toleration, thus demonstrating it is was not acceptable for a 
civilised society to practice religious discrimination towards either individuals or groups, 
it also reflected the idea that Jewish emancipation would encourage them to discard 
their separateness and start to assimilate into British society. He further argues that the 
perception of Jewish business interests being focused on finance and material wealth 
together with the view that the Jew was an outsider, would prove to be a significant 
cause of the growing anti-Semitism after the arrival of the Eastern European Jews.90  
The perception that Jews were different and by this very difference outside the 
parameters of normal society, is examined by Bryan Cheyette in his analysis of the 
writings of various writers in both the Nineteenth and the Twentieth Centuries. In his 
analysis of Mathew Arnold and Anthony Trollope, he focuses on the belief of both 
authors, that whilst the Jews belonged in society as a result of the contemporary liberal 
attitudes, they were  still considered as being different, ‘the other,’ which effectively 
excluded them from normal society.91 He points out that, although Arnold considered the 
Jews to be an unattractive people ‘this petty, unsuccessful, unamiable people without 
politics, without science, without art, without charm deserve their great place in the 
world’s regard,’92  he believed that wealthy assimilated Jews would subscribe to the best 
of English culture, thus emphasising that they were only acceptable when they did 
assimilate.93 In his examination of Trollope, Cheyette  focuses on the consistent use of 
racial typology to describe his Jewish characters in order to stress their difference, 
thereby perpetuating the idea of ‘the other.’ In this way, he was able to establish that 
Jews would know their place within a superior England.94 Whilst accepting these 
arguments in relation to the two authors discussed here, in his overall analysis of ‘the 
Jew’ in English literature, Cheyette argues that different authors presented ‘the Jew’ as 
belonging to and being excluded from society, dependent on the thrust of the writing. He 
maintains, since Jews were represented in a variety of guises (in English literature) such 
as: ‘ Eastern, Oriental, modern medieval, degenerate, assimilated, heretical and 
vengeful,’ there was and still is, a number of interpretations of antisemitism rather than a 
single antisemitism.95 
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In contrast to this, Anthony Julius cites the use of the Jew in literature from the 
Medieval period onwards as an outsider associated with evilness and money-lending, 
citing Chaucer The Prioress’s Tale, Shakespeare The Merchant of Venice and Dickens 
Oliver Twist.  He argues that the use of the Jew as a sinister figure in literature places 
him firmly outside acceptable society.96This premise is supported by Endelman in his 
assessment of the depiction of Jews in literature during the Twenties and the Thirties, 
when it was acceptable to present them as offensive, untrustworthy and, in general, 
involved in nefarious activities.97 
In his assessment of the historical context relating to the period 1880-1910, John 
A. Garrard maintains the Anglo-Jew was generally only recognisable through his religion 
since, in all other respects, he was able to assimilate by mastering the English language 
and adopting the dress of the country. He does, however, concur with the latter part of 
Holmes’ argument based on the visible wealth of the Jews, when he discusses the 
observations made by H.G.F.Modder relating to the Anglo-Jewry elite and suggests that 
the public awareness of their wealth and power created a focal point for the type of anti-
Semitism  prevalent in Europe during this period.98 
The major social problems of the period , high unemployment and lack of 
housing due to the industrialisation of the East End, were were exacerbated by the influx 
of the Eastern European Jews after 1880, are examined by Bernard Gainer, who 
analyses the various problems that arose through lack of housing, severe 
unemployment, a difference of language and customs between the indigenous 
population and the newly arrived immigrants.99 He argues that these factors were the 
driving force behind the anti-Alien movement which, under the initial leadership of the 
founder of the British Brothers League, William Stanley Shaw and the later guidance of 
William Eden Evans-Gordon, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Stepney, 100 
evolved into the formation of the Immigration Reform Association in February 1903 in 
order to increase the pressure on the government to halt the flow of Aliens entering the 
country.101 It may be argued that the establishment of the early anti-Alien campaign 
groups laid the foundations for the various extreme right-wing factions, which flourished 
during the Twenties and the Thirties, culminating in the foundation of the British Union of 
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Fascists in 1932, as discussed by Colin Holmes.102  In his examination of the growth of 
the anti-Alien movement, John Garrard  points out, in reality, its supporters were 
campaigning against the arrival of the Russian Jews, but since it was regarded  as 
unacceptable to be seen as a supporter of anti-Semitism, the euphemism of ‘Alien’ was 
used as a substitute for Jew.103 
 A further major factor behind the drive for controlled entry of the aliens was 
based on the fashionable theories of Social Darwinism prevailing in society at the time. 
These theories supported a growing fear that inter-relationships between the British and 
the aliens, of whom the latter were viewed as racially degenerate, would weaken the 
nation considerably. This aspect of the anti-Alien movement is examined by both 
Bernard Gainer and Colin Holmes.104 The latter states that great emphasis was placed 
on the presence of Jewish immigrants who were viewed as presenting a major hazard to 
the health, morals and physical capabilities of the nation. He analyses the  accusations 
made by known anti-Semites including Joseph Banister, Robert Sherard and John 
Foster Fraser and points out that every known disease was attributed to the immigrant 
Jews, as well as physical degeneracy.105 The irony of these accusations was one of the 
main complaints against the Jews was that, because they refused to marry non-Jews, 
they were not willing to assimilate into society. It may be counter-argued that, because 
of this stance, there was less chance of the Jews weakening the Gentile population. The 
first immigration act, which was created to control the influx of the Russian Jews, was 
passed in Parliament in 1905 and implemented in 1906.106  
In his detailed examination of attitudes towards the Jews between 1876 and 
1939, Colin Holmes discusses the various aspects and reactions of how society related 
to the Jews.  He considers the response of the Establishment to the success of the 
Jews in business and focuses on the stereotypes that were portrayed in the press 
depicting them as totally dominated by the desire to increase their material wealth.107 He 
notes that the alleged liberal toleration of the period did not always apply and 
discrimination occurred, not only in the immigrant areas but also in the academic world, 
citing the example of Lewis Namier being denied a Fellowship at All Souls in 1911, due 
                                                          
102 Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939., ,pp.,203-219 
103 Garrard, The English And Immigration., pp.,62-65 
104Ibid., Pp.18,19; Gainer, The Alien Invasion.,pp. 113-114 
105Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939., pp.,36-38 
106 The Secretary of State for the Home Department, The Administration of the Aliens Act,1905 (London: 
H.M.S.O.,1906) 
107 Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939., p.114 
 
 
21 
 
to his Jewish origin.108He focuses on the accusations levelled against the wealthy 
Anglo-Jews, that they used their power and wealth to manipulate society for their own 
ends.109He maintains two particular images were applied to certain Jews. The first 
image depicted them as aliens, immigrants from Eastern Europe who were outside the 
norms of acceptable society and incapable of assimilating. The second image depicted 
them as latter-day Shylocks, financiers, rich Jews and international Jews intent on 
increasing their wealth at any price. He concludes with the observation the term ‘Jew’ 
was used as a suggestion of infamy to depict a money lender or a person intent on 
deriving maximum  profit from any situation and it was also synonymous with the 
concept of cheating an individual financially.110It is worth noting that the use of the term 
‘to Jew someone’ is now viewed as archaic phraseology and totally unacceptable in 
contemporary society. 
Holmes examines the anti-Semitism that arose during World War One and 
focuses on the accusations levelled against the wealthy Jews of German extraction, that 
they were disloyal.111 He considers the accusations and attacks made against the young 
Russian Jews, many of whom had retained their Russian citizenship, that they were 
cowards and by refusing to enlist, were able to increase their prosperity at the expense 
of the Christians who were fighting.112 He concludes that the outbreak of anti-Semitism 
during the war was not an isolated occurrence, since the imputations of disloyalty 
levelled against the wealthy Jews were driven by the perception of their wealth and 
alleged influence in the higher echelons of society. In direct contrast, the main 
demonstrations against the Russian Jews took place in the East End of London and 
Leeds,where there were large Jewish immigrant communities and they were viewed as 
disloyal by refusing to fight. 113 
In his conclusion, Holmes argues that there is no evidence to suggest official 
government support of anti-Semitism, but he does indicate that there were various 
strands of anti-Semitism between 1876-1939. He cites the discrimination against the 
Jews in both the East End and the academic world of Oxford together with a strong 
racist content prior to 1919. He state an important factor to consider is the pressures in 
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society, particularly in times of economic crisis and social distress and that these 
influences are a recurring pattern which cannot be ignored.114 
On the other hand, Alyson Pendlebury discusses the influence of Anarchist 
thinking on the East London Jews and the general belief that all Jews were Anarchists 
prior to the war. She suggests that this image changed during the war to become the 
‘pro-German Jew’.115 She discusses the government fear that Bolshevism would be 
strongly supported by the young radical Jewish immigrants and she argues that such 
fear was a determining factor behind the government support for Zionism, since it was 
believed this would deter Jewish support for the Russian Revolution.116Lindemann 
observes that various members of the Establishment, including Winston Churchill, 
Hilaire Belloc and G.K.Chesterton, maintained that the leadership of the Bolshevik 
revolution included many Jews and they suggested this, combined with the alleged 
support of the British Jews, was exacerbating anti-Semitism in the country.117  
In charting the growth of political anti-Semitism, Gisela C.Lebzelter analyses the 
period from 1918 – 1939.118 She examines the various myths that implied the Jews were 
intent on both the destruction of the British Empire and world domination, through a 
network of conspiracy. She cites the strong belief that International Jewry was intent on 
world domination as written in The Protocols of Zion, even after it was proved to be a 
forgery. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the lasting influence that it had on the extreme 
right-wing thinking, prevalent in the country during this period.119 This argument is 
supported by John Fox who suggests that belief in the publication was boosted by the 
perception that the Jews were linked to the Bolsheviks and the Russian Revolution.120 In 
his support of these arguments, Holmes emphasises the major influence that 
Bolshevism had on the belief that Jews were both alien and a threat to the established 
order of the day. He further maintains that the appointment of Jews to positions of power 
in both Government and the Establishment, reinforced the Jewish conspiracy theory of 
‘The Protocols.’121 
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 Lebzelter analyses in depth the theories of the various extreme right-wing 
groups which flourished during the Twenties and the Thirties, including The Britons, the 
Imperialist Fascist League and the British Union of Fascists. She focuses on the 
conviction of The Britons, that both the government and the press were controlled by 
International Jewry. She emphasises that a main plank of their propaganda was anti-
Semitism and their conviction that the solution to the problem, was to ensure all Jews 
settled in either Palestine or possibly Madagascar.122In similar fashion, the Imperial 
Fascist League placed all blame on the Jews for any aspect of modern life that they did 
not approve of and she suggests this stance was effectively applied to anything which 
they considered to be evil or deceitful.123  
In her examination of the BUF, she notes, initially, it was viewed as being 
detrimental to pursue anti-Semitic content in its agenda, but although Jew-baiting was 
forbidden, the organisation placed great emphasis on the threat of the ‘alien menace’. It 
argued that, due to the massive unemployment of the time, all foreigners should be 
compelled to leave the country, with the exception of those who had fought during the 
war.124 She examines the change in their policy towards the end of 1933, when the 
movement alleged that the Jews were using their influence to benefit themselves 
through their domination of international finance, the press and the politicians.125 She 
states that, once this policy was established, it became progressively more abusive 
towards the Jews, eventually culminating in violence. She argues, although, overall, the 
movement failed in its objectives, it did succeed in stigmatising the Jewish community 
and strengthening the general dislike of Jews in the East End.126 
 In her concluding remarks, Lebzelter argues that, in order to assess the impact 
of organised political anti-Semitism between the two World Wars, it must be noted that 
anti-Jewish prejudice was part of the cultural tradition, which included social 
discrimination and the use of crude stereotypes of Jews.  She maintains these 
underlying anti-Jewish attitudes were more apparent during times of crisis and she cites 
the period after the war when a fear of the ‘Jewish peril,’ as a result of the Russian 
revolution, combined with the belief there was an international Jewish conspiracy to 
control the world. She further argues that, although the rise and fall of anti-Semitism 
appeared to be influenced by the prevailing economic cycles of the day, the actual 
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impetus may be traced to a lack of prosperity and stability. She pursues this argument 
with the observation that anti-Semitism is stimulated by a combination of socio-
economic conditions, thus creating a receptive audience to specific propaganda and this 
effectively diverts their attention from genuine deprivation to a mythical enemy.127 
In 1942, I. Rennap published the definitive Communist analysis of anti-Semitism. 
He maintained that, since the Jewish population in Britain was comparatively small, 
approximately 350,000, anti-Semitism was less widespread pro-rata than in other 
countries. He did, however, stress the arrival of the Russian Jews at the turn of the 
century had created a backlash due to the perception that they created unemployment, 
they never worked in heavy industry and they obtained their wealth at the expense of 
the Gentile.128He argued that, as unemployment increased in the early Thirties, support 
for the newly formed BUF started to grow. He conceded that, initially, anti-Semitism did 
not form any part of the BUF ethos, but notes that this stance was to change rapidly. 
The BUF adopted an anti-Semitic attitude and labelled the Jews as international 
financiers who controlled big business and the banks. In the East End of London, the 
Jews were accused of creating unemployment and driving small businessmen out of 
existence.129 
He suggested that, although the movement never achieved the success of its 
counterparts in Europe, it did serve as a useful cover for the more powerful and 
influential extreme right-wing movements which supported the ideology of Fascism. 
These included The Link and the Anglo-German Fellowship, of which the latter counted 
among its supporters William Astor, Lords Londonderry, Lothian and McGowan, 
together with directors of banks, insurance companies and major business concerns. He 
maintained that the various organisations used their influence to spread anti-Semitic 
ideas throughout the Establishment, thus encouraging the most reactionary elements 
within the governing class.130 In presenting these arguments, Rennap maintained that 
anti-Semitism was and continued to be, used as a weapon (by the Establishment) to 
maintain the privilege and domination of their class. 
In his detailed analysis of anti-Semitism during the Second World War, Tony 
Kushner notes that, in 1939, the British public was becoming aware of a potential 
Jewish problem in the country, with the arrival of 60,000 refugees. This awareness 
stimulated the growth of anti-Semitism on a daily basis in all walks of life, resulting in a 
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deepening insecurity within the Anglo-Jewish community.131 Kushner considers different 
aspects of the attitude towards the Jews during the war years. In his analysis, he 
suggests that for the right-wing element of the population, the Jews were considered as 
radicals who were linked with the revolutionary movements – the Bolsheviks and they 
were viewed as un-British.132 He examines the use of the Jew as the scapegoat, as 
rationing fuelled the growing black market133 and he discusses the perception that the 
Jews were cowards by nature and as such, refused to fight for the country.134In his 
analysis of government policy, he maintains, in many ways, the government supported 
the Anglo-Jewish community but he tends to support the argument presented by 
Bernard Wasserstein that it was bureaucratic indifference by some government officials 
rather than deliberate anti-Semitism, which tended to influence the government 
response to the Jews.135 He concludes by suggesting that, although there was anti-
Semitism during the war, it was almost a reflexive action, since in the eyes of the 
general public, a scapegoat was required for the deficiencies created by the existing 
conditions. 
In contrast to these arguments, Gavin Schaffer considers the response of both 
the government and the public towards the Jewish refugees, from the racial scientific 
perspective. He analyses the prevailing beliefs held by the  scientific establishment from 
three separate perspectives: that the Jews were  cowards, conspirators and disease 
carriers.136 In his examinatiuon of Jewish cowardice, he cites the accusations made 
against them during the First World War when the young Russian Jews were accused of 
being unpatriotic cowards who refused to enlist,137 an accusation that has been refuted 
by Sharman Kadish in her detailed analysis of the period.138 He argues  that Jews  were 
viewed as being conspiratorial due to the insecurity of the inter-war years when they 
were held responsible for the international problems of either German militarism or 
Bolshevism and were conspiring against Britain: 
“These immigrants had always been traitors to the British                                                                             
workers as well as traitors to the Britsh cause…Bolshevism       
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was of course…introduced in England almost entirely by                  
aliens.”139 
A further theory was because of their conspiratorial traits, Jews possessed an 
immunity to various diseases although they were also viewed as being prone to specific 
diseases such as obesity and diabetes. ‘The Jew was presented as an easy prey to 
certain maladies, slyly immune to others.’140 He argues that these beliefs had a major 
influence on the reaction of both the government and the public towards the Jewish 
refugees fleeing from Germany, since it was felt that they were, in part, to blame for the 
Nazi persecution they were facing and he maintains, although the public displayed 
distaste for the anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany, it did not change their ideas that 
Jews were different or ‘Alien.’141 He suggests that the government refusal to provide 
refuge for the majority of Jews who wished to enter the country, was influenced by the 
belief that there were inherent racial differences between the Jews and the indigenous 
population.142 
 The historical background to the reception of  Jewish refugees in Britain      
Between 1880 and 1905, it is estimated that one million Jews fled from Eastern Europe 
to start a new life in Western Europe and America.143 The majority settled in America, 
South Africa, The Argentine and France, but approximately 100,000 settled in Great 
Britain and by 1905, the Jewish population had increased by 41.9 percent.144 The arrival 
of the Eastern European Jews after 1880, was to have a profound influence on the 
British attitude towards the Jews. In his detailed history of their arrival, Bernard Gainer 
analyses the various problems that arose through lack of housing, severe 
unemployment and the difference in language and customs.145 John Garrard and 
Bernard Gainer  argue that the formation of the Immigration Reform Association in 
February 1903,  increased the pressure on the government to halt the flow of Aliens 
entering the country.146 The euphemism of ‘Alien’ was used as a substitute for Jew since 
public support for anti-Semitism was not acceptable.147It may, therefore, be argued that 
the establishment of the early anti-Alien campaign groups, which culminated in the 
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creation of the 1905 Aliens Act to limit the flow of immigrants into the country,148 laid the 
foundations for the various extreme right- wing groups which flourished during the 
Twenties and the Thirties,resulting in the foundation of the British Union of Fascists in 
1932, as discussed by Colin Holmes.149 
 The 1905 Aliens Act was created by the Tory Government in response to 
continual anti-alien agitation from extreme right-wing Tories. They wanted to curb the 
arrival of the predominantly Eastern European Jewish refugees, who had been entering 
Britain since 1880.150 In his detailed analysis of the causes that led to the creation of the 
act, Bernard Gainer traces the effect that the arrival of the Jews had on all aspects of life 
in the East End of London. He focuses on the resentment that gradually developed as 
the established population of the area viewed the new arrivals as the main causes for 
rising unemployment and for a growing lack of housing.151He examines the general view 
that they were unhygienic with strange habits, which did not conform to the normal way 
of life in the area152and he considers the reaction of the  Anglo-Jewish leaders to the 
newly arrived Russian Jews, which was strongly influenced by the fear that their arrival 
could create an increase in anti-Semitism.153 These views are reiterated by Lloyd P 
Gartner who also examines the efforts of the Anglo-Jewish leaders to ensure that, 
through education, the children of the immigrants would start to become English, rather 
than Jewish, foreigners.154 In examining this period, it is possible to discern the roots of 
the anti-Semitism which prevailed during the Thirties and the Forties. The massive 
unemployment due to the major economic recession of the Thirties and the chronic 
housing shortage created by the lack of adequate modern housing, fuelled the fear that 
a large-scale influx of Jewish refugees would exacerbate these problems. Such fears 
may be viewed as a mirror image of the chronic unemployment caused by the major 
financial recession of the 1870’s and 1880’s155 and the  chronic housing shortage 
created by the redevelopment of the East End during this period,156 which gave rise to 
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the accusations that the arrival of the Russian Jews was the main cause for these 
problems. 
 The Act, which was implemented and amended by the Liberal government in 
1906, did, however, grant refugee status to any individual who had been subject to 
either religious or political persecution.  These conditions were changed in a subsequent 
act passed in 1914 - the Aliens Restrictions Act, which effectively ensured that the 
Secretary of State exercised strict control of all entrants into the country and removed 
the right to claim refugee status.157 The terms of this later act were restated as the 
Aliens Act, 1919 and the Amended Aliens Order of 1920. These changes strengthened 
the power of the Home Secretary by removing power from the Immigration Service, thus 
ensuring that state sovereignty was maintained. In addition, a series of further entry 
restrictions were imposed and unless an Alien had an official work permit or could 
demonstrate possession of visible means of support, entry was only granted on a 
temporary basis. The new restriction also ensured that refugee status was not 
recognised in the country.158 These amended Acts remained in place as the immigration 
laws and they were re-stated each year. With the persistent use of the term Alien rather 
than refugee, it may be argued that the view of refugees as foreigners, unwittingly 
reinforced the perception in the public mind of Jews as outsiders. Such a perception 
may be attributed to a pattern of thought that was created by the arrival of the Russian 
Jews at the turn of the century.The various immigration laws created between 1905 and 
1920 were directed primarily at one particular group of people – the Jews. Initially they 
had been accused of causing unemployment, creating a housing shortage, living in 
insanitary conditions and maintaining their own language and customs. The declaration 
of war in 1914 witnessed a further tightening of the immigration law which concentrated 
the regulation of Aliens in the office of the Secretary of State, thus enabling strict control 
of all entrants to Britain and removing the right to claim refugee status.159 The original 
perceptions of the Jews as being alien to the British way of life, were further influenced 
by the general belief that, during the Great War, young Jewish males refused to enlist 
and that, generally, the Jews were cowards. The most detailed analysis of this period is 
by Colin Holmes, who not only examines the attitudes of the general public and the 
Press towards the Russian Jews’ alleged refusal to enlist, but also discusses the 
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persecution of certain prominent Jews, who were hounded for being of German 
extraction.160  
 In his investigation of this period, Harry Defries highlights the continual writing of 
anti-Jewish articles in the national press and, as he states, many of the young Jewish 
males did not wish to fight on behalf of the repressive Tsarist regime from which both 
they and their families had fled.161 In his analysis of the general view that the Jews fully 
supported the Bolshevik government, he emphasises the crucial role of the British press 
in reinforcing this belief, as it was reported that the Jews were in control of the new 
Russian government.162 These extreme ideas gave rise to a growing conviction that, 
since many of the immigrants had come from Russia, they strongly supported the 
Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Alyson Pendlebury examines this perception of Jewish 
support for the Bolsheviks and suggests that such a belief was strongly influenced by 
the general view Jewish immigrants were linked to the various Anarchist movements of 
the pre-war era and  Jewish radicalism dominated the immigrant community.163 
The belief that, during the war, the Russian Jews had supported the Bolshevik 
Revolution, was to exert a strong influence on the early post-war governments. David 
Cesarani examines these views in his article on Sir William Joynson-Hicks, who, as the 
newly appointed Home Secretary in 1924, not only re-affirmed the immigration laws, but 
also ensured  the entry of aliens was severely restricted and non-naturalised Jews were 
deported for various petty offences. He argues that, since the right-wing of the Tory 
party held considerable influence at the time, the views held by Joynson-Hicks were not 
extreme and in many ways, he was seen as a representative figure of popular 
opinion.164  
The law of 1914, which had been further restated in 1919 and amended in 1920, 
effectively handed complete control for granting entry to immigrants, to the Home Office. 
The stringent conditions which ensured that, without proof of guaranteed employment or 
visible financial means, entry into the country was severely restricted.165 In a speech to 
the House of Commons in March 1933, shortly after the arrival of the first German 
Jewish refugees, Sir John Gilmour gave an assurance that the immigration acts were 
sufficient to control the increased arrival of immigrants and that the national interests of 
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the country would govern any decisions of the immigration authorities.166 This response 
suggests that there was a fear in government circles that the public outcry, raised after 
the arrival of the Russian Jews could be repeated. Then, they had been blamed for the 
high unemployment and lack of housing; the arrival of the German Jewish refugees 
occurred at a time of economic recession and high unemployment. 
It may further be argued that the domination of right- wing political groups, who 
held a predominantly anti-Semitic attitude towards the Jews, during and after the Great 
War, would continue to influence future governments and the general public as they 
were confronted by the growing problem of German and Austrian Jews in the Thirties. 
There was strong support from the right- wing element of the aristocracy for the 
government policy of appeasement.167 Hitler was viewed by them as a bulwark against 
the threat of Communism and many of them were convinced that the Jews were linked 
to the Bolsheviks.168In his examination of the British upper classes, Richard Griffiths 
cites the support provided by Truth, a deeply anti-Semitic weekly magazine published by 
Sir Joseph Ball who supported Neville Chamberlain in his policy of appeasement, while 
R.B.Cockett considers that Truth reflected the real political beliefs of Chamberlain.169 
The establishment of Nazi rule in Germany in 1933 and Austria in March 1938, 
created a major refugee problem for Great Britain and America, as the Jews were forced 
into exile by the implementation of the harsh anti-Semitic laws promulgated by the Nazi 
regime. These included the professional Civil Service Law on April 7th which effectively 
removed the Jews from various professions including education and the Civil service 
and the de-naturalisation law in July 1933, which removed German nationality from all 
immigrants who had been naturalised after 1918.170 In March 1933, the leaders of the 
Jewish Community agreed to organise a Jewish Refugee Committee under the 
chairmanship of Otto Schiff, the president of the Jew’s Temporary Shelter.171 Schiff, who 
had a strong working relationship with the Home Office, was quickly informed by the 
immigration authorities of an increase in the number of German Jews arriving in 
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Britain.172 At the same time, there was a growth of anti-refugee and anti-Semitic 
statements in both the Press and Parliament.173 As a result of this, a meeting was held 
between the newly-formed committee and Neville Laski, the President of the Board of 
Jewish Deputies to consider the growing problem facing the community. An agreement 
was reached to discuss the situation with Sir Ernest Holderness at the Home Office. 
During the course of the meeting with him, the leaders of the community gave a financial 
pledge to the British Government that they would provide financial support for all Jewish 
refugees of German nationality entering the country.174 The offer of a financial 
guarantee was based on the assumption made by Schiff that Hitler would not retain 
power and, therefore, approximately only 3,000-4,000 refugees would request entry into 
Britain, most of whom would ultimately re-emigrate to either Palestine or other 
countries175 
The aim of the pledge was to bypass the current immigration laws and allow all 
German Jews who were in Britain  or wished for entry, to be granted permission to do 
so. Geoffrey Alderman argues that, by providing funding, the community would be able 
to monitor and control the suitability of the entrants, thus ensuring that they would meet 
the criteria to assimilate and so lessening the possibility of stimulating anti-Semitism.176 
The inherent communal fear that the arrival of a substantial number of foreign Jews 
could lead to a growth of anti-Semitism may be viewed as an echo of their reaction to 
the mass influx of Jews at the turn of the century, who appeared to be totally foreign in 
their behaviour and habits. This argument is supported by Louise London who notes 
that the immigration authorities were aware that the Anglo-Jewish leaders did not wish 
to encourage unrestricted Jewish immigration as had occurred at the turn of the 
century.177 had The pledge was discussed by the Cabinet in early April and it was 
agreed that, although there should be no easing of the immigration laws, the financial 
pledge was to be accepted.178 This agreement to accept Jewish financial aid, whilst 
maintaining the status quo of the prevailing legislation, demonstrated clearly the 
ambiguous approach that would become the hallmark of the government response to 
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the growing refugee problem and as Louise London notes, the acceptance of the 
guarantee did not create any government obligation towards the refugees.179 
In further Cabinet discussions in April 1933, consideration was given to the 
expulsion, by the Nazis, of prominent German Jewish academics and it was agreed that 
Britain would benefit from their knowledge and expertise, ‘whilst it would also create a 
very favourable impression in the world.’180 It was, however, noted that it was important 
not to allow British workers to be rendered unemployed by the arrival of the refugees 
since the Cabinet ‘were anxious to avoid the danger of creating an atmosphere in 
Europe critical to this country.’181 The decision to proffer an invitation to prominent 
Jewish academics, scientists and medical professionals, in order to enhance the 
reputation of Britain, was implemented on an unofficial level, with varying degrees of 
success. Within the academic world, the Academic Assistance Council, which was 
succeeded by the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning in 1936,182 was 
established by Sir William Beveridge with a remit to provide assistance in obtaining 
employment for foreign academics either in Britain or in America.183 The funding was 
provided by Jewish charities and contributions, in the form of deductions from the 
salaries of British academics and universities.184 Many of the universities responded 
favourably, although there was a degree of caution and in some instances refusal to 
provide assistance for Jewish academics, as in the response from Sheffield, which 
stated that their limited funds should provide assistance to students whose parents were 
unemployed rather than to Jewish refugees, since: 
     “There are many rich men of the Jewish religion whose  
    individual incomes are larger than the whole income of  
    the University, it would be appropriate that they are to  
    be asked to support the teachers in the first instance.”185 
 
In contrast to the attitude of Beveridge and the Academic Council there was a 
strong element of fear among various professional bodies that the arrival of the refugees 
presented a tangible threat to their job security and as Herbert Strauss states: 
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“In the 1930s, economic factors and fears of émigré      
competition on labour markets, as well as xenophobic                                           
and anti-Semitic currents re-enforced such perceptions.”186 
 
These bodies included the Association of University Teachers, The Association of 
Scientific Workers,187 The General Medical Council (for the registration of dentists),188 
The Royal College of Physicians and The British Medical Council in their opposition to 
the entry of Austrian doctors in 1938.189 They were all supported by the Press who 
stated: 
“There is a big influx of foreign Jews into Britain. They   
  are over-running the country. They are trying to enter  
  the medical  profession in great numbers.”     
  Sunday Express 19 June 1938. 
 
 “Most of the alien doctors and dentists are Jews who   
   are fleeing from Germany and Austria. And the methods  
   these Aliens are bringing into England are not always in   
   accordance with the professional etiquette of this country.”  
   Everybody’s 17 September 1938.190 
 
In March 1938  after the Anschluss, the Jewish Refugee Committee informed the 
Home Office that it could not include the Austrian Jews in this financial agreement.191 
This decision resulted in the government, with the full agreement of Otto Schiff and the 
Jewish community, implementing a visa system in April 1938, in order to control the 
entry of potential refugees into the country. Schiff maintained that the majority of the 
Austrian Jews were shopkeepers and small traders, which presented problems of 
possible re-emigration, in contrast to the German Jews who were mainly of the 
professional or academic classes. 192The new visa system limited entry to distinguished 
professionals of international repute, industrialists in possession of transferable 
business assets and students, providing they met the stringent entry requirements.193  
  
The reaction of the public towards the massive inflow of Jewish refugees at the 
turn of the century may also be seen in the response of both the Anglo-Jewish leaders 
and the government, as the Jewish refugees fled from Nazi Germany and Austria after 
                                                          
186 Paul K Hoch, ‘No Utopia Refugee Scholars in Britain,’ History Today, November 1985 Vol.35, p.55 
187 Ibid.,p.55 
188 London, Whitehall and the Jews.,pp.51-52 
189 Sherman, Island Refuge.,pp48;123-124 
190 Austin Stevens, The Dispossessed German refugees in Britain (Great Britain: Barrie & 
Jenkins,1975),pp.127-129 
191 Sherman, Island Refuge.,pp.86-87; London, Whitehall And The Jews., p.60 
192 Alderman, Modern British Jewry.,pp.278-279 
193 HC. Deb Austrian Refugees, 22nd March,1938 vol 333 cc990-6, p.12 
 
 
34 
 
the Anschluss in March 1938. The imposition of the limited criteria for entry ensured that 
there would not be a massive influx of refugees as there had been at the start of the 
century, which allegedly, had been a major cause of the high unemployment 
experienced by certain sections of the population at that time. 
 
 Methodology and sources 
In order to answer the questions raised in the introduction, a wide range of primary 
resources will be examined and analysed. They will provide the  individual case studies 
relating to the government strategy discussed and refined prior to the  Evian Conference 
and how it was implemented; the political implications of the two government  schemes 
proposed for the rescue of the Jewish children in Vichy France and Bulgaria; the 
government diplomacy relating to the organisation of the Bermuda Conference and its 
agenda; the actions and the aims of the campaigners prior to the conference; the 
discussions and agreement reached at the conference and its success or failure in the 
eyes of the government and the campaigners.  Most of the relevant documentation is in 
special collections held by various universities and museums or in national archives of 
the relevant country, some of which may be accessed online i.e: ( Acts of Parliament, 
the Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic papers, British Parliamentary 
debates in Hansard). Many other archives are only accessible through personal contact, 
since much of the material has not been digitised.  
The main repositories for the relevant documentation used in this thesis may  be 
found in the National Archives at Kew for the Foreign, Colonial and Home Office 
Archives, the Parkes Institute at Southampton University which holds the papers of both 
Rabbi Schonfeld and the Chief Rabbi Dr.Hertz, Liverpool University for the Eleanor 
Rathbone Archive, Warwick University for the Victor Gollancz Archive, Lambeth Palace 
Library for the papers of William Temple, The Wiener Library for its extensive collection 
of Holocaust related documents, London Metropolitan Archives for The Jewish Board of 
Deputies, The British Library for the documentation appertaining to the Evian 
Conference together with access to the relevant newspapers which are not all available 
online. Other sources include the Council for German Jewry, the World Jewish 
Congress, the Council of Christians and Jews, the Imperial War Museum, Yad Vashem 
for specific speeches, national and international newspapers including the Jewish 
Telegraph Agency Archives, various magazines, electronic resources, autobiographies, 
individual political publications and pamphlets, as well as a variety of secondary sources 
including books and articles. 
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The challenge of basing the main body of research on primary resources is 
twofold: firstly, some of the sources may have been destroyed or censored and 
secondly, due to their age, they may, in some instances, be almost illegible due to the 
condition of the paper (as a result, in part, of war-time rationing) and in some cases the 
methods of duplicating employed. A further aspect to be considered is that the 
documents will mainly present a biased viewpoint. When examing the government 
archives of the period, it is possible to trace a certain lack of sympathy  and non-
comprehension of the problems experienced by the Jewish refugees as reflected  in the 
variety of comments added to the original proposals by individual civil servants. In some 
instances, the level of anti-Semitism displayed is somewhat virulent. In the modern 
context, these comments would be classified as both racist and politically incorrect, but 
they have to be considered within the bounds of acceptability in the context of the time. 
A further problem with the government archives is the culling of documentation from the 
records with no indication as to the reason for their removal and this may present a 
barrier to following through comments made by the officials concerned. 
The problem of removal or destruction of documents and letters is also apparent 
in private archives such as the Eleanor Rathbone Archive, which was heavily censored 
by her executors before depositing them with Liverpool University. A further problem 
may be the haphazard filing system used by the individual concerned and this is clearly 
apparent in the Archives of Rabbi Schonfeld which do not appear to have followed any 
one system of filing.  One may also face the other problem of an overwhelming amount 
of documentation which, in some cases, is sheer duplication of the same information in 
a variety of archives. In employing a wide range of primary documents, the ultimate aim 
is to obtain a broad access to the differing views of the relevant groups involved with the 
European Jews between June 1942 and May 1943.  
The thesis will be divided into four chronological chapters:  March 1938 – June 
1942, July 1942 – December 1942, January 1943 - March 1943, April 1943 - June 1943 
in order to consider the responses of the government and the various bodies involved 
towards the European  Jews facing destruction in Nazi-occupied Europe. 
Chapter structure 
The aim of  Chapter One  is to provide the contextual background of the period 
in order to survey the period from the Evian Conference in July 1938 upto the first public 
acknowledgement of the Nazi policies of Jewish extermination. The main consideration 
is to understand why the government sought, through various means, to either 
underplay,, or evade any discussion of Jewish suffering. In order to reach any 
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conclusions, the chapter will analyse the government strategy employed at Evian and its 
aftermath. It will analyse the causes of the anti-Semitic attitudes displayed by the 
Colonial Office and the Colonial Governors regarding the possibility of Jewish settlement 
in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. It will consider how government policy towards the 
refugees changed with the declaration of war and it will examine how far anti-Semitism 
increased during this period. After the internment and release of the refugees there was 
little movement or reaction in respect of the Jews of Europe, until the first reports of Nazi 
policies became public in the latter half of 1942.  A detailed analysis of these points will 
illustrate how the government policy towards the refugees evolved, as the European 
situation changed from a peacetime to a wartime scenario. 
Chapter Two examines  the period between June and December 1942 by 
focusing on the reaction of both individuals and organisations as news of the genocidal 
policies being implemented by the Nazis towards the European Jews under their control, 
started to be published in the national press. The aim of this chapter is to examine how 
the government was able to maintain its censorship and control of the news, thus, 
initially, limiting publication of the Nazi policies towards the Jews under their control. It 
will consider the widely held view that there was a major difference of behaviour 
between the German nation and the Nazi regime, thereby giving rise to the Good 
German versus the Bad German.  It will analyse the initial reactions of the government, 
the consolidation of various campaigners and organisations, the initial rescue schemes 
proposed, with a detailed examination of the government proposition to offer refuge to a 
limited number of French Jewish children in Vichy France and finally the official 
confrontation and acceptance of the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination in early 
December 1942, which resulted in the announcement by the government of the UN 
Declaration on December 17th 1942. 
Between January and March 1943, the government was confronted by a growing 
demand from the public, the Churches and the various campaigning organisations to 
provide assistance to the beleaguered European Jews. This resulted in a series of 
diplomatic approaches to America to agree to informal talks, in order to provide a façade 
of working towards a programme offering assistance to the European Jews. The aim of  
Chapter Three is to illustrate how the government responded to the various 
campaigners. It will examine and consider the reasons for the creation of a government-
supported rescue scheme to remove 4,500 Bulgarian Jewish children to safety in the 
Palestine Mandate. It will examine how diplomacy was employed to reach an agreement 
with America in order to hold a conference which would demonstrate to the public that 
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serious consideration was being given to the plight of the refugees and finally it will 
consider the continuing demands of the campaigners during this period. 
The Bermuda Conference bears a striking resemblance to the Evian Conference 
held in July 1938. The brief of the latter was to consider the possibility of assisting the 
German and Austrian Jews to leave The Third Reich; at Bermuda, it was to consider the 
entire refugee problem evolving in Europe. May Bermuda be viewed in the same context 
as Evian, as a substantial volume of discussion but little solid achievement? The final 
chapter will consider the government objectives and how far they were successfully 
achieved. It will examine the proceedings of conference and consider if its outcome 
mirrored the results of Evian. Finally, it will focus on the Parliamentary debate held after 
the conference and subsequent reactions. 
The conclusion will bring together the different aspects of the arguments that 
have been discussed in the thesis: the persistent belief in government that a further 
influx of Jewish refugees would stimulate the growth of anti-Semitism; the refusal to 
acknowledge the plight of the European Jews under Nazi occupation; the similarity 
between the ethos of both the Evian Conference in 1938  and the Bermuda Conference 
in 1943; the efforts of the campaigners to place sufficient pressure on the government to 
offer assistance to the refugees. These points will be analysed in order to substantiate 
the theory that the modern historians – Sherman, London, Wasserstein, Kushner and 
Cesarani have  tended to focus on the events of the government policies towards the 
refugees during the Thirties and the Forties. This approach has given  little 
consideration to the government use of anti-Semitismt as a political tool in its response 
to the acknowledgement of the Holocaust between 1942 and 1943. 
 
 
 
38 
 
Chapter One.  The British Government and the plight of  
     European Jews from the Austrian Anschluss.  
        March 1938 to June 1942 
In order to consider how the decisions reached by the various government departments 
involved in the planning of the British response after the Anschluss  were influenced by 
the possibility of granting admission to a substantial number of Jewish refugees into 
Britain, the Colonies and the Dominions, this chapter will analyse the documentation 
relating to both the Evian Conference and the correspondence from the Colonial 
Governors of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia when the Colonial Office proposed settling 
Jewish refugees in their areas. Louise London argues that regardless of the subsequent 
rhetoric at the conference, there was to be no deviation from the admissions policy 
applied to all refugees.1 In contrast to this, Sherman points out that the Foreign Office 
was well aware of the potential problem arising from the possibility of mass migration 
from Eastern Europe and this awareness created a strong influence on government 
thinking.2 The chapter will examine the reasons for the failure to organise any 
substantial settlement in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, taking into account the 
opposition from the settlers and the limited financial resources available to the Anglo-
Jewish leadership. It will discuss the reasons for the limited easing of the immigration 
laws after Kristallnacht and  analyse the attitude towards the European Jews after war 
was declared in September 1939. In their accounts of the period, both Sherman and 
London tend to focus their analysis on the events, with no reference to the possibility 
that the majority of the government responses may be viewed as displaying an anti-
Semitic influence which was visible at both the turn of the century with the general 
reaction to the influx of Eastern European Jews and during World War One. The aim of 
this chapter is to demonstrate the feasibility of this argument.  
 Government strategy and the Evian Conference July 1938 
In his opening speech to the Evian Conference, in July 1938, Lord Winterton, the British 
spokesman, made a series of statements which clearly demonstrated the attitude of the 
British Government towards the growing refugee problem and it may be argued this 
stance never wavered even when it was confronted with the confirmation of the Nazi 
policy of Jewish extermination in 1942. The contents of the speech had been discussed 
and refined during a series of interdepartmental meetings in June; they effectively 
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ensured that the British delegation was able to present a façade of humanitarianism to 
the world whilst adhering to the traditional stance of the government which imposed  
limited entry to Jewish immigrants. This approach was consolidated in a series of 
meetings between the British and American delegates, prior to the conference, when its 
basic aims were agreed and resolved by both sides. In their detailed histories of the 
conference, both A.J.Sherman and Louise London concentrate on different aspects.3 
Sherman, whilst briefly discussing the pre- conference discussions, concentrates on the 
actual conference.4 London analyses in great detail the government inter-departmental 
discussions held prior to it.5 Neither of them discuss in depth the machinations of the 
British delegation, during their pre-conference meetings with the leader of the American 
delegation, as they worked to limit the possible remit of the American proposals in order 
to maintain the status quo for potential refugees in Europe. 
Lord Winterton advised the conference delegates that it had always been the 
traditional policy of successive governments to offer asylum to people fleeing from 
political, religious or racial persecution but he emphasised that Britain did not view itself 
as a country of immigration. He supported this statement with the following remarks: 
“It is highly industrialised, fully populated and is still faced   
  with the problem of unemployment. For economic and  
  social reasons the traditional policy of granting asylum   
  can only be applied within narrow limits.”6 
 He reviewed  the actions taken to date by the government since 1933. These 
had included granting entry to refugees who had been funded by the Anglo-Jewish 
community,7 together with a number of academics. The latter group had been assisted 
by the Academic Assistance Council which had been founded by Sir William Beveridge 
in 1933 and renamed the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning in 1936.8 
He indicated that, in the aftermath of the Anschluss, refugees following an educational 
or training course who would eventually re-emigrate, potential immigrants who were 
judged to possess useful skills and refugees able to establish a viable business, would 
be considered as potentially suitable immigrants.9 He informed the delegates that the 
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possibility of small-scale settlement in certain East African Colonies and overseas 
territories was currently being examined, but he stressed that many of the areas under 
consideration were either unsuitable for European settlement due to climatic conditions 
and possible overcrowding, or in some Colonial areas, local political conditions  
hindered immigration. He emphasised that any proposed settlement schemes would be 
based on strict selection.10  
The remainder of his speech was devoted to different aspects of the current 
European crisis. He insisted that if certain countries, thus obliquely alluding to Poland, 
Romania and Hungary, wished to encourage large-scale emigration, they should be 
prepared to allow the emigrants to retain a proportion of their assets in order to assist 
them in settling elsewhere. He  emphasised that, although the purpose of the 
conference was to specifically examine the problems facing the German and Austrian 
refugees, it was important for other countries with large minority groups – ‘the Jews’- to 
realise that due to the prevailing economic situation throughout the world, they should 
not contemplate resolving their problems by instigating forced migration.11 These 
oblique remarks were directed specifically towards conference observers sent by Poland 
and Romania in order to encourage them to reconsider any plans they might have for 
resolving their ‘Jewish problems.’ He concluded by restating the achievements of the 
League of Nations, whilst accepting that the proposed creation of a new international 
organisation could be viewed as providing a further public body to provide further 
assistance in resolving the refugee crisis, thus demonstrating the humanitarian policy of 
the government internationally.12  
The Evian Conference was the outcome of the American response to the 
Austrian Anschluss in March 1938. Immediately after the Anschluss, Cordell Hull, the 
American Secretary of State, contacted Joseph Kennedy, the American Ambassador to 
London, instructing him to approach the Foreign Secretary in order to discuss the 
possible participation of Britain in the formation of a new committee (the 
Intergovernmental Committee) to ease the massive displacement of refugees emanating 
from Germany and Austria. Cordell Hull’s instructions emphasised certain pre-conditions 
which included the proviso that all funding for emigration would be provided by private 
bodies and no country participating in the proposed scheme would be expected to 
amend its existing immigration legislation. The instruction stated that the proposal was 
not to be viewed as denigrating the work already being undertaken by other agencies in 
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their endeavours to assist the refugees. It ended by informing Kennedy that similar 
proposals were being sent to the governments of Western Europe and South America.13 
The issuing of this invitation was followed next day by President Roosevelt announcing 
publicly that he had proffered an invitation to 32 countries to participate in a conference 
to discuss the establishment of a special committee to examine and attempt to resolve 
the growing refugee problem in Europe.14 
In their response, the Foreign Office raised various points for consideration and 
clarification. Included in these points was a clear definition of ‘political refugee’ citing the 
League of Nations definition, which had been signed by the British in February 1938 at 
Geneva. This stated that: 
“1) For the purposes of the present Convention, the term  
      “refugee coming from Germany” shall be deemed to apply to:  
    a) Persons possessing or having possessed German   
        nationality and not possessing any other nationality.   
        Who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the  
        protection of the German Government;    
    b) Stateless persons not covered by previous   
        Conventions or Agreements who have left German  
        territory after being established therein and who          
        are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact the protection                          
        of the German Government.                                         
    2) Persons who leave Germany for reasons of purely  
        personal convenience are not included in this definition.”15 
  The observation was made that it would be extremely difficult to differentiate 
between German and Austrian nationals wishing to emigrate and it was suggested that 
the proposed committee would have to accept responsibility for both countries. The 
Foreign Office strongly emphasised the work of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
from Germany under the aegis of the League of Nations and stated that, as a member 
of the League of Nations, Great Britain would not wish to weaken his positon. It was 
suggested that in order to overcome this problem, it would be necessary to ensure that 
there was a strong link of co-operation created between the new committee and the 
High Commissioner, thus ensuring that there was no duplication of roles. The response 
concluded that, subject to the points raised  being acceptable, the government would be 
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pleased to accept the invitation.16 In the phrasing of this guarded diplomatic response, 
the government, whilst reiterating its intention to maintain its stringent immigration laws, 
indicated its acquiesence to co-operate with America. In their assessments, London, 
Sherman and Joshua Stein argue that this stance was taken in order to capitalise on the 
belief that America was starting to move away from its isolationist policy.17 
At the beginning of June 1938, the Foreign Office submitted a series of 
questions via the American Ambassador, requesting details of the pending conference. 
These included information relating to the proposed organization and procedures to be 
followed at the conference; the extent of the work and the eventual solution of the 
refugee problem envisaged; clarification as to whether the United States considered that 
the outcome of the conference would be viewed as a resolution, a declaration or a 
series of recommendations to the participating governments and finally, the names of 
the delegates attending from other countries.18 In his response, Cordell Hull stated that 
the proposed agenda would be issued in the near future; he listed the participants and 
requested a reply from the Dominions.19  
In early June, an inter-departmental meeting was convened to discuss the 
structure and content of the British delegation’s response at the forthcoming Evian 
Conference on July 6.th The responses from the various departments clearly indicated 
their determination to limit the entry of Jewish refugees. The Home Office maintained 
that, within the constraints of the immigration laws, Britain had been extremely generous 
but it was not possible to grant unlimited entry.  It cited the problems of limited 
employment and the attitude of the Trade Unions towards the employment of the 
refugees in the artisan trades. It admitted that due to these reasons, the number granted 
entry was small but it was prepared to broaden the entry requirements to encompass 
refugees prepared to start businesses, young people for education or training purposes, 
artisans to be limited to 2,000-3,000 on an annual basis, professional people and 
academics.  The committee agreed that these suggestions represented a reasonable 
contribution to the growing refugee problem, but as Louise London points out, effectively 
there was no change in the stance of the Home Office in the implementation of its 
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admissions policy.20  The emphasis on limited employment and the attitude of the Trade 
Unions may be attributed to a determination to avoid the accusations raised at the 
beginning of the century by anti-immigrant organisations, that  Eastern European Jews 
were stealing employment from the indigenous population. This accusation had been 
proved to be untrue in a major report on the sweating system in 1890,21 but it was 
actively employed by the anti-Alien movement in their campaign which resulted in the 
establishment of the 1905 Aliens Act.22                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The Colonial Office informed the meeting that they had been in contact with all 
the Colonial Governors to ascertain their reaction to granting entry to individual Jewish 
refugees. They stated that in almost all the replies, they had received a negative 
response, although there were some limited opportunities for a small number of doctors 
and dentists provided their qualifications were registered in the United Kingdom. They 
informed the meeting that they were exploring the possibility of settlement in Northern 
Rhodesia and the Tanganyika Territory but they did not view the Colonies as being in 
any position to sustain large-scale immigration.23 Mr. Wiseman, from The Dominions 
Office, stated that, since Britain did not make any financial contribution towards 
emigration to the Dominions, it would not be possible to offer this facility to German 
Jews who would require financial assistance, this could be construed as breaking the 
conditions governing emigration to the Dominions. He did, however, state that the 
invitation to participate at Evian had been forwarded to the Dominions, but he informed 
the meeting that he did not believe the German Jews would be accepted in these 
countries.24                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 The Treasury spokesman, Mr. Playfair, stated categorically that no consideration 
could be given to offering any financial assistance to the refugees since this could 
create a new precedent with unknown consequences. It was also felt that any offer of 
financial assistance would encourage other governments to exert pressure on their 
minorities to emigrate, thus creating further problems of settlement to be resolved. In 
response to other suggestions such as the provision of subsidy to shipping lines to help 
with transport costs, he indicated that this would have to be considered by Parliament. 
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He maintained currently,  the Treasury did not consider that the circumstances relating 
to the refugees, warranted any alteration in their policy. He concluded by stating the 
Treasury had no objection to the possibility of requesting the German Government to 
permit the refugees to withdraw a larger proportion of their assets in order to facilitate 
their resettlement.25 The chairman of the meeting raised the possibility of a majority 
decision being reached by the delegates at the conference to consider providing 
financial assistance to refugees. Mr Playfair indicated that this would not be viewed 
favourably by the Treasury since it would be in complete contradiction of current 
government policy.  Mr.Makins, from the Foreign Office, pointed out that an agreed pre-
condition of the conference was that all finance for the refugees must be provided by 
private organisations.26 
The meeting considered the implications for the government if a new committee 
were created. The Home Office considered that its proposed remit could be viewed as a 
duplication of the League of Nations. It was agreed that, if such a committee were 
established, the British delegation should endeavour to ensure that it was as innocuous 
as possible with a limited constitution and it should be viewed as an organisation to 
assist the High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Finally, on June 14,th the American Administration issued an agenda for the 
conference which basically reiterated the contents of the original invitation issued by 
Roosevelt in March, but it stated that at the opening session, an invitation would be 
given to Sir Neill Malcolm, the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, 
to attend all the sessions.27 
As a result of this response, a further meeting was held to finalise the 
instructions which would be given to the British delegation. Various points were raised 
by the representatives from the government offices involved which included emphasis 
being placed on the deterrence of offering any encouragement to other countries 
wishing to dispose of their Jewish communities; the limited number of professional 
people who could be considered for admittance into the country by the Home Office; the 
insistence of the Dominions Office that any financial assistance to the refugees would 
be resented; the determination of both the Treasury and Lord Winterton to maintain the 
current government policy of insisting that all financial aid for the refugees must be 
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provided by the private organisations; the agreement that any representation to the 
German Government should be made by the American Government. 
 Finally, Lord Winterton advised the meeting that Lord Samuel of the Council for 
German Jewry had requested his advice as to who should represent the Anglo-Jewish 
community at Evian. A major fear of the community was that their attendance would be 
viewed by the Germans as further proof that it was being organised by “International 
Jewry” and this would have given credence to the accusations made by Hitler in Mein 
Kampf and Henry Ford in The International Jew,28 that International Jewry controlled the 
world both politically and financially. In his analysis of the period, John Fox argues that 
one of the causes of anti-Semitism could be attributed to the publication of The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion which had stated that the Jews were intent on dominating 
the world through finance and politics.29 It may be argued that the questions raised with 
Lord Winterton, as to how attendance by representatives of the Jewish community could 
be misconstrued, reflected the determination of the Anglo-Jewish leaders to ensure that 
no accusations of Jewish influence or control could be levelled against them at the 
forthcoming conference. The Council also requested advice as to whom they should 
forward any memoranda appertaining to the possible alleviation of the Jewish Refugee 
problems and whether it was practical for the Council to make any statement to the 
Press. The meeting agreed that Lord Winterton should advise the Council to send 
comparatively subordinate representatives to the conference and forward any written 
communication to the relevant delegates at Evian.30 
In the final instructions issued to the British delegation, great emphasis was 
placed on certain key points which included the admission that, although the conference 
was to discuss the problems of the German and Austrian Jews, it was known that anti-
Semitic measures were being implemented in Poland, Romania and Hungary with a 
strong possibility that this was also the case in Czechoslovakia.  It was common 
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dispersal of their Jewish communities to other countries. The British delegation was to 
knowledge that both Poland and Romania were seeking assistance in resolving the 
ensure that no hint of encouragement should be given to the observers from these 
countries at the conference in their pursuit of aid to resolve their problems. In his 
assessment of this reaction, Michael Marrus analyses the problems facing Eastern 
European Jews who were subject to the threat of expulsion in Poland, Hungary and 
Romania and the fear this created in government circles as they contemplated a 
massive influx of impoverished refugees.31 It was to be restated by the delegation, that 
due to the high level of unemployment in Britain, entry to persons seeking work would 
be severely restricted. The delegation was to maintain close contact with the private 
organisations who would be attending the conference.32 There was an underlying fear 
that the governments of the Eastern European countries were considering following the 
example of the Nazi attitude towards their Jewish minorities, by implementing forced 
migration. The government did not welcome the prospect of large numbers of  Eastern 
European Jews entering the country since the previous influx had created major 
problems in employment, housing and assimilation into British society.. 
In a separate section of the instructions, the position of the Colonies was 
reviewed in detail with great stress placed on the requirement to avoid discussing the 
possibility of immigration into Palestine, since, in the eyes of the Colonial Office, this 
was not an acceptable solution to the refugee problem. A series of reasons were cited 
which hinged on the fact that Palestine was a Mandate with a limited right of entry 
dependant on the prevailing circumstances of the time. It was stated that there were 
special problems and conditions which were under continual review and due to these 
considerations, it precluded any discussion of possible settlement at the forthcoming 
conference. In his analysis of the period, Wasserstein argues the refusal of the Arabs to 
consider any form of partition together with their continued revolt against the British 
authorities, presented a major problem, since maintaining the equilibrium of Palestine 
was viewed to be a prominent element of British strategy as the situation in Europe 
deteriorated. 33 The report stated that there were no restrictions to refugees entering the 
Colonial Dependencies from Europe whether they were Jewish or not, provided they 
complied with all the immigration regulations. It was, however, pointed out that any 
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potential immigrant must demonstrate definite means of support or employment before 
being granted entry and provide a deposit or security to ensure against possible 
destitution.34 It was noted that the majority of the German and Austrian Jews were 
engaged in business and industry and there were few opportunities in the Colonies for 
these people. There was the possibility of some limited agricultural settlement in East 
Africa which was being considered by the Governors of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia 
but that would have to be funded by the private Jewish organisations. In his analysis of 
the attitude taken by the Colonial Office, A.J.Sherman argues that the main concern was 
to ensure that no false hopes would be raised as to the possibility of allowing large-scale 
Jewish emigration into the Colonies, particularly Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, which 
might cause embarrassment to the Colonial Governors.35 In the memorandum produced 
by the Colonial Office, it was made clear that there was little possibility of offering any 
positive aid to the Jewish refugees since, in the eyes of many Colonials, they were 
viewed as outsiders who did not conform to the accepted mores of the time. 
In a resume of a meeting on 2nd July, prior to the conference, attended by James 
MacDonald, the Vice Chairman of the United States refugee committee and various 
other dignitaries, R. Makins of the Foreign Office made the following comments. The 
ideas of Roosevelt were intuitive and had not been given detailed consideration. He had 
suggested broadening the scope of the conference to include all Central European 
refugees and some of his advisors suggested an immense settlement scheme 
organised on a semi-commercial basis. The meeting attendees showed little enthusiasm 
for these ideas and stressed the immense financial costs that would be incurred. The 
position in the British Colonies was clarified by Sir.C. Parkinson, whilst the Jewish 
representatives involved stated that the French Colonies were unsuitable. McDonald 
ruled out exerting pressure on South America but suggested that American influence 
supported by the British Government could be a possible method of approach. He 
confirmed that the American Administration would not propose governments be liable to 
provide financial assistance for the refugees. It was agreed that a collective approach 
should be made to Germany to allow the refugees to retain a portion of their wealth, to 
facilitate their settlement in other countries. It was further suggested that since relations 
between Britain and Germany were better than those between Germany and America, it 
should be the British Government who would approach the German Government. In a 
brief discussion as to the viability of any future organization, little was made clear. The 
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Americans thought that all the private organizations should address the conference but 
the Jewish representatives at the meeting did not agree since they wished to avoid too 
much publicity. McDonald admitted that he did not know what concrete results were 
envisaged as a result of the conference, but he indicated that if 27,000 refugees were 
allowed to enter the British Empire, he thought that the rigid administration of the 
American quota system would be eased. In his conclusion, Makins made the following 
remarks: 
“I derive the strong impression that the United States                          
were much embarrassed by the difficulty in which their           
initiative has placed them and were looking to the British   
Empire as the likeliest scapegoat. Mr. McDonald was                  
essential negative, and the outcome of the discussion             
was that on the basis proposed for the meeting little   
progress could be expected,”36  
thus clearly demonstrating that the general government view of the American proposals 
was that they were ill-conceived and in British eyes, a waste of time. 
            In contrast to this report from Makins, Myron Taylor, the Chairman of the Evian 
Conference, sent the following account to Cordell Hull after the conference, detailing the 
discussions held prior to it with delegates from the British Government. The British had 
proposed that Sir Michael Palairet should make a private visit to Paris to discuss the 
forthcoming conference, thus avoiding any publicity in the press. He continued by 
informing Washington that the British had already discussed the general situation with 
the French. As a consequence of this action, they had been provided with a copy of the 
original English text of the opening speech to be forwarded to Lord Winterton for his 
consideration. In a discussion with Palairet on 31st June, it was made quite clear that 
firstly, the British intended to devalue the importance of the proposed committee, whilst 
emphasising the importance of the League of Nations’ work with the refugees and 
secondly, they were adamant that the scope of the new committee should be severely 
limited. As a result of this, a copy of the draft conference resolution was passed over for 
consideration in London.37 
   In a further meeting with Lord Winterton and Palairet on 5th July, it was noted 
that the British strongly supported the work of the League and felt a new organisation 
would detract from the respect given to Sir Neill Malcolm and his organisation. They 
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suggested the obvious resolution to this situation was to ensure that the new 
Intergovernmental Committee should act in an advisory capacity to the League. 
However, they were informed  this was not acceptable and it was decided that the 
appointment of an informal committee to consider the final resolution for the conference 
was advisable.38 In a further move by the British to promote their conception of the new 
organisation as an advisory committee to the League, a dinner was hosted by Lord 
Winterton to discuss this concept and stress the importance of the work done by Sir 
Neill Malcolm. This approach changed immediately upon being informed that the new 
committee was envisaged as having a British chairman. This resulted in Lord Winterton 
communicating with the Prime Minister,thus bringing about a modification of the British 
approach and Lord Winterton accepting the position of Chairman on the new 
committee.39 It may be argued that although the British representatives gave the 
impression of accepting the wishes of the American administration, they did, in effect, 
achieve their goal of being in a position to exercise their influence over the newly 
constituted committee, thus ensuring that all future decisions made would benefit British 
policy towards the refugees. 
In both his opening and closing speeches, Lord Winterton, as instructed by 
London, adhered to the guidelines agreed at the various government meetings prior to 
the conference. In retrospect, his closing speech, which welcomed the inauguration of 
the Intergovernmental Committee to be based in London, reflected the influence of the 
pre- conference meetings.40 His reference to the situation in Palestine and the 
insistence that unlimited Jewish migration was not feasible due to the current political 
situation, was  justified  by the emphasis on the responsibility of the British Government 
to resolve the current problems with the indigenous population in the Mandate.41 He 
was, however, able to deflect any criticism of this stance by reaffirming the possibility of 
small-scale settlement in Kenya by Jewish refugees, subject to private funding, together 
with the announcement that further options in East Africa were under active 
consideration.42 
In his report to the Cabinet, Lord Winterton made the following observations: the 
desire of the American Government to broaden the conference agenda to encompass 
potential refugees coming from other countries apart from Germany and Austria, had 
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been successfully deterred; the Americans who had initially viewed the League as a 
dying concern, had, after some persuasion, accepted the principle of close collaboration 
between the newly-formed Intergovernmental Committee and the High Commissioner 
for Refugees. The inclusion of any denunciatory clause aimed at the German 
Government, had been avoided, thus ensuring that the British approach to Germany 
remained unimpeded. He thanked the Colonial Office for assisting him in announcing 
the possibility of small-scale settlement in Kenya and he advised the Cabinet that 
America was proposing to combine their quotas for refugees from Germany and Austria. 
He continued by stating that he believed the German Government might prove to be 
amenable in allowing Jewish emigrants to leave with a larger proportion of their assets 
and this would be promoted by the new Intergovernmental Committee. He concluded by 
informing the Cabinet of the proposed structure of the new organisation and announced 
that, with the approval of the Prime Minister, he would be both the Chairman and the 
British Representative. 
The response of the Cabinet members confirmed their traditional stance towards 
the refugees. The Home Secretary stated that he believed there was a growing attitude 
in the country against the admission of Jewish refugees and as a result, it was felt that 
permission could only be granted to individuals, dependent on their merits. The Colonial 
Secretary restated the case for limiting the entry of refugees into Palestine and informed 
the Cabinet that, although entry into Kenya was agreed, it would be limited in numbers. 
The possibility of migration to Northern Rhodesia was being opposed by the Non-Official 
Members of the Legislative Council. Finally, Lord Winterton informed the Cabinet that 
the annual British proportion of the Evian scheme would be £400.00 out of a total annual 
cost of £6000.00.43 In her analysis of the Colonial Office attitude, Louise London 
maintains that it never envisaged any form of mass settlement in the Empire by the 
Jewish refugees. She further states, that as a result of strong Arab opposition, the 
government was determined to limit Jewish entry into The Palestine Mandate. She 
argues an important reason for discouraging settlement was the fear that, by providing 
the possibility of immigration, it would  encourage Poland and Romania to force their 
large Jewish populations to migrate.44 In examining this argument, a further 
consideration is that the fear of encouraging mass migration from Eastern Europe as 
stated at the Evian Conference, could act as a catalyst in creating a xenophobic 
response towards the arrival of a substantial number of Jewish refugees. 
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In retrospect, the conference may be considered to be a total failure in terms of 
resolving the refugee crisis, since all the participating governments, whilst expressing 
deep sympathy for their plight, maintained that, due to both the economic conditions and 
the major employment problems being experienced worldwide, it was beyond their 
capabilities to offer any constructive assistance to resolve the growing problems. In 
contrast to this, as Louise London argues  from the British perspective, the original aims 
of the government had been achieved, since, in the coming months, Britain would be 
able to refer to the Intergovernmental Committee for any assistance to be given to the 
refugees rather than accept any responsibility on an individual level.45 The delegation 
had, therefore, been able to ensure that the façade of humanity displayed by the 
government towards the refugees remained intact without deviating from the traditional 
stance, initially adopted in 1905, of limited admittance to refugees into the country. The 
influence of the High Commissioner for Refugees, who was a British appointee, was 
maintained, whilst the influence of a British chairman on the newly-constituted 
committee ensured that the government would be admirably positioned to limit any 
potentially awkward situations in the future. In his analysis of the conference, 
A.J.Sherman argues that the mention of settlement in Kenya by Lord Winterton in his 
closing speech together with a brief mention of Palestine, had been an astute diplomatic 
move, since it was well received by all the delegates.46 As a result of this, Lord 
Winterton had been in a position to report to the Cabinet that the possibility of being put 
under pressure to grant large scale admittance to Jewish refugees into the Colonies and 
the Palestine Mandate, had been effectively circumscribed with the suggestion that 
there was a strong possibility of settlement opportunities being offered to German Jews 
in the East African colonies.47 Whilst supporting Sherman in his assessment of 
government policy towards settlement in the Colonies, Louise London states that mass 
settlement in the Empire was never a consideration due to the underlying fear of 
encouraging the forced eviction of the Jewish populations in Poland and Romania. 
 Refugees and Colonial attitudes 
This section will analyse the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the 
Governors of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia to support the contention of this thesis that 
a primary obstacle to the settlement of the Jews in the Colonies was the ingrained anti-
Semitism of both the Colonial Office and the Colonial Governors, which effectively acted 
as a major barrier to any potential settlement scheme involving Jewish refugees. The 
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assumption by the Colonial Office that it would be comparatively easy to organise small-
scale settlements of German Jewish refugees in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, was 
swiftly shattered by the response of the respective Colonial Governors. In his detailed 
study, A.J. Sherman suggests that the Colonial Office refused to countenance the 
possibility of settling Jewish refugees in the Colonies apart from Kenya.48 On the other 
hand, Frank Shapiro maintains that Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, was 
keen to implement the immigration of German Jews into various Colonies in Southern 
and Central Africa and he maintains that MacDonald showed great compassion towards 
the refugees.49 Hugh MacMillan refutes both these arguments and states that the British 
reaction towards settlement of Jewish refugees in the Colonies was dominated by the 
official government policy of appeasement.50  
The original proposal to settle a small number of German Jews in Kenya had 
originated from the Council for German Jewry in 1937 with the suggestion that a survey 
should be made in the Kenya Highlands on their behalf, by an officer of the Palestine 
Agricultural Department.51This request was forwarded to the Governor of Kenya for 
consideration who raised a series of objections as to the possibility of large-scale 
settlement. The global economic recession during the Thirties had a severe effect on the 
overall situation in Kenya. As world prices for crops slumped, the land under cultivation 
contracted dramatically, resulting in heavy indebtedness by the majority of landowners 
in 1939. Taking this situation into account, immigration was viewed as a potential benefit 
and the Kenya Association was formed to encourage new immigrants. One of its 
primary objectives was to scrutinise the potential settlers to ascertain their suitability to 
settle in a highly selective white community. Preference was given to potential 
immigrants who possessed the right background - that is British and Protestant. Other 
faiths and nationalities were not welcomed.52 Bernard Wasserstein suggests that it was 
the influential section of the white settler community who did not welcome the thought of 
a large-scale influx of Jews and he cites their success in thwarting a Jewish settlement 
scheme in Kenya, referred to as the Uganda project, which had been proposed by 
Joseph Chamberlain in 1903-4.53 In his reply, the Governor, whilst agreeing to the 
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proposed settlement of a limited number of German Jewish refugees, raised a series of 
objections to the possibility of a large scale settlement. He cited various reasons 
including the possibility of Jewish artisans or professionals jeopardising the economic 
prospects of the Indian and native populations and he demonstrated his own prejudice 
and the general feelings of the white community, in the following remarks to the Colonial 
Minister that: 
“I consider that a Jewish enclave of this kind would                                      
be an undesirable feature in the Colony…. I should                                        
have no objection to the carefully regulated influx of                                   
Jews of the right type”.54  
He reiterated these sentiments in a further letter sent in July when he discussed 
the reactions of the Indian community and the possible antagonism of the sizeable Arab 
community in the Colony against the proposed influx of German Jews.55 The Kenyan 
Indian community believed that the entry of German Jews would drastically change the 
racial balance of the indigenous population and could lead to the creation of serious 
employment problems.56 Their various objections were passed to the India Office in 
London and finally refuted by the Colonial Office.57 These responses from the Governor 
and the Indian community suggest that there was a degree of anti-Semitism which 
prevailed in the Colony based on the view of the Jews as the outsiders who did not 
conform to the accepted social mores of the white community. At the same time, the 
Indian community considered that the arrival of the Jews could pose a serious threat to 
their commercial activities. In assessing these responses, it is possible to discern a 
similarity to the accusations raised in 1905 that the Jewish immigrants were taking 
employment and business from the indigenous population in Britain. 
These objections together with the anti-Semitic attitude of the Governor, were to 
be repeated in March 1939 when it was proposed to increase the number of Jewish 
settlers from twenty-five to one hundred and fifty. The Governor raised serious doubts 
as to the financial stability of the organising body - The Plough Association  - and its 
capability to finance further immigration.58  In April, a further demonstration of the 
hostility towards potential immigrants was the imposition of a financial bond (£500.00) if 
the immigrant were deemed unable to return to his country of origin, together with the 
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stipulation that the guarantor of the bond must be a resident of the Colony.59 The 
Governor continued with his campaign to limit the number of immigrants into the Colony 
and in May he informed the Colonial Secretary that he feared some of the immigrants 
would deprive the indigenous population of employment, thus repeating the objections 
raised by the Indian community: 
“There is no shortage in those trades and occupations in   
 which German Jews are most likely to engage themselves.”60  
These later responses from the Governor and the Indian community clearly 
reiterated the earlier complaints raised by both parties  and it may be argued the 
prevailing antipathy shown towards the Jews was strongly influenced by the belief that 
the Jews were different.They did not conform to the accepted patterns of behaviour in  
colonial society and they were primarily concerned with organising commercial 
enterprises in order to obtain high profits to the detriment of business competitors. 
The initial response from the Governor of Northern Rhodesia was very similar to 
that of the Kenyan Governor. In July 1938, Government House informed London that 
the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council were strongly biased against any 
proposed scheme to settle Jewish refugees in the country because of their religion.61 
This anti-Semitism was reflected by Sir Leopold Moore when he objected (on 1st August) 
to the possibility of a Jewish settlement in Northern Rhodesia, in a speech reported in 
the Bulawayo Chronicle:  
“…less than a month ago I got to know that the Imperial  
 Government has designed a plan to settle in Northern  
  Rhodesia 500 families of Jewish refugees from Austria   
 Germany…. If the Imperial Government tries to foist upon   
 us….thousands of Jewish refugees I will oppose it.”62 
 
The intransigent attitude of the newly-appointed governor, Sir John Maybin, was, 
in many ways, supported by Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, who 
continued to procrastinate when the Foreign Office insisted that the opposition of the 
white community should be disregarded. MacDonald employed a series of delaying 
tactics and stated that he was loathe to prejudice any action that might result from 
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continuing consultations in the country.63 The deliberate delaying tactics employed by 
the Governor clearly illustrated the feeling of antagonism demonstrated towards the idea 
of offering a place of settlement to the German Jews. There were strong protests made 
by the leaders of both the Railway Workers’ Union and the Northern Rhodesia 
Mineworkers’ Union against the proposed Jewish immigration into the Colony. In a 
mirror image of the Kenyan response, it was feared that they would pose a threat to 
both the economic and employment situation which would have an adverse effect on the 
white population.64  
A further consideration is, although the Jewish refugees were of Germanic 
extraction, they were viewed as being  Semitic, originating from the Middle East. In his 
analysis of the Jew in literature, Brian Cheyette examines the differing depictions of 
Jews in the Empire at the turn of the century and in this context, rather than classifying 
them as part of the white population, they were viewed as Eastern or Oriental, which 
implied that they were not considered as being acceptable to white society.65  In the 
long-term, the white settlers had little to fear since it subsequently transpired that the 
financial cost of settling approximately 150 Jewish families in Northern Rhodesia was 
prohibitive – approximately £1,500.00 per family (£82,907.00 in current terms). It was 
realised that to settle a maximum of 400-500 families would have cost £500,000.00, 
which, as Sherman points out, was beyond the capability of the community to fund.66 
The Colonial Governors and the white hierarchy in the Colonies viewed Jews as 
outsiders who refused to assimilate into the English way of life although they were 
Caucasian Europeans. The perception that their different life style, religion and apparent 
refusal to assimilate into society, created an insurmountable barrier which effectively 
blocked the opportunity for large-scale settlement in the Colonies. They were 
considered to pose a major threat to business and employment, whilst the potential 
skills and opportunities they could bring to the Colonies, were disregarded. These 
attitudes reflected  the current thinking prevalent in the Colonial Office and the elite of 
white Colonial society. It may be argued that these attitudes were the result of the 
growing affluence of the Jewish business class in the last twenty years of the Nineteenth 
century together with the arrival of the Eastern European Jews from 1880 onwards. 
Their arrival had been considered to present a major threat to both employment and 
business. This viewpoint combined with the concept of their reluctance to assimilate into 
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the British way of life had been bitterly resented by the indigenous population of the 
areas in Britain, where they had initially settled. 
 
 Kristallnacht and its aftermath 
The equanimity of the Cabinet after the Evian Conference was shattered by the Nazi 
pogroms in Germany on November 9th-10th 1938, which became known as Kristallnacht. 
The mass destruction of Jewish property and businesses together with the wholesale 
imprisonment of Jewish men was to reverberate across Britain. The press, which had 
viewed the continued arrival of Jewish refugees as a major threat to both unemployment 
and the reason for an increase in anti-Semitism between July and September,67 in a 
complete volte-face now communicated the horrors perpetrated during the pogroms 
throughout Germany and Austria.68 The main focus of the reporting focused on the 
possibility of rescuing and admitting Jewish children into the country and this swiftly 
gained public support. In their analysis of the period, both London and Sherman suggest 
that, whilst the Jewish refugee organisations were prepared to accept the limited 
response of the government to the events of Kristallnacht, they took the opportunity to 
press for the admission of young refugees into the country.69 This section will examine 
both the reasons and the reactions of the government towards the proposals of the 
Anglo-Jewish leaders in their attempt to increase the number of young refugees entering 
the country. Louise London argues there were two different viewpoints on government 
action. Chamberlain was determined to maintain his diplomatic relationship with 
Germany; he did, however support the idea of immediate action, which would provide 
temporary relief for the refugees whilst insisting that consideration should be given to 
long-term projects such as settlement overseas, although he admitted that this 
possibility had a limited scope in the Colonies.70 In contrast to this, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
the Home Secretary, favoured a general acceptance of the younger refugee who would 
be of benefit to the country, thus demonstrating the humanity of the government to the 
rest of the world.71 A.J.Sherman suggests that the government was aware of major 
public concern both in Britain and America of the situation facing German Jewry and it 
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was feared in government circles that, unless there was a visible demonstration of 
assistance, there could be a deterioration of Anglo-American relations.72 
The government now came under considerable pressure from various church 
leaders, organisations and the public to allow the entry of more refugees into the country  
73but as R.Makins, from the Foreign Office, pointed out, the Nazi actions had effectively 
exacerbated the financial condition of the German Jews, thus creating further problems 
for any possible settlement in other countries. He did not think that the Home Office 
would be amenable in agreeing to an increase in the number of Jewish immigrants 
entering the country. On November 15th, a deputation from the Council for German 
Jewry had a meeting with the Prime Minister. They agreed, generally, with the 
government policy of limiting the entry of Jewish refugees into the country, but they now 
requested that children under the age of 17 should be allowed entry and, as in 1933, 
they gave a financial guarantee that all expenses would be privately funded, thus 
ensuring that there would be no cost to public funds; the deputation also stated the 
children would be educated and trained with a long-term view of ensuring their re-
emigration in the future. At the same meeting Dr. Weizmann, requested that 6,000 
young men being held in concentration camps and 1,500 children should be given 
immediate entry into Palestine. The final request at the meeting came from Viscount 
Bearstead and Lionel De Rothschild, who raised the possibility of financial assistance 
from the government to assist in aiding the departure of the Jews from the Reich.74  
In a wide-ranging discussion on the 16th November, the Cabinet confronted the 
implications of Kristallnacht and their response to it. It was noted that there had been a 
world-wide reaction to the events in Nazi Germany and great emphasis was placed on 
the alleged anti-British feeling now emanating from America. The Foreign Secretary 
indicated  it was based on the American assumption that, since  Britain was near to 
Germany, it was felt that the former was in a position to implement steps to halt the 
persecution of the Jews. It was also noted that the general public was not impressed by 
the apparent lack of government response to the devastation in Germany. The Colonial 
Secretary, whilst conceding that it was imperative to demonstrate a large degree of 
humanity to the refugees, insisted it was important to emphasise that possibilities of 
settlement in the Colonies should not be viewed as the ultimate panacea to the Jewish 
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problem. Furthermore, he did not think it feasible to increase the number of settlers in 
Kenya, which was currently limited to 25 families and he indicated that there was 
unequivocal opposition in Northern Rhodesia, from the unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council, to the possibility of Jewish refugees settling there. He concluded 
that the strongest possibility for potential settlement was British Guiana. The other 
ministers agreed that it would be a politically astute manoeuvre to indicate such a 
contingency. 75  
The Prime Minister then informed the Cabinet of his meeting with the deputation 
from the Council for German Jews. In the ensuing discussion, a number of points were 
made. Lord Winterton reiterated that all problems appertaining to the ongoing refugee 
problems had been discussed at Evian and resulted in the creation of a new 
organisation which, in similar fashion to the League of Nations, reflected many opinions 
and interests. He noted that America believed Britain was doing little to resolve the 
problems, which he insisted, was totally untrue and he cited the examples of Australia 
and New Zealand bowing to British pressure and accepting more Jewish refugees. This 
was supported by the Secretary of State for the Dominions who informed the meeting 
that he had already spoken to the Australian High Commissioner who had indicated that 
the annual quota for refugees of 5,000 might be raised to 6,000 or 7,000, which 
compared very favourably to the current American quota. Lord Winterton pointed out 
that the American quota had not been increased, although they had combined the 
German and Austrian quotas on an annual basis. He then informed the Cabinet that the 
real crux of the problem was the financial restrictions imposed on German Jews who 
wished to emigrate and that, until this was resolved, the emigration problem would 
remain insoluble.76 
The Home Secretary confirmed the belief that in order to exert pressure on 
America to expand assistance to the refugees, it was imperative that Britain was seen to 
visibly demonstrate a willingness to offer the possibility of settlement in Kenya, Northern 
Rhodesia and British Guiana. This suggestion was strongly supported by the Foreign 
Secretary who added that, if land were made available in British Guiana, there was a 
definite possibility that, apart from private financial assistance, the American 
Government might contribute towards potential settlement costs.77  The discussion then 
moved on to the current situation regarding the entry of refugees into the country. The 
Home Secretary informed the Cabinet that the country was receiving 1,000 letters daily, 
applying for entry into the country and these were being forwarded to the co-ordinating 
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committee dealing with potential immigrants. He stated that the Jewish organisations 
were averse to granting entry to a substantial number of refugees for fear of 
encouraging anti-Semitism. They did not wish to announce the number of Jews 
admitted, since they feared that they would be criticised for supporting either too many 
or too few refugees. He considered the government policy towards the refugees ably 
reflected public opinion and insisted that it was crucial to check individual immigrants to 
ensure that undesirable elements were excluded from the country. Taking these factors 
into account, he was agreeable to admitting a number of young Jews for agricultural 
training in order to facilitate their settlement elsewhere and he was in favour of 
accepting a number of Jewish maidservants to replace the German domestics who had 
returned home. He concluded his recommendations by informing the Cabinet that the 
Jewish Council was providing £5,000 per week to support the immigrants.78 Tony 
Kushner notes that this appearance of flexibility by the government towards the 
refugees was influenced by the knowledge that, since, in both these areas, any union 
activity was weak and the demand for domestics was high, there was little likelihood of 
any anti-refugee protest.79 
Further points raised during the meeting centred on the need to demonstrate 
positive action towards the Jews to assuage public opinion; the problem of informing the 
public how many Jews had been given permission to enter the country whilst wishing to 
demonstrate the humanitarian policy of the government and the fate of the older 
German Jews, who presented an impossible problem to resolve, since the Jewish 
Council did not classify them as being within their remit.80 The meeting concluded with 
the decision that a statement of policy for dealing with the Jewish problem, should be 
prepared by the Foreign, Home, Colonial and Dominions’ ministers in conjunction with 
Lord Winterton, as speedily as possible, for public announcement. 
In considering the points discussed by the Cabinet during this meeting, it should 
be noted that an important government objective was to consider how pressure could be 
brought to bear on America to amend its immigrant quota system and accept a greater 
responsibility for the refugees. The ministers involved in the discussion, whilst 
acknowledging the major difficulties the German Jews faced, still adhered to the time- 
honoured policies that had been pursued assiduously in the treatment of all refugees 
since the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act: this had focused at that time on the exclusion 
of Jewish immigrants wherever possible. However, whilst pursuing these goals, the 
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government was determined to maintain a façade of humanitarianism in the eyes of both 
the general public and the world.  
On the 21st November, the Prime Minister reiterated in the House of Commons 
the government stance on granting entry to the refugees. He announced that entry into 
the country was constrained by the capacity of the voluntary organisations in their ability 
to select, receive and maintain the refugees. Since 1933, 11,000 refugees had been 
granted entry together with a further 4,000 to 5,000 who had subsequently re-emigrated. 
He reminded the Commons that, as had been stated at the Evian Conference, the 
Empire did not automatically provide a solution to the re-settlement of the refugees, but 
options within the Colonies were being actively explored, particularly in British Guiana, 
subject to private financial assistance being available. He continued by announcing that 
a small experimental settlement scheme for young men in Kenya had been approved by 
the Colonial Governor and if this proved to be successful, permission would be given for 
their families to join them. In conclusion he briefly mentioned Palestine which he 
deemed to be too small to provide a solution to the Jewish refugee problem but he 
stated that approximately 40% of the Jewish emigrants into the country in the previous 
year had come from Germany. He expressed the hope that the newly formed 
Intergovernmental Committee would achieve a measure of success in solving the 
growing refugee problem.81 
In the ensuing debate, an impassioned account of the sufferings experienced by 
the Jews in Nazi Germany was given by Mr. Phillip Noel-Baker. This was duly supported 
by various other members of the House who all suggested that the settlement of the 
refugees throughout the Empire would provide an adequate solution to their plight. It 
could, to a large degree, be financed by the Jewry of the country with any additional 
finance assistance being provided by Britain. In his response, Sir Samuel Hoare, the 
Home Secretary, having briefly alluded to Evian and the possibility of settlement in the 
Empire, moved on to explain to the House the problems facing Britain in its ability to 
provide practical assistance to the growing refugee problem. He emphasised the issue 
of both foreign competition and unemployment in a densely populated industrial country, 
which could lead to growing resentment against alien immigration. He insisted that as a 
precaution against undesirable individuals masquerading as refugees, it was vital to 
maintain a check on all prospective immigrants.  This would be achieved by working in 
close liaison with the Co-ordinating Committee which dealt with the prospective 
refugees, to ascertain the financial situation of the individual and with the Minister of 
Labour to ensure that there was no threat to indigenous employment or industry. He 
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noted that as a result of this policy, 11,000 Germans had settled in the country and they 
had created 15,000 jobs in industry. 
He briefly reviewed the visa procedures in Germany and Austria and announced 
that the government was prepared to provide a temporary abode for trans-migrants who 
intended to settle elsewhere in the world. He informed the House of the training scheme 
which had been organised by the Co-ordinating Committee to train Jewish boys in 
agriculture and Jewish girls for domestic work in preparation for settlement in the 
Empire. Having expounded the virtues of the government policies towards young 
refugees, he finally announced the measures he was prepared to adopt in order to 
rescue ‘non-Aryan’ children. He stated that, subject to financial guarantees being 
provided by private organisations and individual sponsors, the Home Office was 
prepared to grant an unlimited number of entry visas for unaccompanied young people 
up to the age of 17 coming from the Reich, thus providing the official approval for the 
Kindertransport settlement scheme.82 This announcement ensured that the illusion of 
humanity which the government assiduously fostered internationally, as had been 
displayed at Evian with the announcement of potential settlement in Kenya and Northern 
Rhodesia, was maintained with minimal financial outlay. However, London argues that 
the policy to admit the children was a short-term solution gsince any possibility of 
permanent settlement was still subject to the existing immigration laws.83  
 Whilst considering this countenance of government generosity as a change of 
policy towards the refugees, it may be argued that the entry of Jewish children being 
totally dependent on funding from private organisations and charities, in effect, enabled 
the government to present a façade of generosity and humanity to both Europe and 
America but at no cost to itself. Likewise, as has been mentioned, the employment of 
young Jews in agriculture and domestic service would prove beneficial to the country 
with no financial outlay from the public purse. A further consideration is that the main 
reasons proffered by Hoare to maintain the restrictions on immigration, had not changed 
since 1905. The Jews, or as he initially termed them, the aliens, were still viewed as 
different, or, in some cases, undesirable, their arrival was considered as constituting a 
major threat to employment, which could create anti-Semitism which, with its long roots, 
was present in 1905 and 1917.  However, neither London nor Sherman make any 
allusion to this similarity. 
At a further Cabinet meeting in early December, as a result of a request from the 
Jewish Agency, consideration was given to granting entry to 21,000 Jews – 11,000 
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adults and 10,000 children in addition to the annual quota into Palestine. The original 
request from Chaim Weizmann in November had been ignored. The Colonial Secretary 
informed his colleagues that the children were guaranteed homes and he could not 
envisage their entry creating any problems in the Mandate. He then proceeded to argue 
against this idea by citing the reaction of the British representatives in the neighbouring 
Arab countries who had informed him that, in their view, if the scheme were to proceed, 
the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs would refuse to attend the proposed 
London Conference on Palestine; however, to counterbalance this, Weizmann had 
informed him that if the Jewish Agency request were refused, their representatives 
would withdraw from the Conference. He suggested that the immediate solution was to 
refuse entry for the children at the present time but it might be a possibility in the future. 
In the meantime, providing finance was available from the refugee organisations, the 
children could be brought into Britain. The Home Secretary concurred with this 
suggestion.84 The Secretary of State for India informed the Cabinet that he believed 
granting entry to the children would have an adverse effect on Muslim opinion and he 
had been informed by the Indian High Commissioner that the common view held in India 
was Britain was preparing to halt Jewish migration into the Mandate prior to the 
forthcoming conference.85  
Whilst supporting the arguments of the Colonial Secretary, the Foreign Secretary 
stressed the importance of achieving an agreement with the Arabs over the future of 
Palestine, but he conceded that it was imperative to consider the problem of large scale 
Jewish resettlement in its entirety. He further suggested that this might result in a 
change of policy currently being implemented by the Home Office which he strongly 
supported. Both the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary informed the meeting that 
they did not believe the Jews were in any position to substantiate their threat of 
withdrawal from the proposed London Conference.86 The Cabinet agreed that it was not 
possible to permit the children to enter Palestine at present, but it should be discussed 
at the forthcoming Conference.87 
  Whilst admitting that allowing the children into Palestine did not create any 
problems, this decision illustrated the continuing fear of upsetting Arab opinion, which 
now dominated government thinking. It may be argued that the reactions of the 
Secretary for India and the British representatives in the various Arab countries, were 
coloured by the traditional view of Jews as outsiders who created problems wherever 
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they settled.  The suggestion that they should enter Britain was perfectly acceptable, 
subject to the provision of private funding being available and it was agreed that there 
must be a concerted action to resolve the Jewish refugee crisis. Whilst wishing to 
display profound sympathy  towards the Jews under Nazi rule, a prime requisite of the 
government was to maintain its adherence to its traditional immigration policy regardless 
of the consequences for the Jewish refugees. The other dominant factor in its response 
was the determination to maintain its dominance in the Middle East, as the prospect of a 
potential war loomed in early 1939. 
 
 Britain declares war September 1939 
On September 3rd, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. This section will analyse the 
initial government response to the entry of refugees from Europe and the reasons for its 
change of policy  towards the refugees resident in Britain after the invasion of France in 
1940. It will consider the reasons for the persistence of anti-Semitism through an 
examination of the weekly Intelligence reports prepared for the Home Office and the 
response of the Anglo-Jewish leaders in their attempts to combat it. 
 In the final days before the declaration of war, various measures had been 
invoked in preparation for such an event. As a precursor to the possibility of war, the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill was passed in August 1939 by both the Commons 
and the Lords.88The Bill replicated the conditions contained in the 1914 Bill89 which 
effectively handed unlimited power to the government during a time of war. This transfer 
of power was clearly demonstrated in a circular issued by the Colonial Secretary to the 
High Commissioner of Kenya in October 1939. The circular stated that no further 
permits were to be issued to potential refugees still resident in Germany and admittance 
was only granted to refugees now resident in neutral or allied countries; entry would be 
subject to a detailed investigation of the individual visa application, due to wartime 
conditions.90 It informed the Governor that special tribunals had been created in order to 
review all German, Austrian and Czechoslovakian nationals, to ensure that they were 
genuine refugees.91 The refugees were thus placed in three categories: Class A were 
viewed as presenting a threat to the country and were interned; Class B were subject to 
certain restrictions of liberty and Class C were cleared completely.92 This section will 
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examine these policies and consider why the comparatively lenient measures initially 
applied to the refugees were amended to implement internment of all refugees in 1940.   
 A.J.Sherman suggests that the main reasons for the policy to halt the entry of 
refugees still resident in Germany and to subject refugees in neutral countries to further 
investigation, was partly driven by the lack of funds available to the various refugee 
organisations, the high level of unemployment amongst the refugees and the 
government view that they posed a major security risk to the country.93 Tony Kushner 
maintains that the cancellation of pre-war visas was based on two reasons - security 
grounds since it was believed that any refugees arriving after the declaration of war 
might be enemy agents since they would require German authorisation to leave 
Germany, together with the fear of an increase in domestic anti-Semitism. The latter fear 
was supported in government circles where it was agreed that an increasing number of 
people supported the anti-Semitic ideas of National Socialism.94  Louise London argues 
that, although the Home Office displayed some sympathy towards the refugees in 
Britain, they did not consider the plight of the continental Jews to be part of their remit, 
since the British Government stated it was fulfilling its contribution towards solving the 
refugee crisis by destroying the Nazi regime. She suggests that the Home Office was 
able to implement a further tightening of its entry regulations as a result of the power 
emanating from the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill. The main consideration now 
became the possible usefulness of the potential immigrant to the war effort; the concept 
of humanitarian grounds ceased to exist.95 With the declaration of war, entry into Britain 
for refugees was effectively halted. It was extremely concerned that some of the 
refugees granted entry might now prove to be passing information to the enemy but until 
the invasion of France in June 1940, government treatment of the refugees remained 
unchanged. In the aftermath of the fall of France, the government response towards 
refugees would ensure that entry into Britain was non-existent for Jewish refugees.  
A further consideration is that, by insisting only the careful vetting of foreign 
aliens would ensure the long-term security of the country, the government was now in a 
position to justify the continuity of ensuring its ability to maintain a rigid control over 
immigration. In 1940, in his reply to Eleanor Rathbone, to grant admission to Czech 
refugees, Sir John Anderson, the Home Secretary, expressed the fear that nationals 
from Occupied Countries could be used by the German authorities to obtain sensitive 
information which would be of assistance to them.96 This situation was to change  
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dramatically as the Phoney War ceased in April 1940, with the collapse of Norway. The 
national press, looking for a scapegoat, announced that there was evidence of a Fifth 
Column and the finger was pointed at the enemy aliens - refugees.97 The targeting of 
the predominantly Jewish refugees as enemy aliens bore a striking resemblance to the 
accusations of Jewish refugees supporting the Bolsheviks in 1917. 
With the fall of Holland and Belgium, the first tightening of restrictions on aliens 
was implemented with the internment of all enemy aliens residing in the South-East and 
the Eastern Counties.98This was swiftly followed by further internment of all category B 
German and Austrian males on 16th May99 and females in the same category at the end 
of the month.100 This process continued and by mid-July, the majority of Austrian and 
German Jewish refugees were interned.101 Many books have been written about this 
period including Collar the Lot  and Anderson’s Prisoners.102In his detailed account 
published in 1940, F.Lafitte chronicled the first record of the activities of the refugees, 
the influence of the press and the Government response, which resulted in the 
wholesale internment of all the Jewish refugees in Britain.103 This action was reversed in 
1941, when it was agreed that a substantial number of internees were to be deemed 
eligible for release in order to contribute to the war effort.104 The continuing fear of 
German spies was used as an excuse by the government in their refusal to provide 
assistance for, or entry to, the Jewish refugees as they attempted to escape from 
Occupied Europe into Great Britain or the Palestine Mandate.105 The growing influence 
of the Zionist movement in both Britain and Palestine presented further problems for the 
government, as they continued to enforce the allocation quota set out in the Palestine 
White Paper of 1939. The quota had been created in order to restore a semblance of 
peace to the region and maintain good relations with the Arabs since Palestine was 
viewed as a vital strategic part of British diplomacy in the region.106 In his analysis of the 
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influence of the 1939 White Paper on Palestine on the Colonial Office,107 Wasserstein 
argues that the agreed policy of instigating an annual quota for the admittance of Jews 
into the Mandate ensured that Arab support was maintained since this was required in 
order to guarantee oil supplies and control of the Suez Canal. He further suggests that 
the determination of the Colonial Office officials to adhere to this policy resulted in a 
perception of the Jews as being overbearing in their attempts to obtain some relaxation 
of the entry requirements to the Mandate.108 The results of this are examined by 
A.J.Sherman in his analysis of the Colonial officials in the Mandate during the war, who 
viewed the Jews as difficult to deal with,109 whilst Tom Segev states that, overall, the 
British reaction towards the European Jews was governed by the inability to come to a 
definite decision on the future of the Mandate without losing the support of the Arab 
population.110This combination of ideas and policies would dominate government 
thinking throughout the period as news began to filter through, of the Nazi policies being 
implemented against the Jews under their control and their reaction to the news from 
Europe appertaining to the plight of the Jews under Nazi control during 1942.    
 The accusations in both the Press and the Government, which suggested that 
the refugees presented a substantial threat towards the security of the country, were 
reminiscent of the accusations made against the German Jews during the last war. 
Then, prominent members of the Anglo-Jewish community with affiliations in Germany, 
had been forced publicly to declare their loyalty to Britain.111 There is a further similarity 
with the accusations of a Fifth Column and the depiction of Russian Jews actively 
supporting the Bolshevik Revolution.112  While accepting the arguments of Sherman that 
the lack of funds available to the various refugee organisations and the possibility of a 
threat to the security of the country and  Louise London, that the plight of the continental 
Jews was not regarded as a responsibility of the government during this period, it is 
possible to trace a pattern of reaction reflected in the response of the country towards 
the refugees when they were viewed as presenting a threat to national security during 
war time.                                                                                                                    
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When considering the overall attitude of the government towards the 
predicament of the German Jewish refugees after the Anschluss in March 1938 and 
during the early years of the war, a clear policy towards the refugees emerges. The 
government, as London points out, was determined to maintain a rigid policy of 
immigration control, thus limiting the entry of Jews into the country. In order to achieve 
this, it employed all means at its disposal, including the acceptance of private finance for 
the Kindertransport, whilst portraying itself as humanitarian in its public attitude towards 
the refugees. Taking into account the arguments of Sherman and London as to the 
reactions of the government during this period, a further consideration is that the 
accusations levelled against the refugees that they represented a security threat to the 
country, bear a striking similarity to the discourse against the Jewish immigrants during 
the First World War, which may also be considered as a major contributory factor 
towards the growing xenophobia and anti-Semitism during this period. 
 
 Anti-Semitism 
In considering the reasons for the government preoccupation with the threat of 
increased anti-Semitism, a major factor to take into account was that its resurgence  
throughout the world did not leave Britain unscathed during the Thirties. The British 
Union of Fascists under the leadership of Sir Oswald Mosley, whilst presenting an 
extreme view of the pernicious influence of Jews in Britain, did, to a limited degree, 
reflect the general perceptions of the Jews particularly in the East End of London with its 
tradition of ‘anti-alien hostility which had emphasized anti-semitism from the turn of the 
century.’113 In everyday life, different levels of discrimination were applied to them. They 
were discouraged from applying for certain jobs, banned from some restaurants and 
hotels, not accepted for membership of certain golf clubs and discouraged from entering 
certain professions such as teaching in better-known schools and in medicine.114 The 
dominant fear caused by the lack, or loss of, employment during the Thirties, created a 
climate of active discrimination against the employment of Jews.115 These attitudes are 
discussed by various historians including Louise London and J.M.Ritchie, in their 
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examination of the reaction of the medical organisations towards the arrival of German 
and Austrian doctors and dentists. The representative bodies camouflaged their 
antagonism towards the refugees by inferring that their medical expertise was not of the 
standard required by the British organisations and to allow them to practise would be 
unprofessional.116  
A further consideration is that the fear caused by the lack, or loss of, 
employment during this period may be viewed as a reflection of the reaction towards the 
Eastern European Jews at the turn of the century when they were accused of depriving 
the indigenous population of employment. This underlying influence of anti-Semitism 
was aggravated by the arrival of the German and Austrian Jews who were viewed as 
outsiders who did not conform to the British way of life and who presented a threat to 
the status quo. In a determined attempt to encourage German Jews to behave in a 
manner acceptable to the English, the Board of Deputies of British Jews issued a 
booklet While you are in England  ( in English and German).117 The booklet, which has 
been used as the basis of a novel depicting the struggles of a German couple who 
struggle to assimilate into Britiain,118  included basic information such as the various 
organisations involved in providing assistance to the newly-arrived refugee, how to 
register with the local police, types of work allowed and training offered to young 
people.119 The main thrust of the booklet, whilst specifically produced for the German 
Jews, concentrated on what constituted acceptable behaviour from the refugees and its 
advice could be applied to all incoming refugees regardless of race or religion.The 
booklet included the following points: 
 
“1. Spend your time immediately in learning the English  
       language and its correct pronunciation. 
2. Refrain from speaking German in the streets and in   
      public conveyances and in public places such as restaurants 
      …do not talk in a loud voice. Do not read German newspapers 
      in public. 
3. Do not criticise any Government regulations, nor the way  
     things are done over here. Do not speak of “how much better  
     this or that is in Germany. 
4. Do not join any Political organisations. 
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5. Do not make yourself conspicuous by speaking loudly, nor  
     by your manner or dress.”120 
 
 In contrast to this, evidence suggests that the problems experienced by the 
newly- arrived refugees contributed to the difficulties resulting from their struggle to 
adapt to a different way of life in a strange country. These problems are analysed by 
Stefan Howald and Irene Wells in their detailed investigation of everyday life for the 
refugees during the war121 and discussed in detail by Marian Berghan.  In her 
conclusion, Berghan argues that, whilst the refugees were struggling to adapt to an 
unfamiliar way of life, they were faced with a substantially hostile reception created by 
the growing level of xenophobia in the country.122   
The perception of the Jews as outsiders, was to be restated throughout the war 
and little sympathy was extended towards their situation in Europe. In his assessment of 
the government response to the plight of the Jewish refugees, Kushner suggests that 
the ethos behind their actions was strongly influenced by an instinctive dislike of Jews 
since there was a general perception that they were different and refused to assimilate 
into British society, which was not compatible with the prevailing liberal attitudes of the 
time.123 On the other hand, Russell Wallis argues that the government, whilst using the 
excuse of anti-Semitism to defer difficult decisions, genuinely believed that any display 
of sympathy for the plight of the Jews would generally exacerbate anti-Semitism.124  
 In his rigid adherence to the maintenance of the immigration laws, Herbert 
Morrison, the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, epitomised the attitude of 
the government towards the admittance of Jewish refugees. In her detailed analysis of 
the government attitude towards the European Jews from the outbreak of war in 1939 
until their acknowledgement of the extermination of the Jews in December 1942 Louise 
London argues that overall government policy was based on ‘a context of self-interest, 
opportunism and an over-riding concern with control.’125 She points out that after May 
1940, the Home Office was even more rigid in its control of granting entry to war 
refugees and that, in effect, this relegated humanitarian aid for the refugees to the side-
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lines.126 She maintains that a further factor was the official government policy that the 
demands of the war effort superseded the plight of the refugees, thus providing official 
justification for granting admission to a strictly limited number of refugees who were 
considered to be of benefit to the war effort. She argues that this official justification of 
rigidly controlled entry, dominated all levels of government thinking and, ultimately, it 
became increasingly difficult for individual government officials to provide humanitarian 
aid where necessary, although the official stance was one of humanitarianism.127 
In his assessment of the government attitude towards the Jews between 1939 -
1945, Bernard Wasserstein argues that their plight was not considered to be of major 
importance within the context of the whole war, since it was accepted as the norm, that 
full support would be given by the Jews for the Allied cause, thereby negating any 
display of preferential treatment towards them as a separate group. Consequently, they 
were never viewed as a special case.128 He concedes that there was an element of anti-
Semitism in government circles, but he suggests that this did not exert a major influence 
on government attitudes. He concludes that a primary reason for the indifference shown 
towards the Jews was a lack of comprehension as to the aims of the Nazi-Jewish policy. 
He argues that the conventional moral code of the majority of the civil servants involved 
in the decisions and attitudes to be applied to the Jews, could not come to terms with 
the lack of ethics and morals applied to the Jews under Nazi rule.129 
In August 1942, the British Consul in Switzerland forwarded a copy of a telegram 
from Gerhart Reigner, the Secretary of the World Jewish Congress in Geneva, to Sidney 
Silverman M.P., Chairman of the British Section of World Jewish Congress. The 
organisation, based in London, provided the only link between Switzerland and the 
headquarters in America, thus becoming a vital centre since London effectively became 
the diplomatic centre of the world.130 This was illustrated when it played a major part in 
exposing the Nazi atrocities in Europe by the forwarding of the report, which had been 
received by Sydney Silverman M.P. in London, from the Geneva Section, detailing the 
Nazi policy of Jewish extermination, to Rabbi Stephen Wise, the leader of the World 
Jewish Congress, in America.131 Alex Easterman, the London Congress Secretary, 
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worked in close liaison with Sydney Silverman M.P. and consistently lobbied the Foreign 
Office on behalf of the European Jews.  
The telegram contained details of the proposed extermination of European Jewry 
by the Nazis.132 It was noted by D. Allen, on September 10th, that no confirmation had 
been received to substantiate the claims, although the Foreign Office had received 
numerous reports of Jews being massacred on a large scale. Various other sections 
within the department were consulted, but no other information was available. Finally, 
Frank Roberts decided that the telegram should be passed on to Silverman with the 
comment: 
“I do not see how we can hold up this message much                                          
longer, although I fear it may provoke embarrassing                         
repercussions. Naturally we have no information bearing                                                
on this story.”133                                      
When Silverman requested permission to forward a copy to Rabbi Stephen Wise 
in New York and asked for Foreign Office comments on the possibility of publishing the 
report, yet again D. Allen commented, that although various reports detailing the bad 
treatment of Jews deported to Poland appeared to partially support the report received 
from Switzerland: 
“We have also received plenty of evidence that Jews …                 
have perished as a consequence of mass deportations                                  
and executions. Such stories do provide a basis for                                            
Mr. Reigner’s report but they do not amount to                                               
‘extermination at one blow’  I do not think we should                                                
be wise to make use of this story in propaganda…..                                              
We should not help matters by taking any further action                            
on the basis of this rather wild story.” 134 
This refusal to publicly acknowledge the destruction of the European Jews may, 
as Wasserstein argues, be seen as total incomprehension of a deliberate policy of 
extermination, but there was also a perception in both the Foreign and the Colonial 
Offices that generally, the Jews were prone to exaggeration in order to gain their 
objectives as well as sympathy for their alleged ill-treatment, as expressed by various 
civil servants: 
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“…As a general rule Jews are inclined to magnify their persecution.”135    
“Jewish Agency sob stuff.”136                                                                       
”The Jewish technique of atrocity propaganda.”137                    
These somewhat derogatory remarks clearly displayed a degree of anti-
Semitism, which it may be argued reflected an attitude that was considered to be  
acceptable by an element of the Colonial Office administration. This opinion of Jewry in 
general may be considered to display a pattern of response based on the original 
reactions and perceptions towards the arrival of the Jews in 1905. They had been 
viewed then, as alien in their dress, language and manners and this image of difference 
still lingered in certain echelons of the government.   
 In his analysis, Russell Wallis argues that the government genuinely believed 
any display of sympathy for the plight of the Jews would generally exacerbate anti-
Semitism,138 whilst Kushner argues it was the fear of domestic anti-Semitism that 
resulted in their refusal to relax the immigration laws during this period. He does, 
however, state that Morrison’s insistence on the maintenance of the immigration laws 
was fully supported by the Cabinet at all times and this, combined with their refusal to 
initially acknowledge the continuing destruction of European Jewry, suggests a definite 
anti-Jewish bias within the higher echelons of government.  Morrison insisted on more 
than one occasion, that any relaxation of the immigration laws could stimulate the 
growth of anti-Semitism and in support of this argument, he cited the weekly reports of 
black-marketeering from the Home Information Section, which monitored the causes of 
anti-Semitism on a national basis.139 As a result of this attitude, he was viewed by a 
group of the campaigners, led by Eleanor Rathbone, as holding anti-Semitic views for 
his refusal to grant a substantial number of visas for Jewish children to enter Britain in 
late 1942.140 In contrast to this alleged attitude of anti-Semitism, he publicly condemned 
the Nazi atrocities in Czechoslovakia and Poland at a rally organised by the Labour 
Party in September 1942.141 This seemingly ambiguous approach to the Jewish 
refugees was to become a hallmark of his attitude towards them throughout the war, as 
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in his capacity as Home Secretary, he continued to adhere to and administer the 
immigration laws.  
 The weekly reports produced for the Home Intelligence Section contained a 
separate section which monitored the various reasons which contributed to the rise and 
fall of anti-Semitism across the country. Tony Kushner examines the causes of anti-
Semitism in British society from various angles throughout World War II and he 
suggests that the stresses in society at this time, such as rationing and the threat of 
invasion, required a convenient scapegoat to act as a safety valve. He argues that the 
Jews were an eminently suitable group to fulfill this role, since it was a traditional role 
that they had fulfilled in the past.142  
 The Public and Anti-Semitism 
Throughout the duration of the war, the regular weekly reports on the morale of the 
nation produced by the Home Intelligence Section, included a section devoted to anti-
Semitism which was used by the government to monitor both any increase in its growth 
and the possible causes for it. These reports attempted to answer the following 
questions: what was the general attitude of the public towards the Anglo-Jewish 
community and why did it perceive them as a separate group who were consistently 
accused of dominating the black market, profiteering and evading military service? What 
was the response of the Anglo-Jewish leaders towards these accusations and what 
measures did they implement in a determined effort to counteract the various 
imputations levelled against the Jews in general?  
One of the main accusations levelled at the Jews was their participation in the 
black market with allegations ranging from trafficking in cigarettes143 to the increase in 
the number of Jews being prosecuted for alleged criminal black market trading.144 In his 
analysis of these accusations, Kushner argues that a parallel may be drawn with the 
depiction of Medieval Jews and usury and he expands this theme by comparing the 
concept of profiteering with the portrayal of Shylock.145  This argument is supported by 
Todd M .Endelman who states that during the 1920s and 1930s many writers including 
H.G.Wells, John Buchan,T.S.Eliot  and  Rudyard Kipling depicted Jews as objectional 
individuals who gave offense with their appearance and alleged participation in criminal 
activities.146 These varying depictions of Jews in literature are analysed by Brian 
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Cheyette who states that there is no one stereotype of the Jew in English literature 
during this period and he argues that authors ‘actively construct them in relation to their 
own literary and political concerns’ and as he suggests, this influence on writing resulted 
in Jews being depicted  as both acceptable and despicable in behaviour and attitude.147 
  A further allegation levelled at the community was the apparent avoidance of 
military service by Jewish men with the comment ‘one thing Hitler has done is to put 
these damned Jews in their place.’148 Other causes of anti-Semitism were fuelled by the 
perception that the Jews were profiting from the war, their dominance in variety 
broadcasts from the BBC and their preponderance in certain industries.149  
The most serious allegation levelled at them was that they had been the cause 
of the Bethnal Green shelter tragedy because they had panicked when entering the 
shelter. On March 3rd ,1943, a major catastrophe occurred, when due to inadequate 
lighting, many people perished as they attempted to enter the bomb shelter at Bethnal 
Green tube station. An immediate reaction was that the Jews were to blame and this 
was reported in the Home Intelligience weekly reports: 
“These East End Jews; they were so terrified, that they  
  stampeded.” 
“The trouble was occasioned by the Jews.”150  
                                                                                                                                                     
 In his report produced on the 23rd March, 1943, L.R.Dunne acknowledged the public 
belief that the tragedy had been caused by Jews panicking: 
“That this was a Jewish panic. This canard had a much                                                                              
wider circulation and was, I understand endorsed by the                                      
broadcast utterances of a renegade traitor from Germany.” 
He then categorically demonstrated the falseness of this belief with the following 
comments: 
                        “ Not only is it without foundation, it is demonstratably false.      
                The Jewish attendance at this shelterwas, and is, so small    
                as to constitute a hardly calculable percentage.”151 
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The actual cause of the disaster, in which 173 people, including 60 children, were 
crushed to death, was shown to be due to the inadequate entry facilities into the shelter. 
There was only one entrance for a shelter that could house 10,000 people: 
“From the street there was only one entrance, the doors of        
which opened inwards and led to a flight of nineteen steps.        
These steps were defective very faintly illuminated, and                              
though 10 feet wide, without a hand-rail in the centre.                                
There was no physical means of controlling the crowd               
and no warden posted there.”152  
 
The accusations that the Jews were prone to panicking as displayed at Bethnal 
Green, was a commonly held belief and in a determined  attempt to refute any 
accusation of cowardice, Victor Rothschild, the Labour Peer, refused to evacuate his 
three children to America, with the comment to Chaim Weizmann: 
“If I sent those three little things over, the world would  
  say that seven million Jews are cowards.”153 
 
 Furthermore, detailed regional reports were produced which highlighted the 
prevalence of anti-Semitism in different parts of the country. Both Leeds and Brighton 
were considered to be riddled with ill-feeling towards the Jews and various accusations 
levelled against them included cornering the supply of commodities and charging higher 
prices, manipulating the use of coupons, displays of ostentation and dominating the 
entertainment industry.154 Other common accusations maintained that the Jews, 
generally, avoided work, they were dirty and they should go to Palestine, as illustrated in 
a letter sent to the Board of Deputies in June 1942. The writer, who was horrified at the 
anti-Semitic remarks she had heard during a visit to her hairdressing salon, cited the 
following comments: 
“If the Jews had any decency they’d go to Palestine.               
What are we doing, keeping a lot of Jews here? They                
never work… they were so dirty that the authorities               
didn’t wish to have them.”155 
 
“Hitler’s’ original plans were quite right…...many of Hitler’s      
ideas, especially in connection with the Jews, are good”.156 
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In her analysis of the general perception of the Jews, Sonya O. Rose suggests 
that the ‘myth of the blitz’ as described by Angus Calder, the endurance of the British to 
cope with the bombing, food shortages and general deprivation, required the 
counterpoint of the Jews, as aliens who did not conform to reinforce the ideal created. 
The creation of this outsider was then employed to depict the stoicism of the native 
Briton to boost the self-esteem of the nation. She suggests that it was this requirement 
which fuelled the anti-Semitism in the public domain.157  
 
 Perhaps in considering the allegations reported to the Home Intelligence 
Section, it should be noted that the various charges levelled against the Jews, 
demonstrate an uncanny resemblance to the imputations levelled against them during 
World War One when they had been accused of profiting from the war, refusing to enlist 
for military service and cowardice.158  As a consequence of this similarity, it may be 
argued that the original perception of the Jewish immigrants as being intent on pursuing 
all financial opportunities, even to the detriment of the indigenous population, still 
exerted a strong influence on the public credence in similar circumstances twenty-five 
years later. 
 
 The Response of the Anglo–Jewish Leaders 
 
In 1938, the Board of Deputies created a Co-ordinating Committee (for defence 
measures), in order to combat the increase of anti-Semitsm. This section will trace the 
growth of its importance as it evolved into the Defence Committee to monitor and advise 
on any anti-Semitism affecting political, economic and social matters.  
 Information and assistance were provided to the committee through the Trades 
Advisory Council, which, initially, met infrequently. In 194O it was reconstituted and in 
1941, it became a democratic organisation, the Trades Advisory Council of British 
Jewry, commonly known as the Trades Advisory Council.  The membership base 
included Jewish traders, industrialists and professionals.159 The main aims of this body 
were to strengthen and maintain standards of integrity, deal with all aspects of Jewish 
participation in both trade and industry, examine complaints and irregularities which 
involved both Jews and non-Jews in trade and business and monitor any forms of 
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discrimination, such as defamatory statements in the newspapers.160 The integral part 
this body was to play in the Anglo-Jewish response to combat the various anti-Semitic 
accusations levelled at the community, was illustrated in an address given by The 
Chairman of the Board of Deputies in March 1942. He was adamant that the role of the 
Council was to ensure that all Jews, whether traders or members of the public, acted in 
a manner befitting their position as representatives of the Jews worldwide, with a view  
to working  towards the elimination of black market participation in the community.161 It 
may be argued that this statement implied an acknowledgement that the Jews were, as 
Todd Endelman suggests, engaged in sharp practices which tended to exacerbate 
accusations of involvement in the black market,162 but consideration must be given to 
the overall stance of the Board of Deputies which had evolved during the Thirties and 
was based on a determination to maintain an unobtrusive profile at all times.163 In  an 
address from the chairman of the Trades Advisory Council  in April 1942, the following 
points were made: 
“At a recent meeting of the Teignmouth (Devon) Chamber  
  of Commerce a   tradesman said that he had been told that 
  a Jewish financial syndicate had been formed to purchase  
  all available goods in the country, and to market these  
  goods through Jewish houses only.”164 
He disclosed that illegal practices by Jewish businesses had been investigated 
recently. These had included eight firms controlled by Rabbis who had been exposed as 
employing Jewish refugees and exploiting their labour.165 In 1942, a report was carried 
in the national press describing the work of the Council as ‘Black Market Tribunals’ 
which had been established in the main Jewish communities to deter black market 
practices.166 
In the continued attempts to dispel the idea that the black market was dominated 
by Jews, the secretary of the Jewish Manchester Information Committee produced a 
report which focused on the level of reporting in the national press which indicated 
Jewish participation, as opposed to non-Jewish participation. The report included a short 
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list of cases published in both the national and local press where the emphasis was 
placed on the religion of the individual.167 Other actions taken by the community 
included the preaching of a sermon by the Chief Rabbi condemning Jewish participation 
in the black market which was reported in the national press,168 together with various 
public speeches denouncing the involvement of Jews in illicit dealings.169 
In his examination of Anglo-Jewish leadership during this period, Bolchover 
argues a major concern of the community leadership was to dispel the perception of 
Jewish dominance in the black market as they feared that this would stimulate the 
growth of anti-Semitism. He suggests that the creation of the Trades Advisory Council 
was the result of the Communities’ acceptance of emancipation in Britain as a contract 
which supported the concept that the Jews should not display any individuality or 
separate nationality traits which would demonstrate their differences in acceptable 
society.170 Such fear was a major factor behind the creation of the Trades Advisory 
Council through which they endeavoured to refute the numerous allegations levelled 
against the community by the public, as a result of rationing and general shortages in all 
spheres of life. In examining the actions of the community, it may be argued that, apart 
from the influence of rising anti-Semitism during the Thirties, it was the memory of the 
accusations levelled against the Russian Jews during World War One, when they were 
accused of refusing to enlist, of avoiding work and of profiteering, which still exerted a 
strong influence on their actions. 
In his analysis of this period, Tony Kushner discusses the attitude and ideas of 
the Establishment and the general population towards the Jews, suggesting that they 
were seen as outsiders who did not attempt to assimilate into general society.171 Many 
people believed that it was their behaviour and attitude towards non-Jews which created 
the prejudice against them. They were perceived as business people who grasped at 
any opportunity to make money,they dominated certain areas such as shops and 
finance and were strongly involved in the black market.172 These perceptions which 
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continued throughout  and after the war, are clearly illustrated in letters received by 
Eleanor Rathbone and Victor Gollancz: 
“Do you realise the feelings of the Hampstead residents  
 towards these German Jews? …. They are rude, insolent,   
 greedy inconsiderate and arrogant.”    
 
  “Jews are a sticky lot ….and in all the outstanding Black Market 
  convictions the prime mover has been a Jew.”173  
 
            “Jews protest too much…. And the Jews in spite of                      
              conflicting figures from all quarters, have not the                                                                                                                           
   monopoly of suffering.” 
“The non-refugee Jews do in fact obtain goods in short                                    
supply by greasing the palms of shopkeepers.”174                                                                                                                                                                                        
             
A further factor to be considered is the influence of traditional Christian teachings 
which depicted the behaviour and attitude of the Jew as being the cause of his own 
nemesis. Kushner examines the influence of his thinking which implied that the 
persecution of the Jews was related to their own behaviour namely the crucifying of 
Jesus Christ, although he argues that the Council of Christians and Jews battled to 
overcome the belief that anti-Semitism was the fault of the Jews.175 Tom Lawson 
supports this and suggests that the Holocaust was a partial Christian crime.176 In his 
expose of the Nazi degradation of Jews during the Thirties, the Archbishop of Durham 
implied that the traditional Christian attitudes towards the Jews provided the basis of 
anti-Semitism which supported their ideas.177 Kushner concludes his analysis of the 
causes of anti-Semitism during this period by suggesting that, because Britain was 
liberal in thinking and supported national individualism, it expected the Jews to 
assimilate rather than persist in their adherence to belonging to a specific collective 
body.178  
This argument is supported by David Cesarani who suggests that the creation of 
‘The Other’ is an integral part of British political culture.179 Perhaps, in considering the 
                                                          
173ULL XIV2 17 (63) Mrs.M. Crabtree letter to Eleanor Rathbone 25/1/44; (62) (63) A.H. Gray letters to 
Eleanor Rathbone 5/12/43,15/12/43  
174Warwick University M55/157/3/4/NT/1/20 C. Henderson letter to Victor Gollancz,28/6/45; 
Gollancz;28/6/45;M55/157/3/4/NT/1/20Leonard Soper letter to Victor Gollancz 28/6/45 
175 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination.,p.166, 
176 Tom Lawson, The Church of England and the Holocaust. Christianity, Memory and Nazism 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006), pp.101-102 
177 The Bishop of Durham, The Yellow Spot (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936),pp.5-8 
178  Kushner, The persistence of prejudice.,p.161 
179 David Cesarani, ’An Alien Concept? The Continuity of Anti-Alienism in British Society before 1940’, in 
David Cesarani & Tony Kushner (Eds.) The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain (London: 
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allegations reported to the Home Intelligence Section, it should be noted that the various 
accusations levelled against the Jews, demonstrate an uncanny resemblance to those 
levelled against them during World War One when they had been accused of profiting 
from the war, refusing to enlist for military service and cowardice.180 As a consequence 
of this similarity, it may be argued that the original perception of the Jewish immigrants 
between the years 1880-1905 had created an ingrained pattern of response which still 
exerted an influence on the public reaction in similar circumstances, twenty-five years 
later. 
Whilst accepting the various arguments of London, Wasserstein, Kushner etc. in 
examining the variety of reasons behind the reported increase in anti-Semitism, the 
response of the Anglo-Jewish community and the attitude of various government 
officials towards the Jewish refugees, there is a further concept to be considered, based 
on the fact that the main link among the responses of the different groups was the 
continuing influence exerted by the memories of the reactions towards the arrival of the 
Eastern European Jews at the turn of the century. The accusations of profiteering, 
avoiding military service and cowardice had all been levelled against the Jews during 
World War One. The response from the Anglo-Jewish leadership mirrored their earlier 
attempts, at the turn of the century, to educate the newly arrived Eastern European 
Jews to assimilate into society in order to avoid being viewed as different. The reaction 
of the government towards the plight of the European Jews suggests a determination to 
avoid a repetition of the protest that had arisen with the arrival of the Russian Jews at 
the turn of the century and during World War One.  
Throughout the Thirties and the early years of the war, government policy may 
be considered to epitomise the mask of Janus. On the one hand, they did not wish to 
encourage the arrival of the German and Austrian Jewish refugees and cited the 
possibility of stimulating anti-Semitism in the country, but on the other they were 
determined to display an appearance of sympathy and toleration to the world. The 
declaration of war in September 1939 and the fall of France in 1940 were to dictate the 
future policy of the government towards the refugees, which included internment and 
weekly reports monitoring anti-Semitism.Taking into account the various factors which 
contributed to the government response towards the refugees during this period and in 
particular the perceived growth of anti-Semitism, it may be argued that whilst the 
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historians of the period have examined the main reactions of the government in detail, 
the roots of the growth in anti-Semitism have to a large degree ignored. various  
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Chapter Two.  The acknowledgement of the Holocaust.  
   July 1942 – December 1942                                                                                                                             
 
As the news of the Nazi policies towards the European Jews under their control reached 
Britain, the Press, with the agreement of the Ministry of Information, started to publish 
the known facts during June 1942.1 The initial details were based on a report compiled 
(in Poland) by the Bund, the underground Jewish Socialist Party. It had been smuggled 
out to Shmuel Zygielbojm, a member of the Polish Government-In-Exile. As a result of 
this, he passed the facts to the British Press and persuaded Wladyslaw Sikorsky, the 
Polish Prime Minister, to broadcast the report of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews, to 
the Polish population.2 These reports were followed by numerous press reports of the ill-
treatment of Jews in Vichy France including the deportation of foreign Jews to Eastern 
Europe and the separation of parents from children.3  
 This chapter, which is organised chronologically, will analyse how the 
government maintained its censorship of  all communications and why the government 
was reluctant to release the first news of the Nazi programme of mass murder prior to 
July 1942. It will consider how far the detailed press reports influenced the reaction of 
various individuals, many of whom had subscribed to the theory that there was a broad 
divide between the Nazi regime and the ordinary German. It will examine the reaction of 
the campaigners in their endeavours to exert pressure on the government to offer 
assistance to the European Jews in both Nazi-Occupied Europe and the Axis countries, 
with a specific focus on the proposed Government offer to provide asylum for a limited 
number of French Jewish children in Vichy France and it will compare it  to their 
response after the initial reports of Kristallnacht were published in November 1938.4  
Finally, it will consider the response of the government in December, when the news of 
Jewish extermination in Poland was confirmed by the Polish Government-In-Exile. In 
considering the government response throughout this period, it will consider how far 
anti-Semitism influenced their reasons for minimising the plight of the Jews.  
                                                          
1 ‘Mass Butchery in Poland’, The Times, June 10th,1942, p.3 issue 49258; ‘One Million Jews Die’, June 
30th,1942, Daily Mail, p.3 issue 14405; ‘Jews in Poland. Travelling Gas Chambers’, The Daily Telegraph, 
June 25th 1942 
Ibid.,’Cardinal Hinsley On Nazi Atrocities’, July 9th,1942, p.2 issue 49283 
2 JTA Jewish News Archive,’Sikorski Assails Nazi Atrocities Against Jews in Broadcast to Poland’, available 
at http://www.jta.org//1942/06/10/archive/sikorski-assails-nazi-atrocities-against-jews--in-..’ accessed 
10 February 2015,P.1;Michael Fleming, Auschwitz, the Allies and Censorship of the Holocaust (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2014), pp.97-98 
3 ‘Round-Up Of Jews In France’ , The Times, September 1st,1942, p.3 Issue 49329     
4 Ibid.,’German Jews Rounded Up’, November 12th 1938,p..2 
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 Censorship and Propaganda 
The period between the beginning of the war in 1939 and the official government 
acknowledgement of the extermination of the Jews in December 1942, was one of 
considerable indecision. Strict censorship was imposed on all  news as the government 
moved towards the implementation of various propaganda programmes with, initially, 
limited success 5 The issue of what was known about the Nazi brutalities in Britain 
cannot  be separated from the question of censorship and propaganda. This section will 
analyse how the policies surrounding censorship, evolved; it will examine the 
historiography relating to the government censorship and its reactions to the reports of 
Nazi policies towards the Jews in Europe and it will consider how far the concept, that in 
Germany, there were two separate groups, the Nazis and the Germans, exerted an 
influence on both government and the general public viewpoint. 
  Ian MacLaine analyses the strategies and thinking behind the use of anti-
German propaganda as he traces the gradual move towards broadcasting the facts 
concerning the brutal behaviour of the Nazis.6 Philip M.Taylor examines how the 
government used propaganda to promote the idea of democracy in what he terms ‘Total 
War and Total Propaganda, 1939-1945.’7 He looks at the initial failure of the system 
which was based on the experience of the successful methods employed during World 
War One but were now deemed to be failing due to inter-departmental fighting and the 
concept of democratic censorship. He suggests that the decision to  employ 
broadcasting as a propaganda tool was only reached after considerable time was 
wasted on the planning stages but that, within two years, the system was well organised 
and extremely effective both at home and abroad.8 He points out that the use of the 
mass media through radio and cinema ensured  the nation was kept informed of all 
important developments which were deemed relevant (to the war effort) by the 
government. He further maintains that, through the medium of the radio, the government 
possessed the ability to broadcast both news and valuable propaganda, on a worldwide  
basis, to the allies and to the enemy.9This ability by the government to keep the nation 
informed,  had already been recognised by Joseph Goebbels in a speech made in 
March 1933 to the Controllers of German Radio, when he stated: 
                                                          
5 Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda In The Twentieth Century. Selling Democracy (Edinburgh; Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999), p.151 
6 Ian McLaine, Ministry Of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), pp.166-170 
7 Taylor, British Propaganda In The Twentieth Century., p.151 
8 Ibid., pp.156-157 
9 Ibid., pp.153-160 
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“I consider radio to be the most modern and crucial   
 instrument that exists for influencing the masses.”10  
 
In his analysis of wartime cinema, James Chapman examines the different 
genres of film used for propaganda, in order to influence public opinion and maintain a 
firm control of the news media and he cites the influence of news-reels which were 
effectively deployed to produce a seemingly uncensored view for the public. He argues 
that film could be utilised to present a specific viewpoint; however, that did not 
guarantee a general public acceptance of it. 11 In effect, both MacLaine and Taylor 
conclude that, after the initial failure to produce relevant propaganda between 1939-
1941, by 1942, the content and focus had been successfully re-vamped into a credible 
operation demonstrating the ability to produce a successful programme of propaganda 
in support of the war effort together with a morale-boosting campaign at home and for 
the allies overseas. The main objectives of producing such propaganda had been 
achieved.12 These arguments are supported by Chapman, although he suggests that 
the deployment of film was of the greatest significance in the overall manipulation of 
propaganda in Britain during this era.  
At the start of the war, various departments, under the umbrella of the Ministry of 
Information, controlled the censorship of the press, the radio and the cinema. The initial 
use of British propaganda was criticized by various individuals including J.B. Priestley 
and a number of refugees,13 who were willing to offer their expertise in this field to the 
government. They strongly believed that insufficient emphasis was placed on providing 
encouragement for various groups of Germans to display opposition to the Hitler 
regime.14 In his letters to Edward Davidson, Priestley suggests that it is the attitude of 
the hierarchy which is out of touch with what is required to produce a modern approach 
to enthuse the public: 
 
“Condenscension has crept into the rather brief remarks    
addressed to me by the…. senior civil servants…..These                                      
are important personages who decide our policy and are                                        
not given  to welcoming outside assistance, only pay lip                             
service to this notion of a people’s war…This more than                                   
the failure of the new organisations, accounts for the                                          
over-stubborn censorships, and the stiffness and creakiness                             
                                                          
10 J. Noakes and G. Pridham (Eds.) Nazism 1919-1945 Volume two State, Economy and Society 1933-1939 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2008), p.191 
11 James Chapman, The British At War Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945(London: I.B. Taurus 
Publishers, 1998), pp.249-253 
12Taylor, British Propaganda In The Twentieth Century., pp.155-161 
13Heinrich Fraenkel, Help us Germans to fight the Nazis! (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.,1941) 
14ULL, R.V. Spathaky letter to Eleanor Rathbone 11/9/39, RP XIV 2 19 (45); Eleanor Rathbone letters to Sir 
Robert Vansittart 18/9/39, Harold Nicholson 25/9/39, R.V. Spathaky 20/9/39, RP XIV 2 19 (45) 
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of the machinery of information and propaganda. A final word           
about the ministry of information… its chief fault, I think is                      
that most of the people at the top are organisers, who know                             
how to run a department but do not know much about the                                           
public mind, whereas the men in control ought to have been                         
persons who understood what they are trying to serve. What                                            
is wanted in that Ministry is a little less Lincoln’s Inn Fields                        
and a bit more Gracie Fields.”15    
  
 The role of these departments is analysed by Ian MacLaine and Philip Taylor.16 
The latter examines the censorship imposed on the press and the BBC, pointing out 
that, as the system settled into place, the very organisations being censored were not 
entirely aware of government control. He concludes that it was this illusion of non-
censorship which contributed to the highly effective propaganda produced during this 
period.  MacLaine argues that it was a deliberate government policy, agreed in 1941, to 
avoid atrocity stories being made public, in an attempt to counter apathy, since it was 
believed that sheer horror stories were repellent to the normal mind and great emphasis 
was placed on ensuring that no mention should be made of the situation facing the 
European Jews under Nazi rule: 
“In self-defence people prefer to think that the victims were   
specially marked men – probably a pretty bad lot anyway. A  
certain amount of horror is needed but it must be used very  
sparingly and must deal always with treatment of indisputably  
innocent people. Not  with political opponents.                                                          
And not with Jews.”17 
 
 He states that even when news of the Nazi persecutions was publicised in 1942, 
more emphasis was placed on the persecution of Christian churches in Europe by the 
propagandists in the ministry. He argues that the main reason for this was twofold: the 
government believed that any special mention of the European Jews’ plight could lead 
to an increase in anti-Semitism and they wished to avoid any accusation that the war 
was being fought on behalf of the Jews. This fear of increasing anti-Semitism was based 
on information received through regular weekly reports issued by the Home Intelligence 
Division to various government departments chronicling all daily aspects of life in the 
country. This information included reports of black market involvement, evasion of the 
call-up by young Jews and a general dislike of Jews in general.18 He also suggests after 
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18 Ibid., pp.166-167 
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the realisation that the atrocity stories which were circulated during World War One, 
were proved to be false, there was a distinct possibility of similar propaganda being 
treated with scepticism by the public.19  
In a detailed examination of the BBC reporting of the Nazi atrocities in Europe, 
Jeremy D. Hunt argues that the news reported on the Home Service was totally different 
to that of the European Services. He suggests that this disparity between the two 
services was a deliberate government policy, as stated by Brendan Bracken, the 
Minister of Information, in 1941: 
“The governors of the BBC have always recognised that in  
  wartime it is necessary and right that the government   
 should control the policy of the BBC in matters affecting   
 the war effort, the publication of news, and the conduct of  
  propaganda.” 20 
 
The guidelines produced by the Ministry of Information for the Home Service, 
ensured that the persecution of the European Jews received minimal reporting in order 
to limit the perceived growth of anti-Semitism in the country.21 In complete contrast, the 
European service was explicit in its detailed reporting of the Nazi atrocities, since this 
was considered to be a useful tool in the propaganda war waged on the radio 
throughout Europe. 22  
 
The first publication of the extermination reports 
In July 1942, the first reports of the Nazi extermination policies in Occupied Europe were 
published in the national press. The initial public response was muted, but as more 
detailed reports of the Vichy policy towards the French Jews were reported, church 
leaders, members of the Anglo-Jewish community and individual campaigners began to 
lobby the government to implement a rescue programme. Finally, in December 1942, 
the government publicly acknowledged its awareness of the Nazi extermination policy 
being implemented against the European Jews in occupied Europe. This section will 
examine how the public reaction to both the initial reports and the later news published 
in September, changed, as more graphic detail was published.  
It has been suggested by Nicholas Terry that British Intelligence became aware 
the Nazis were pursuing a policy of mass executions in Eastern Europe from 1941 
onwards. He states that their awareness was based on the German radio messages 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 167,168  
20 Jeremy D Harris, ‘Broadcasting The Massacres. An analysis of the BBC’S contemporary coverage of the 
Holocaust’, in David Cesarani (Ed), Critical Concepts in Holocaust Studies.Vol. V Responses to the 
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21 Ibid., pp.299-364 
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decoded at Bletchley Park.23 In 1997, an article appeared in The Guardian which 
supports this theory, by quoting information passed to British intelligence in 1941, 
stating that: 
“The execution of Jews is so recurrent a feature of these reports                          
that the figures have been omitted from the daily transcripts)….                 
Whether all those executed as Jews are indeed such is of course               
doubtful, but the figures are no less conclusive as evidence of a                   
policy of savage intimidation if not of ultimate extermination.”24 
 
In their examination of the period, both Richard Breitman and Sinclair McKay  
cite a speech  by Churchill in August 1941,clearly indicating  a British awareness of the 
Nazi  extermination policies in the Soviet Union without mentioning the Jews:25 
“Whole districts are being exterminated. Scores of  thousands                             
literally scores of thousands of executions in cold blood are                       
being perpetrated by the German police-troops upon the   
Russian patriots who defend their native soil………..here has                       
never been such merciless butchery on such a scale, or                              
approaching such a scale…we are in the  presence of a crime  
without a name.”26  
 
Breitman and Lewis suggest that any mention of the Jews in the USSR was 
deliberately omitted from the speech, since it was felt that mention of them might alert 
the Nazis to their codes being broken.27 This argument is supported by David Cesarani 
in The Guardian in an article entitled ‘Code breakers reported slaughter of Jews in 
1941’, in which he stated: 
“It was a double tragedy The allies could not reveal their knowledge                 
because it would have betrayed the code-breaking, and it was at the            
nadir of allied power.” 28               
 
A further consideration, not mentioned by Breitman or Lewis, is that the refusal 
to acknowledge the extermination of Russian Jews may have been influenced by the 
government decision to minimise any public mention of Jewish persecution, thus 
avoiding the accusation of waging war on behalf of the Jews, and thereby minimise any 
possibility of stimulating anti-Semitism which, as reported to the Home Office on a 
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25 Ibid., p.5 
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weekly basis, was prevalent during this period. The government was aware of the 
treatment and conditions being experienced by the Eastern European Jews during 
1941, through specialised reports that were produced by the Home Office based on 
information received from various organisations including the Jewish Telegraph Agency 
based in both London and New York. These reports contained explicit details of Nazi 
atrocities aimed at the Jews, from a variety of individual sources in occupied Europe:              
“The Germans clearly pursue a policy of extermination   
  against the Jews. From an official German document   
  the statement is quoted “The only things Jewish that   
  will remain in Poland will be Jewish cemeteries.”   
   ANP/2718/41 4.7.41; Aufbau New York to Various Addresses.  
 
“Many reports refer to batches of Jews shot… During  
  the third week of August, 6743 Jews – men women and  
  children – were executed by the Germans in Ukraine.”     
             LIV/56836/41; 18.6.41; Guttman, Bucharest to Landes Baltimore.29 
 
The press did not publish the known facts until June 1942,30 when, on June 17th, 
the JTA published reports of the liquidation of the Vilna Ghetto and the execution of 
60,000 Jews.31 The earliest reports of the atrocities in Poland were publicised in a 
broadcast to the Polish nation by the Polish Prime Minister-In-Exile,  Wladyslaw 
Sikorsky, on June 9th, which gave a detailed account of the mass murders of Jews in 
Poland within the last year:32 
“The Jewish population in Poland is doomed to annihilation                             
in  accordance with the maxim – slaughter all the Jews                    
regardless of how the war will end.”33 
 
 This was followed by a detailed account published on June 25th 1942, by The 
Daily Telegraph.34 The initial details were based on a report compiled (in Poland) by the 
Bund, the underground Jewish Socialist Party. It had been smuggled out to Shmuel 
Zygielbojm, a member of the Polish Government-In-Exile. As a result of this, he passed 
the facts to the British Press and persuaded Wladyslaw Sikorsky, the Polish Prime 
                                                          
29 HO213/953, Postal & Telegraph Censorship report on Jewry No.3 Part II, Situation in Europe 22nd 
January 1942, p.3 
30  ‘One Million Jews Die’, Daily Mail, June 30th,1942, p.3 issue 14405; ‘Mass Butchery in Poland’, The 
Times, June 10th,1942, p.3 issue 49258;Ibid.,’Cardinal Hinsley On Nazi Atrocities’, July 9th,1942, p.2 issue 
49283available at 
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February2015 
32 JTA Jewish News Archive,’Sikorski Assails Nazi Atrocities Against Jews in Broadcast to Poland’,available 
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Minister, to broadcast the report of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews, to the Polish 
population.35  
This was swiftly followed by various press reports  detailing information of the 
Nazi atrocities.36 In his analysis of the general acknowledgement that the Polish Jews 
were being murdered, Michael Fleming stresses that the level of reporting in the press 
during this period was exceptional, since, prior to June 1942 and after July 1942, very 
little was mentioned about the situation of the Jews in Occupied Europe. He suggests 
that there were various reasons for this change in attitude including the government 
realisation that it would become increasingly difficult to suppress the news due to 
increasing pressure from the Polish Government-In-Exile to make the report public and 
the fact that the Ministry of Information viewed the reports as a potential weapon in the 
war of propaganda.37 In a document issued by the Ministry of Information in 1941, any 
propaganda that mentioned the Jews, was to be limited, thus reflecting the policy of the 
Cabinet and the Home Secretary to censor such propaganda that mentioned the 
Jews.38 When discussing the use of atrocity propaganda in September 1942, the same 
attitude still prevailed.  In an internal BBC memo discussing the news of the Nazi 
atrocities, Sir Richard Maconachie stated: 
“I was also told to see what we could do about the    
maltreatment of children, although in the case of         
Jewish children it would be better not to refer to their                                        
race.” 39 
 
The government was alert to the fact that a proportion of the British public was 
convinced that the Jews had been instrumental in taking the country into war.40 This 
belief, which had been publicly supported by both Lord Beaverbrook: and Oswald 
Mosely during the Thirties41 was similar to the accusations levelled against the Jews                                              
                                                          
35 JTA Jewish News Archive,’Sikorski Assails Nazi Atrocities Against Jews in Broadcast to Poland’, available 
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 during the Boer War by various individuals and groups including, J.A.Hobson who had 
stated : 
     “Recent developments of Transvaal gold-mining have thrown    
              the economic resources of the country more and more into   
              the hands of a small group of international financiers, chiefly    
             German in origin and Jewish in race… A consideration of these 
    points throws a clear light upon the nature of the conflict in  
              South Africa. We are fighting in order to place a small     
              international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators in  
              power at Pretoria..”42  
 
and John Burns, the Trades Union Congress and the Social Democratic Federation  
who remarked during a parliamentary debate during the Boer War:  
“Wherever we examine there is the financial Jew operating,                         
directing inspiring the agencies that have led to war…I thought                      
I had landed in a synagogue when I went to hear the trial of 
theJohannesburg prisoners…I thought I had dropped into                     
some place in Aldgate or Hounsditch…The trail of the financial                            
serpent is over this war from beginning to end.”43John Burns. 
They had all insisted that Jewish financiers had influenced the government into 
declaring war.44 This awareness of the  possibility of apparent support of the 
accusations levelled against the Jews by Oswald Mosley45 gave rise to a policy of 
ambivalence towards the plight of the European Jews.  On the one hand, they did not 
want to publicly acknowledge that European Jewry was being slaughtered by the Nazis, 
but on the other, the publication of the atrocities could be used as propaganda to further 
the war effort. In his analysis of the government censorship relating to reporting news 
about the Jews, Michael Fleming argues that, since the government maintained that all 
Jews were nationals of their respective countries, they subscribed to the belief they 
were either (or should be) assimilated in the countries of which they were nationals. This 
policy ensured that the public focus was directed towards the general suffering of the 
countries affected by the Nazi extermination policies, rather than the murder of the 
Jews.46 This argument is supported by MacLaine who suggests that the deliberate 
avoidance of mentioning the Jews was due to the reported increase in anti-Semitism 
which appeared in the regular weekly reports received by the Home Intelligence Section 
of the Ministry of Information.47 Kushner, whilst supporting these arguments, maintains 
that the liberal perspective of the government and the Establishment, which had 
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assumed the anti-Semitic policies pursued by the Nazi regime was based on the theory 
that the Jews were different, ultimately deterred them from admitting that the situation of 
the Jews under Nazi occupation might be a unique occurrence.He argues that if the 
government had acknowledged that the Jews were singled out as a separate race, as 
the Foreign Office had stated, it ‘would perpetuate the very Nazi doctrine we are 
determined to stamp out’ and such a government stance could encourage nationalism.48  
.   It may, therefore, be argued that the government pursued a definite policy of 
publicly disregarding the plight of the Jews, since they did not want to link the war effort 
with the protection of the Jews. In pursuing this approach, they intended to avoid any 
link to the accusation that it was being fought on behalf of the Jews. Furthermore they 
distrusted Jewish sources which they believed were prone to exaggeration. 49 
The decision of the government to minimise the plight of the Jews in Nazi-
occupied territory was clearly illustrated by their deliberate policy of limiting any mention 
of the Jews until it suited their propaganda programme in mid-1942. This was followed 
by minimal reporting of the persecution being inflicted on European Jewry until the end 
of the year, when the news of the Nazi actions could no longer be contained and the 
general population became aware of the massacres taking place in Europe. A major 
consideration of this decision to minimise the plight of the Jews was the determination of 
the government to portray the war as a battle of Great Britain versus evil epitomised by 
Hitler and the Nazis, rather than a war to rescue any one individual group of people. 
Their ability to implement this with little opposition, was helped by the belief of many 
people in Britain that the majority of Germans did not support Hitler and his brutal 
policies of extermination, although, as the war progressed, attitudes towards Germany 
did begin to change.                                             
 In his detailed analysis of the British press, Andrew Sharf argues that, although 
it was generally contradictory rather than negative in its reporting of the Jewish situation, 
the influence it exerted on public opinion was a major factor in helping to form both the 
short and long-term reaction of the public towards the European Jews.50 He maintains 
that from the start of the war in 1939, numerous reports had appeared in the press 
documenting the atrocities being committed by the Nazis in the occupied areas of 
Europe.51 In her examination of the press coverage emanating from the reports of the 
atrocities, Deborah Lipstadt supports this argument by comparing the different 
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presentation of the facts between the British and the American press. She notes that in 
Britain, the reporting was clear and emphatic with bold headlines and prominent 
positioning, whereas the reporting in the American press was far more subdued, with 
many reports being printed on inner pages with little detail.52  
In general, most of the papers carried detailed accounts of the plight facing the 
European Jews. The Manchester Guardian which had carried in-depth accounts of the 
Nazi policies towards the Jews during the Thirties, represented the most liberal 
approach, whilst the Daily Mail and the Daily Express which appealed to a broad swathe 
of newspaper readers, tended towards a more middle-of-the-road view, with some 
exceptions, such as the demand for internment by the Daily Express in 1940.53 
In contrast to the general approach taken by the press, Colin Shindler examines 
the response of The Times towards the rise of Hitler and the Nazi regime during the 
Thirties and suggests that the editors of the paper at this time reflected the broad 
approach of the government and establishment towards Nazi anti-Semitism (the Jews 
were to blame for their predicament, they were alien and they refused to assimilate into 
normal society), thus distancing the paper from the anti-Nazi approach taken by The 
Manchester Guardian and various other newspapers.54 The paper actively supported 
the policy of appeasement and in 1937, the editor, Geoffrey Ward, stated that: 
“I have always been convinced that the peace of the                                         
world depends more than anything else on our getting                                       
into reasonable relations with Germany.”55                                       
 
In June 1942 the initial accounts which appeared in the national press, were 
concise and factual. The Times, whilst reporting the arrests and executions of the Poles, 
briefly alluded to the Jews: - ‘Massacres of tens of thousands of Jews have been carried 
out this year. People are being starved to death in the ghettos.’56 Shindler argues that 
by concentrating on the suffering of the Poles rather than focusing on the Nazi policy of 
Jewish extermination, The Times did not grasp the concept of the Nazi-Jewish policy.57 
In contrast to this concise approach, both the Daily Telegraph which headlined its report 
Germans Murder 700,000 Jews in Poland and the Daily Mail under the headline One 
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Million Jews Die, contained explicit details of the atrocities being perpetrated by the 
Nazis: 
Daily Telegraph – ‘Jews in Poland Travelling Gas chambers’ June 25th 1942 
“Men and boys between 14 and 60 have been driven together                      
into one place……there killed either by Knifing, Machine                         
guns or grenades… Children in orphanages, pensioners…                            
and the sick have been shot .Women have been killed in                                                   
the streets… In November the slaughter of Jews by gas                               
in the Polish territories incorporated in the Reich began.”58   
  
Daily Mail – ‘One Million Jews Die’ June 30th 1942 
“One million Jews, one-sixteenth of the entire world                                   
population of  Jewry have been exterminated in                                       
Axis-controlled countries since theoutbreak of war…                             
.Poland – About 700,000 killed. Mass executions of                          
Jews deported from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria                                  
and Holland Latvia 125,000 Jews murdered…Soviet Russia –                
Odessa 25,000 men,women and children were crowded                             
into barracks and machine gunned. Barracks were then set                               
on fire and occupants burned to death.”59    
 
One of the few papers to consistently report the deportations of the European 
Jew was The Jewish Chronicle which reported on the deportation of the German Jews 
in November 1941 and continued to publish both factual accounts and rumours of 
massacres in Eastern Europe throughout the beginning of 1942. On July 3rd 1942, the 
front page carried the headline ‘MASS MURDER IN POLAND 700,000 Jews Wiped Out’ 
using this as the lead section of the editorial page.60The paper continued to provide 
updated reports and on 11th December, 1942, it carried the headline TWO MILLION 
JEWS SLAUGHTERED on the front page surrounded by a black border.61 The paper 
actively lobbied the government for action and continued to do so, but in 1943, domestic 
matters started to dominate its reporting and less mention was made of the European 
Jews. In his analysis of the approach taken by the newspaper, David Cesarani suggest 
that there was a limit to the quantity of devastating reports that could be published and 
tolerated by the readership at this time. He argues that the reason for this was twofold: 
the news was appalling and the Jews had accepted that, rather than focus on their own 
concerns, they subscribed to the ethos the survival of the nation reigned supreme over 
all other concerns.62 A further consideration was the belief that in promoting their 
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patriotism, they would lessen the possibility of stimulating an increase in anti-Semitism. 
This viewpoint had been actively promoted by both Neville Laski in his capacity as 
President and Sidney Salomon as Press Officer of the  Board of Deputies in the books 
they had published in 1939, in their written refutation of the accusations levelled against 
the Jewish community.63                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
There was little public reaction to the initial reports, although church leaders 
responded with letters to the press condemning the atrocities.64 In September 1942, 
numerous press reports were published of the ill-treatment of Jews in Vichy France, 
including the deportation of foreign Jews to Eastern Europe and the separation of 
parents from children.65 In August and September, The Times started to publish details 
covering the round-ups in the Vichy policy towards the Jews within its territory.66 The 
focus of the French reports in September 1942 swiftly moved to the exposure of the fate 
of Jewish children, with a succession of articles that included detailed descriptions of 
their treatment: 
The Times – ‘Anti-Jewish Drive in France’ August 28th 1942 
“Even Jewish children were liable to arrest…. Eyewitnesses                    
confirm reports that women threw their children from   
windows before jumping out themselves.”67   
 
 
The Times – ‘Round-Up Of Jews In France’ September 1st 1942 
“French police rounded up for deportation Jews of foreign       
origin.  Many were over 70 years old, many were young  
children…Mothers were separated from children.”68    
 
The Times - ‘Vichy’s Jewish Victims. Children Deported To Germany’ 
September 7th 1942‘ 
“Recently a train containing 4,000 children, unaccompanied, 
  without identification papers or even distinguishing marks,  
  left Lyons for Germany.”69   
“Meanwhile the plight of between 5,000 and 8,000 homeless  
 Jewish children in the unoccupied zone…..remains desperate.”70  
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This news was confirmed in the House of Commons in a speech by Winston Churchill, 
condemning the deportations as a bestial tragedy: - 
“…the most bestial, the most squalid and the most senseless                               
of all their offences, namely the mass deportation of Jews                                    
from France, with the pitiful horrors attendant upon the                              
calculated and final scattering of families.”71 
    The Times would continue to report the round-ups, the mass deportations 
from Europe to Poland and eyewitness testimonies of the various atrocities being 
committed, but its underlying policy was to support the government and in particular the 
Foreign Office, in its approach to the growing Jewish problem. This ensured that no 
mention was made of the reality of mass extermination in Europe which was based on 
an organised programme.72 In his conclusion to the stance taken by The Times during 
the Forties, Shindler suggests it was unsure of its role: did it act as an unofficial organ of 
the government? Did it represent a broader establishment? Was its role to be a 
newspaper of independent views and essential reporting? He considers that it was all of 
these, but, as he emphasises, most of its news-space was devoted to supporting the 
government in its war effort and the events unfolding in Europe. Taking this approach 
into account, the destruction of the European Jews was relegated to the bottom of the 
agenda, since they were not classified as a priority by the government who were 
determined to minimise their plight.73 
 As a result of the detailed reporting in the press, various organisations and 
individuals approached a number of government officials in both the Foreign and the 
Colonial Offices, with a variety of schemes to rescue European Jews, with a strong 
focus on the rescue of Jewish children.74 This initial response to the news of the Nazi 
atrocities presented a complete volte-face to the widley held view that there was a clear 
division between the  Nazi regime and the German populace, which had given credence 
to the theory of German versus Nazi. 
  Germans versus Nazis 
In 1941 Sir Robert Vansittart published Black Record, a complete version of his 
broadcasts from 1940 which had effectively proposed that Germany and German culture 
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were  dominated by a lust for war and a desire to establish a world empire; he further 
argued that the brutal actions of the Nazi regime illustrated a reversion to its barbarian 
roots.75 His ideas exemplified the differing views of the Germans in Britain. Support 
came from various politicians including Harold Nicholson and publications including The 
Spectator,76 whilst condemnation came from (the progressive publisher) Victor Gollancz, 
in his response published in January 1942, in which he argued that inflicting drastic 
retribution on Germany would not create a long-term peaceful solution for the future.77 In 
a further criticism of the Vansittart publication, Heinrich Fraenkel, in a Fabian Society 
pamphlet published in June 1941, stated that in his accusations against Germany, 
Vansittart had handed Goebbels an immense boost for his propaganda against Britain 
with the threat of drastic punishment to be inflicted on a defeated Germany by a 
victorious Britain.78  
  Through the analysis of these different views, it becomes apparent that there 
was a marked tendency, which had prevailed throughout the Thirties, for a large 
proportion of the public and the government to view the attitude of Germany through the 
prism of the good German versus the Nazi, resulting in a widespread belief that the 
majority of Germans did not support the policies pursued by Hitler against the Jews.  
In his analysis of the period, Russell Wallis maintains the attitude of the British 
towards Germany was strongly influenced by a belief that there were great similarities 
between the two nations, thus giving rise to the theory the majority of  Germans would 
act as a brake on the extremes of Nazi policy towards the Jews.79 He strengthens his 
argument by suggesting that this attitude resulted in any public discussion about the 
German atrocities as reaching a position of vitriolic stalemate.80 The difference in 
attitude is clearly illustrated by an exchange of words between Anthony Eden and Lord 
Winterton in the House of Commons during the debate on the German Invasion of 
Russia in 1941. Eden spoke of ‘Hitler’s Germany,’ thus implying that there were two 
separate Germanys whilst Lord Winterton stated that ‘I do not recognise any difference 
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between Hitler and the Germans at the present time.’ 81 Such an exchange of words 
illustrates the attitude of the Foreign Office who subscribed to the theory that Nazism 
had been imposed on Germany and was not generally supported by the nation.82 Wallis 
examines how the persistent belief, that the German nation was in a position to 
influence the extremes of Nazi policy towards the Jews, was used in later propaganda 
broadcasts to Germany, in an attempt to split the unity of the Germans after the Nazi 
atrocities became public knowledge.83 
 Another prominent supporter of this idea that Germany was divided between the 
Nazis and the Germans, was Eleanor Rathbone who forwarded a copy of a pamphlet to 
Duff Cooper at the Ministry of Information written by a German refugee Heinrich 
Fraenkel, who had published a book supporting this theory ‘Help us Germans to fight 
the Nazis!,’ in which he criticised the propaganda produced to bolster the German 
opposition.84  
In her analysis of the German reaction towards the atrocities being committed by 
the Nazis, Brigitte Granzow argues that, since the regime imposed on the population 
under Hitler, was effectively a totalitarian regime, the majority of Germans believed 
Hitler was unaware of the Nazi atrocities committed in the concentration camps and if he 
had known, he would have stopped them.85 In effect, it may be argued that this presents 
a mirror image of the British belief in the ‘good’ German versus the Nazi. It is interesting 
to note that a similar attitude prevailed in the U.S.S.R. where most Russians believed 
that Stalin was unaware of the machinations of the NKVD during the period of the Great 
Terror.86 
A further consideration suggested by Bernard Crick is that the language 
employed by Hitler in his attitude towards the Jews was viewed as rhetoric rather than 
reality, 87whilst Andrew Sharf argues that the concept of a deliberate policy of Jewish 
persecution was inferred by the press as being more akin to the Russian pogroms of the 
late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, such as Kishinev, rather than the 
behaviour of a civilised nation.88  
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 In his assessment of the initial response by the Church of England leadership to 
the threat posed by the Nazi regime, Tom Lawson argues that their initial understanding 
of Nazism was an attack on Christianity and civilisation.89 It may be argued therefore, 
that utilising these ideas of the Church leaders by focusing on Christian persecution, the 
government could portray the war as a crusade to save Christian society from the 
alleged paganism of the Nazis, thus avoiding any mention of the growing Jewish 
persecution in Europe. It was believed that this approach would resonate with the public, 
since, during this period, the Nazis were viewed as a separate body within Germany and 
they did not truly represent the German nation as epitomised by the Vansittart Black 
Record.90 
 
 The initial response of the campaigners from July – October 1942 
As the first reports of the Nazi policies in Europe were published, the campaigners 
began to lobby the government for assistance to be given to the European Jews. 
Eleanor Rathbone, who was to consistently demand that assistance and rescue should 
be provided for the refugees, had her first major clash with the government over the 
proposed rescue of French Jewish children in Vichy France in September 1942. This 
scheme, which failed, was a major cause of her antipathy towards Herbert Morrison, the 
Home Secretary, whom she considered to be an anti-Semite. Her view was based on 
his insistence that granting permission for the admission of a substantial number of 
Jewish refugees into the country in November 1942, which he refused, could stimulate 
an increase in anti-Semitism.91 
Initially, the Council of Christians and Jews had advocated  there should be no 
specific mention of anti-Semitism, However, when the reports of Jewish persecution by 
the Nazi regime, were published, the leaders of the churches commenced actively 
campaigning to rescue the Jews, with meetings and by means of letters to the press, 
both on an individual and joint basis.  
  Cardinal Hinsley initially condemned the killing of the Polish Jews in a 
broadcast on the European Service when the first definite news of the Nazi policies was 
publicised in July 1942.92 This was followed by a large demonstration protesting against 
the Nazi atrocities at the Royal Albert Hall in October, presided over by William Temple, 
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the Archbishop of Canterbury. Many expressions of support were received from a 
variety of individuals including the Archbishop of York, the Ethiopian Emperor, the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Belgium and a strong message of sympathy from Winston 
Churchill, which included the following observations: 
 
“The systematic cruelties to which the Jewish people                                                 
…have been exposed …under the Nazi regime are                                                 
amongst the most  terrible events of history…  Free                                                
men and women denounce these evil crimes and when                                         
this world’s struggle ends……racial  persecution will                                                  
be ended.”93 
 
It may be argued that in this message of support from Churchill, the allusion that racial 
persecution would only cease when the war was ended, laid the groundwork for all 
future statements from the government, which always reiterated that until the war was 
won, little could be done for the plight of the refugees.    
In conjunction with the protests and publicity by the religious leaders 
condemning the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination, various approaches were made to 
the government by other individuals and organisations, with suggestions for assisting 
the European Jews under Nazi rule. 
 In September 1942, a Labour Party deputation to the Foreign Secretary, stated 
that, according to its sources, 50,000 Jews in France had been passed to the Germans 
for deportation to an unknown destination.  The delegation also informed the Foreign 
Secretary  it had learnt of a proposal from the Belgian Government suggesting that it 
might be possible for Washington to persuade the Vichy regime to issue exit visas to 
Jews who held an entry visa for another country; this would enable them to travel via 
Spain to Portugal, from where they could be settled in a secure country such as the 
Belgian Congo, for the interim period of the war.94  
The initial response of the Jewish leaders 
In a similar vein to the Labour Party proposals, Rabbi Schonfeld, the Executive Director 
of the Chief Rabbi’s Religious Emergency Council founded in July 1938, wrote to 
Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, on behalf of Dr.Hertz, the Chief Rabbi. The 
council  had originally focused on providing assistance to predominantly orthodox Jews 
trapped in Europe, but as news of the Nazi extermination of the Jews became known, it 
enlarged its remit to encompass all European Jews trapped in Nazi-occupied territories, 
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by emphasising the humanitarian rather than the political aspects of the situation.95 In 
his communication to Anthony Eden, it was proposed that there might be the possibility 
of a neutral country being asked to intervene with the Hungarian authorities ‘to grant at 
least a right of asylum’ to the Jewish refugees now resident in Hungary since ‘They 
ought not to be sent back as mercilessly as is the case at present.’96 In his response, 
Eden maintained: 
“The treatment of the Jewish population by Germany and                               
German - controlled countries is a cause of much distress                                
to Mr. Eden and to His Majesty’s Government. Intervention….                         
carries with it no guarantee of success: on the contrary, even                   
should it be possible to persuade a neutral state to take the                             
action suggested, it would certainly come to the notice of the                     
German Government. In this event, experience has shown                                        
that pressure would be exerted upon the Hungarian                                           
government to mete out even harsher treatment to the Jews.”97 
 
In a further meeting in September 1942, Dr.Hertz raised the possibility with Lord 
Cranbourne the Colonial Secretary, that blank visas could be issued to the British 
Consuls in Turkey, to be used to transport Polish children to Turkey from where they 
could be sent to safety in various British Colonies, until the war ended.98 Lord 
Cranbourne pointed out that, although he extended his sympathy to the plight of the 
children, the scheme was not feasible for varying reasons. These included issuing visas 
for an unknown number of children and the problem of providing accommodation in the 
Colonies. He explained that the East African Colonies possessed a limited capacity to 
take immigrants and this had now been reached; there was, therefore, no more capacity 
for additional refugees.99 A further suggestion of using Cyprus as a base for the 
children, was refuted with the statement that, due to the smallness of the island, it would 
experience great problems in being able to provide sufficient food for an unknown influx 
of refugees.100  The other major obstacle to the proposed scheme was the insecurity of 
travel in the Eastern Mediterranean.101 This seemingly sympathetic response, whilst 
citing a series of feasible reasons for non-acceptance of the various suggestions made 
by the Chief Rabbi, clearly demonstrates that the Colonial Office had no intention of 
altering its policy which ensured that the rigid entry requirements of the White Paper into 
Palestine were adhered to, whilst ensuring that its strict control of Jewish immigration 
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throughout the Empire remained unchanged.. The excuses given by Lord Cranbourne 
were a straightforward reiteration of the Colonial Office response towards the Jewish 
refugees at the Evian Conference in July 1938, when the government had insisted that 
large-scale entry into the Empire was not feasible.102 
The Foreign Office made the following observations in its response to the 
various suggestions proposed by the Chief Rabbi.  They were adamant that no special 
consideration could be given to Jews, since non-Jews in Allied Countries, for example 
Belgium and Poland,  were also suffering and would expect to receive similar 
concessions for their children.103  It noted that if the plight of the Jews, as an individual 
group, were acknowledged, this could be viewed as tantamount to accepting that the 
Jews were a separate nationality.104  It did concede, that in the event of there being no 
Allied Government-in-exile, the government was prepared to extend entry to the United 
Kingdom for a limited number of children under the age of sixteen who had lost their 
parents through death or deportation. It indicated that although this concession was 
about to be offered to children in Vichy France, it would not be offered elsewhere. The 
Foreign Office stated it was of the opinion the Turkish authorities would raise difficulties 
about allowing transit facilities across the country for an unknown number of children 
without definite assurances that their stay in Turkey would be very short. In conclusion, 
since the Governor of Cyprus had already refused to allow Greeks to settle there, it 
would not be possible to offer this facility to refugees.105 As with the Colonial Office, the 
Foreign Office response clearly illustrated its determination to adhere to immigration 
policy but it also indicates that, although various reports of the Nazi policies towards the 
Jews had appeared in the press, there was still a reluctance to accept any 
discrimination in favour of Jews, since this would, in effect, imply that they were a 
separate nationality.  
In a further response to Lord Cranbourne, Rabbi Hertz proposed the possibility 
of settling rescued Jewish children in Mauritius or in other British administered territories 
which he suggested could be based on the similar facilities which had been given to 
Allied Governments.106 He accepted the premise that entry into Palestine was limited 
but he raised the possibility of including wives and children of legal male residents in 
Palestine, in an exchange scheme of Palestinian women resident in Germany for 
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German women resident in Palestine.107In his response, Lord Cranbourne, whilst 
reiterating his original stance towards the Jewish children trapped in Europe, provided a 
detailed explanation of the exchange scheme. He explained that the original 
negotiations had not envisaged any nationalities, apart from Germans and Palestinians, 
being included in the scheme. This approach had been revised at the request of the 
Jewish Agency and with the cooperation of the High Commissioner in Palestine. The 
scheme was proving to be extremely difficult to implement in its revised form due to the 
current situation in Occupied Europe and the intransigence of the German Government 
towards the amended plan.108 
In contrast to the direct approach taken by Hertz and Schonfeld, the Board of 
Deputies pursued an approach that mirrored their policy employed during the Thirties, 
when confronted with the rise of the Nazi party. Then, they had followed a deliberate 
policy of maintaining a low profile in the public domain preferring to solicit the support of 
prominent Gentiles to speak on their behalf at public meetings, in order to counteract the 
possibility of stimulating anti-Semitism and they continued to do so during the war.109  
This was clearly demonstrated in their request to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 
September 1942, as more news of the Nazi extermination of the Jews was received. 
Selig Brodetsky, in his capacity as chairman of the Board of Deputies, asked the 
Archbishop if it would be possible for him to raise the issue of Jewish extermination in 
the House of Lords since, as he stated: 
“A specific warning which I feel might be of some use and                   
might appropriately come from that House of Parliament in                         
which the the voice of the Church, as well as the laity, can                     
make itself heard.”110     
Many of the schemes were totally impracticable, but even when reasonable 
solutions were proposed, the government baulked at the idea of implementing them. In 
his analysis of the government refusal to consider some rescue operations, Meier 
Sompolinsky argues that the driving force behind this recalcritant attitude was the policy 
of strategic war considerations.  He maintains that the policy of Arab appeasement in 
Palestine was viewed as a vital component of overall government strategy to ensure 
that peace and stability in the Middle East was maintained. In order to achieve this, it 
was decided that no favour could be shown towards the Jews, thus ensuring that there 
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would not be a Jewish exodus from Europe to Palestine.111 In her analysis, Louise 
London argues that it was an agreed government policy that the admission of ‘Aliens’ 
was not only severely restricted but any admission was to be based on an evaluation of 
their potential contribution to the war effort, thus effectively ensuring that no 
consideration would be given on humanitarian grounds.112 A further point is that the 
government, in particular the Colonial Office, had no intention of changing its stance 
towards the possibility of Jewish refugees being granted permission to enter any part of 
the Empire, since, Jews were not welcomed by the Colonial authorities. In his 
assessment of the authorities’ attitude towards the Jews, Bernard Wasserstein stresses 
that neither the Dominions nor the Colonial governors were prepared to consider the 
possibility of Jewish settlement, as the Jews were still viewed as an alien presence:  
“The hard fact remains that they are not wanted by any                                                                                                                                         
Colonial Government for a number of very good reasons…                                      
The introduction of a body of people, however small, which                                            
is entirely alien in every sense of the word, would be greatly                                       
resented by the working classes in the Colony…I am thinking                     
particularly of the West Indies.”113 
 
Kushner maintains that during the Forties,  the traditional view  of the Jews as 
‘Aliens,’ who refused to assimilate and conform to the mores of acceptable society, 
exerted a considerable influence on society generally, since they were considered to 
present a major threat to the establishment.114 Furthermore, the term ‘Alien’  had 
originally been used by the campaigners who agitated for the introduction of the original 
immigration act in 1905 to halt the influx of the Eastern European Jews. They had usí 
the term ‘Alien’ in order to avoid being accused of anti-Semitism.115  
 
 The government proposal to rescue Jewish children in Vichy France 
The news and reports of the Nazi policies towards the Jews from the middle of 1942 
prompted a multiplicity of schemes being presented to the government by various 
organisations and individuals in the hope of saving them. In the main, the government 
refused to countenance any of the proposals, but in late September 1942, detailed 
consideration was given to a proposal from Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, to 
mount a limited rescue scheme for Jewish children in Vichy France. This section will 
examine the apparent change of direction by the government in its policy towards 
                                                          
111 Sompolinsky,The British Government and the Holocaust., p.52 
112 London, Whitehall And The Jews 1933-1948., pp.172-173;-188-189 
113Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews., pp.46-47 
114 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination., pp.33-42 
115 Garrard, The English and Immigration.,pp.56-59; Gainer, The Alien Invasion., p.118 
 
 
104 
 
providing assistance to European Jews and why it was agreed to mount the scheme.  
The historiography relating to the rescue attempts of the French Jewish children is 
somewhat sparse. Louise London briefly mentions the decision by Herbert Morrison to 
allow a limited number of children into Britain in September 1942 but stresses that the 
government clearly stated the proposed rescue was an exceptional concession and 
would not be repeated.116 Both Pamela Shatzkes and Bernard Wasserstein argue that 
Morrison supported the rescue scheme because the Refugee Committee offered to 
provide the necessary financial support for the refugees and that, by allowing a limited 
number of children into the country, the gesture would appeal to the humanitarian 
feelings of the public.117  
In the wake of the press reports describing the policies of Vichy France towards 
Jewish children, the initial mention of offering settlement to them originated from a 
proposal made by Sir Herbert Emerson to Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary at a 
meeting in early September 1942. It was suggested that Britain should issue 1,000 entry 
visas to Jewish children in Vichy including many of German or Austrian origin.  He 
indicated that in a report he had received from the Joint Jewish-American Distribution 
Committee, he understood that the American Government was considering admitting 
1,000 children with the added possibility of accepting more who could be settled in San 
Domingo.118 In his minutes of the meeting, A.W.G.Randall stated that, unless a 
substantial proportion of the children were of Allied origin, the Foreign Office would 
oppose the suggestion and as he noted in his response to the issuance of 1,000 entry 
visas,  Mr.Morrison had  stated: 
“…That he could not accept the suggestion, and referred                                                                         
to the anti-foreign and anti-Semitic feeling which was quite                              
certainly latent in this country (and in some cases not at                                    
all latent).”119 
 It was, however, noted that Morrison had agreed to grant entry to Jewish 
children who had either one or both parents in this country, even though it would only 
represent a tiny number. With reference to the report that Sir Herbert Emerson had 
received from the Joint Jewish-American Committee that the American Government was 
proposing to grant admittance to 1,000 children, Randall suggested that confirmation of 
the American decision, as stated by Sir Herbert Emerson, should be obtained from 
Washington, since a plea by the Polish Government-In-Exile to allow Polish children into 
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America, had been declined. He further noted that, if the suggestion proved to be 
correct, it would be difficult for Herbert Morrison to deny any concessions for the rescue 
of Jewish Children.120   
In considering the remarks in which Morrison referred to both latent and active 
anti-Semitism, his reaponse may be viewed as a clear example of the general feeling 
towards the Jews which, as Panikos Panayi suggests, still to a degree, permeated the 
government and the establishment.121 There was a fear that granting entry to a 
substantial number of foreign Jews would provide the stimulus to recreate the general 
anti-Semitic reaction of the public, which had been caused by the arrival of the Eastern 
European Jews at the turn of the century. They were also aware that this friction had 
been exacerbated during World War One when, as Colin Holmes states, the Jews were 
viewed as unpatriotic and driven by a desire to benefit from the prevailing circumstances 
of the period.122 
Following this meeting, Morrison presented a memorandum to the War Cabinet 
outlining a scheme based on a proposal from Sir Herbert Emerson, in his capacity as 
the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and supported by Otto Schiff, 
the Chairman of The Jewish Committee for Refugees, to rescue approximately 300-350 
children and elderly people aged over 60 from Vichy France.  Furthermore, as on 
previous occasions, the Jewish Refugee Committee would provide financial guarantees 
for the refugees, thus ensuring that they would not be a charge on the public purse.123 In 
his presentation, Morrison gave both sides of the argument, stressing the possibility that 
the scheme could lead to an increase in anti-Semitism. He emphasised the large 
number of refugees already in the country.  He suggested that the granting of entry to 
Jewish children would encourage the Vichy Government to deport more Jewish 
parents.124He countered these arguments by pointing out that, should the scheme be 
implemented, the government would maintain an appearance of humanity. If on the 
other hand, it denied the children entry such denial could promote the idea that there 
was no humanity at all in government thinking. He then suggested a compromise which 
he felt would be acceptable to all concerned:  to give careful consideration to a limited 
number of cases of individuals exposed to extreme danger, who had relatives in Britain. 
He concluded by reiterating that, other than this, there would be no further concessions 
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made and he cited his refusal to grant transit visas to 28 children living in a Jewish 
Home in Vichy France.  The children were in possession of guaranteed entry into 
Palestine but they required a temporary place of residence until transport could be 
provided for their onward journey to Palestine. 125 In his justification of this refusal, 
Morrison argued that if an exception were made for this group, there was a strong 
likelihood that other people in unoccupied France, many of whom were in possession of 
entry permits to Palestine or elsewhere, would apply to enter Britain on transit visas. 
Morrison did not view this as being acceptable, but as he stated – ‘it would become 
impracticable to draw a line of demarcation.’126 
 In a Foreign Office memo dated 28th September, prepared by A.G. Randall, a 
senior member of the department, as a response to the proposals of Morrison, the 
attention of the Cabinet was drawn towards the important issues which required 
consideration. It was felt that, by limiting the entry to French Jews, no thought was being 
given to the position of non-Jewish Allied Nationals who also faced the danger of 
deportation from Vichy France; this was substantiated with a note of the various 
representations that had been made to the British Government by the Belgians, the 
Poles and the Dutch.  It pointed out that Britain had allowed wives and children of Allied 
soldiers into the country and based on that, it suggested that entry to refugees from 
enemy-occupied or enemy-controlled territory should only be given to persons who had 
either rendered, or could render, service to the Allied war effort. Randall argued that 
other than beng of service to the country, there was no practical reason to admit 
refugees on a purely humanitarian basis.  In his final observations, he stressed the 
potential diplomatic problems that could arise, should the Portuguese Government 
refuse to issue transit visas or hinder the transport of the refugees from Lisbon to 
Britain.127 The contents of the memorandum clearly made two points: the determination 
of the Foreign Office not to view the position of the Jews as being an exception in the 
Nazi- occupied or dominated territories in Europe; the resolve to adhere to the 
immigration laws with its refusal to offer entry to refugees on purely humanitarian 
grounds. 
  The original proposal granting entry to French Jewish orphans was amended 
by the Home Secretary in a further memo which suggested that, unless proof could be 
provided that their parents were officially dead, orphans would be refused entry. He 
argued there was a strong possibility that the granting of entry to children whose parents 
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had been deported, would further encourage the Vichy Government to expand their 
continuing deportation of foreign Jews to Eastern Europe.128  As an alternative 
humanitarian gesture, he proposed to allow entry to children from Unoccupied France, 
providing there were a parent or close relative living in Britain who could provide 
financial support. This concession would include all children of Allied Nationals in order 
to avoid discrimination in favour of Jews.129 This proposal was agreed by the War 
Cabinet in October. 130In her analysis of the Anglo-Jewish reaction to the deportation of 
Jews by the Vichy regime, Amy Zahl Gottlieb notes that, as the community had done in 
1933,131 they were prepared to accept the financial responsibility for the maintenance of 
the refugees and it was on this basis that Morrison laid his recommendation for agreeing 
to grant entry to a limited number of French Jews before the War Cabinet.132 It may, 
therefore, be argued that, in reality, the attitude of the government towards Jewish 
refugees had not altered in any way since their original arrival in 1933, when, as Louise 
London argues,  the dominant factors of government policy towards the refugees were 
‘self-interest, opportunism and an overriding concern with control,’ which restricted any  
humanitarian gesture  towards them.133 
On October 26 th Sir Herbert Emerson presented a memorandum to the Foreign 
Office informing them that a group of influential British people was proposing to contact 
governments in both Central and South America to request support in obtaining 
permission from the Vichy Government, to facilitate the departure of children to 
countries prepared to offer them sanctuary, since this was being withheld by the Vichy 
authorities. The memo listed both the countries and the number of places being offered 
to children.134 He described the difficulties being experienced by various organisations in 
obtaining exit permits from the Vichy Government. The regime had agreed to issue 500 
visas for children going to America with the proviso that there should be no publicity or 
propaganda surrounding their departure,135  but all other requests were delayed. In his 
conclusion, he stated that he believed it would be extremely difficult to obtain exit visas 
for the remainder who had been granted entry to other countries including South Africa 
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and Canada, from whom 500 entry visas had been provided for Jewish children in Vichy 
France, based on financial guarantees from Jewish organisations.136 He also felt that 
any approach by individuals to neutral governments could exacerbate the overall 
situation with the Vichy government, thus creating further obstacles to the various 
attempts to rescue the children.137 
In a major speech to the Upper House of the Canterbury Convocation in October 
1942, George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, outlined the overall atrocities being 
perpetrated by the Nazi regime in occupied Europe. He highlighted the famine 
spreading throughout the continent, the murder of hostages, the use of slave labour and 
the deportation of Jews from Vichy France, which effectively created between five and 
eight thousand abandoned children now utterly dependent on Britain, Switzerland and 
America, to provide them with sanctuary: 
“The latest report which has reached this country tells of                                
the deportation of thousands of Jewish refugees from Vichy                     
France …leaving behind them between five…and eight                       
thousand children of whom many are now orphans….and                                  
all are waiting for the charity of Britain or America or                            
Switzerland to give them sanctuary.”138 
 
This speech was followed by a meeting at the end of October between Herbert 
Morrison and a deputation of parliamentarians led by William Temple, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury.139 Various points were raised which were recorded by Mary Sibthorpe the 
Secretary of the Friends Alien Protection Committee, which had evolved from the 
German Emergency Committee of the Society of Friends founded in 1933 by the 
Quakers to provide assistance to German refugees fleeing from the Nazis.140 She 
forwarded her notes   to Temple for his information. The deputation raised the allegation 
that the contribution by the British Government towards helping the refugees in Vichy 
was minimal in comparison to other countries.141 This allegation was strongly denied by 
the Home Secretary. He reiterated the number of refugees who had been granted entry 
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into both Britain and the Empire; he stated that we were a small island and in constant 
danger of invasion. In his use of this justification, he echoed the sentiments expressed 
by Lord Cranbourne to Rabbi Schonfeld earlier in the year. Britain, like the Empire, did 
not possess the means to support an influx of refugees, due to the restrictions imposed 
by the war – lack of space, the difficulty of absorbing a large number of refugees.  In his 
reiteration of the Colonial Office sentiments, Morrison clearly demonstrated that he 
intended to adhere to and administer the rigid immigration laws, in order to limit the 
entry of any potential Jewish refugees. 
 He further stated that he firmly believed there was a growing resentment among 
a proportion of the population towards the refugees. The implication of the remarks was 
that, under the prevailing situation, he was not prepared to sanction any action that, in 
his eyes, could create a rise in the anti-Semitism prevalent in certain sections of the 
population. He suggested that it was unclear as to whether the Vichy regime was 
influenced by anti-Semitism or was acting under orders from Germany, insisting there 
was a degree of uncertainty as to the intentions of the Germans, since it was not known 
whether they were intent on a policy of extermination of the Jews or whether they were 
deporting them for use as forced labour.142 Morrison insisted that, regardless of the 
number of refugees he gave entry to, the problems would not be alleviated. He was 
adamant that there was a definite attitude of anti-Semitism that needed to be contained, 
particularly as the Jews were being accused of major involvement in the black market, 
even if that was not factually correct. He concluded by telling the deputation that, taking 
all the reasons he had cited into account, he did not feel able to expand on the 
concessions he had already granted.143                            
In contrast to this record of the meeting, the Foreign Office report noted that the 
deputation had requested the issue of 2,000 visas for refugee children, regardless of 
whether or not the Vichy Government would issue exit permits; they had suggested that 
visas issued prior to the war for transit to Palestine, should still be valid and that the 
decision to allow children into the country should not be dependent on financial support 
from the Refugee Organisations.144 In his response, the Home Secretary assured the 
deputation the government was fully aware of the situation in Vichy France, but in 
contrast to the campaigners’ report, no mention is made of his observation that there 
was a degree of uncertainty regarding German intentions towards the Jews. The most 
obvious reason for this omission is that the Foreign Office was aware of the Nazi 
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extermination policies.  Gerhart Reigner the Secretary of the World Jewish Congress in 
Geneva had informed Sydney Silverman M.P., Chairman of the British section of the 
World Jewish Congress, in a telegram sent to the Foreign Office in August, of the 
proposed Nazi policies.145 Morrison emphasised what the country had already done for 
Jewish refugees since 1933146 and he asked the deputation to take a realistic approach 
and accept that the country could not focus solely on these refugees. He mentioned 
that, although the general response of the population was sympathetic towards the 
refugees, there was a section of opinion which could be potentially anti-Semitic in its 
reaction to their arrival.147 He reiterated that he would not change his stance on 
controlling the entry of refugees into the country, concluding that the problem could not 
be dealt with on an individual basis but had to be controlled by a policy which clearly 
defined the limits of aid available to the refugees.148 
Throughout his meetings and discussions, it becomes very apparent that Herbert 
Morrison was convinced that the entry of Jewish refugees into Britain would increase the 
perceived threat of anti-Semitism in the country, a view that was not supported by the 
campaigners. In the subsequent exchange of correspondence among William Temple, 
Eleanor Rathbone and Mary Sibthorpe, a key issue was the refusal of Morrison to 
consider granting entry to Jewish children and the elderly, since, according to Rathbone, 
he was adamant that ‘there was danger of an outburst of anti-Semitism if further Jews 
were brought in.’149 In her support of  Rathbone, Mary Sibthorpe also cited the  use of 
the press allegations by Morrison that Jews were heavily involved in the black market,  
thus exacerbating the general level of anti-Semitism in the country, which, as she 
stated: 
“I find it completely deplorable that an acting Home Secretary,                                            
with the emergency powers now held…,should say that the                               
entry of 2,000 starving children might lead to an    
“uncontrollable outburst of anti-Semitism” In fact I do not                      
believe it for a moment.”150  
In his replies to both campaigners, Temple agreed ‘It seems quite clear that you could 
not stimulate anti-Semitism by bringing in these unhappy children,’151but to Mary 
Sibthorpe he did intimate: 
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“I think there is a quite real danger of an outbreak of anti-Semitic           
feeling in this country and that the introduction                     
of a large number of Jewish refugees of working or fighting                        
age would make the prospect seriously worse. But I cannot                  
believe that this has any application to the proposal to admit                                    
say some two thousand children.”152                                     
            In his resistance to allowing the entry of large numbers of Jewish refugees into 
the country, Bernard Wasserstein suggests that Herbert Morrison was accurately 
reflecting the general beliefs and attitudes of the period.153 A further consideration is that 
the growth of anti-Semitism at this time may be viewed as a mirror image of the general 
reaction towards the arrival of the Jewish immigrants at the turn of the century. The 
Jews were perceived as presenting an invidious threat to the mores of society and as 
such, they needed to be constrained. 
These two reports of the same meeting clearly highlight the different approach 
and attitude towards the Jewish refugees. The Home Secretary, as advised by his civil 
servants, was determined to maintain the traditional government stance of strict 
adherence to the immigration laws; as the ultimate control lay within his remit at the 
Home Office, he was able to ensure this attitude remained unchanged. It also 
demonstrated the unwillingness, of the government to confront the truth of the reports 
relating to the extermination policy of the Nazis.  In contrast to this attitude, the 
members of the deputation, which included the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal 
Hinsley and Mr.Whale the Moderator of the Free Churches, Eleanor Rathbone, Victor 
Cazalet and Mary Sibthorpe,154 displayed a high level of compassion towards the 
Jewish refugees,that was sadly lacking within the Establishment. The campaigners 
demonstrated their ability to overcome religious and political differences as they 
attempted to gain the involvement of any organisation or government who would assist 
with their schemes to rescue the beleaguered Jews in Europe. 
In a further attempt to rescue children in Vichy France in October 1942, the 
Jewish Agency in Lisbon contacted Professor Lewis Namier, a member of the Jewish 
Agency Political Committee in London. He was asked to obtain 1,000 entry permits to 
Palestine for Jewish orphans up to the age of seventeen, whose parents had been 
deported to Eastern Europe, together with permits for 200 unnamed adults to 
accompany them.155 The request was passed to the Colonial Office who contacted the 
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Home Office to obtain their approval for a telegram to be sent to the Palestine High 
Commissioner. His agreement was required in order to grant admission to this group as 
immigrants, in accordance with the 1939  Palestine White Paper. The Colonial Office 
also forwarded copies of the correspondence to the Foreign Office for their records. 156 
The Palestine High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, confirmed his acceptance to 
grant admission to 1,000 orphaned children from Unoccupied France in early 
November, on the understanding that the visas were to be allocated through the 
American officials in Vichy.  When relations between America and the Vichy regime 
broke down after the Germans entered unoccupied France in November 1942,157 this 
assumption was no longer relevant. In a further telegram from MacMichael, it was 
assumed that the visa allocation would be arranged by the Swiss authorities.158 
On November 11th 1942, in his response to the King’s speech, Viscount 
Cranbourne, the Colonial Secretary, informed the House of Lords that Germany now 
occupied the whole of France. He then announced that the government had agreed to 
admit Jewish children into Britain from Occupied France,who had lost their parents, 
providing they had a near relative in Britain who could be responsible for them. He 
informed the House that the High Commissioner of Palestine had agreed to accept 
1,000 children into the Mandate if they could be transported there.159 The Vichy 
Government had refused to issue visas for the children and the total occupation of 
France by Germany ensured that no children reached the safety of Britain. The final 
comments on the entire issue were made during several debates in the House of 
Commons in early 1943, on the possibility of rescue for Jewish refugees, when Manny 
Shinwell questioned why the government had refused entry visas to 2,000 French 
Jewish children.160 The Foreign Office noted the inaccuracy of this statement by stating 
that the scheme had failed due to the refusal of both Vichy and the Axis powers to grant 
exit visas. It stated further that there were visas available for children but there were 
major difficulties in arranging transport from Spain and Portugal.161  
In February, Mrs.Cazalet Keir requested a statement from the Foreign Secretary 
to clarify why 2,000 French children had been refused visas to enter Britain, thus leading 
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to their subsequent deportation to Germany. In his rebuttal of this accusation, Anthony 
Eden stated that the Vichy authorities had refused to sanction the departure of the 
children from France. He pointed out that the Vichy authorities had modified this 
decision by granting exit permits for 500 children to depart for America,162 but they had 
been adamant that the many other visas available for the United Kingdom, Palestine, 
the British Dominions, or other countries, could not be used. He stated that, with the 
occupation of Vichy France by the Germans, no children including the original 500 
mentioned, were allowed to leave the country. He emphasised that, at the time of 
agreeing to grant entry to a limited number of refugee children into Britain, there were 
visas available to various countries which vastly exceeded the number of children able 
to leave.163 In this nuanced response, Eden demonstrated quite clearly the government 
refusal to accept responsibility for the failure to rescue the French children; the blame 
lay with the refusal of the Vichy regime to allow the departure of the children. No 
mention was made of the procrastination of Herbert Morrison in respect of making and 
implementing a speedy decision which might have saved the children from the Nazis. In 
maintaining this position, Eden was able to promote the humanitarianism of the 
government towards the children. 
It may be argued that the initial reaction of the general public to the plight of 
European Jewry was comparable to the public response when the destruction, during 
the events of Kristallnacht, was reported in November 1938. In both cases, the 
emphasis on the uncertain future facing Jewish children was to exert a strong influence 
on the immediate attitudes towards them. In 1938, this had led to the creation of the 
Kindertransport scheme which rescued 10, 0000 children from Nazi-occupied Europe 
prior to the outbreak of World War Two. It had been privately funded, thus making it 
acceptable to the government.164 In September 1942, Otto Schiff, the Chairman of the 
Jewish Refugee Committee, offered to fund the rescue of French-Jewish children with 
close relatives in Britain, thus guaranteeing that their arrival would not be a charge on 
public funds. In contrast to the protest after Kristallnacht, there was no initial major 
public response to the first reports of the Nazi atrocities and in the regular Ministry of 
Information reports, no comments from the public were recorded. The main response 
came from various organisations and religious leaders rather than the general public.  
Throughout 1942, although further reports and news of the Nazi policies in 
Europe become known to the government, it refused to ease the entry requirements, 
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even for children to enter the country. The declaration of war in September 1939 had 
effectively closed the country to the Jewish refugees since they were now viewed as 
enemy aliens. This attitude stands in stark contrast to the response after Kristallnacht in 
November 1938, when entry requirements for children had been eased,165 thus ensuring 
that nearly 10,000 reached safety. A driving force behind the refusal to give refuge to 
Jewish children was the insistence that the Jews could not be treated as a special case 
since any differentiation would indicate that they were actually a people rather than a 
religion.166  An official acceptance of Jews as a nationality would expose the anti-Semitic 
attitudes held by various ministers and officials who preferred to label them as enemy 
aliens rather than as genuine refugees.The policy pursued by the government at this 
time may be viewed as a complete contradiction of the contents in the Balfour 
Declaration issued in 1917, which favoured the establishment of a national home for 
Jews in Palestine, thus recognising the Jews as a nationality. The political expediency of 
the Declaration  in 1917 was not favoured by government after 1939.167 
 
 Confronting proof of the Nazi extermination policy 
 
Throughout the latter part of 1942, the government was forced to confront an increasing 
level of evidence substantiating the earlier accusations that the Nazi regime was 
instituting a definite policy of Jewish extermination in the countries under its control. In 
October 1942, the Daily Mail reported that Himmler had promised Hitler ‘There would 
not be a Jew left in Germany by the end of the year.’168 Finally, in December, the 
government publicly acknowledged the European Jews in Nazi-Occupied Europe faced 
extermination and as a result of this, a growing campaign was launched to demand that 
the European Jews should be rescued. What were the reasons that compelled the 
government to officially acknowledge the Nazi policy of extermination?  What was the 
primary aim that the government hoped to achieve with Anthony Eden’s speech in the 
House of Commons on December 17th 1942?     
 In a declaration issued on November 30th 1942, the Elected Assembly of 
Palestine Jews presented a petition to Sir Harold Macmichael, the High Commissioner 
for Palestine, requesting that the Allies ‘Do what you can to stop that evil force. Put an 
                                                          
165 HC Deb Racial, Religious and Political Minorities, 21 November 1938 vol 341 cc1428-83., pp.20,21 
166 Cab/66/33/13Reception & Accommodation of Refugees Committee Memo by the Foreign Secretary, 
9/1/43, P.51; Draft telegram to H.M. Ambassador, Washington, p.2 
167Balfour Declaration: November 2, 1917, available at 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Hisotry/balfour.html accessed 6/28/2016 
168 LMA. ACC3121/C11/7/2/7 ‘Himmler: ‘Not A Jew In Germany’, Daily Mail October 12th 1942 
 
 
115 
 
end to these ghastly mass slaughter. HELP US TO RESCUE THE SURVIVORS.’169 On 
December 1st 1942, the Polish Ministry of Information published an eight-page article in 
the Polish Fortnightly Review detailing the extermination of Polish Jewry.170 These 
actions were followed by reports in the press headlined ‘Nazi War On Jews. Deliberate 
Plan For Extermination’171 and letters from the Archbishop of Canterbury and Eva 
Marchioness of Reading, in her capacity as President of the World Jewish Congress, 
British Section, emphasising the Nazi policy of Jewish destruction.172 Finally, on 
December 9th, Edward Raczynski, the Minster of Foreign Affairs of the Polish-
Government-In-Exile, handed an official note to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, 
detailing the extermination of Polish Jewry by the Nazi regime in the Warsaw Ghetto.173 
As a result of this, the government scepticism as to the accuracy of the various reports 
that had resulted in a refusal to  accept the veracity of them, was finally dissipated and it 
was acknowledged  the Nazi regime was implementing a policy of extermination against 
the Jews.174 This was made official by Frank Roberts, on behalf of Anthony Eden, when, 
in his acknowledgement of the report, he informed the ambassador that Britain, together 
with the other allies, intended to issue a declaration condemning the atrocities.175  In 
their analysis of the initial government refusal to accept the truth of the reports, Kushner 
and Wasserstein argue that there was a certain level of distrust towards the Jews 
among the officials both in the Foreign and the Colonial Offices, since they were of the 
conviction that the Jews were prone to exaggeration at all times.176 Whilst accepting 
these arguments, it should be noted that officials in both the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office had received numerous reports from the Home Office detailing  the Nazi 
policies towards the Jews which demonstrated their intent to eradicate the European 
Jews, thus undermining the belief that the Jews were prone to exaggeration.177 
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 The United Nations Declaration – December 17th 1942   
As the news of the Nazi policy became public, the leading religious leaders issued 
strong statements of condemnation in the press:  Cardinal Hinsley condemned the 
brutal persecution of the Jews at a Roman Catholic day of prayer;178 the Archbishop of 
York denounced in Parliament the Nazi annihilation of the Poles and Jews;179 the Chief 
Rabbi, Dr.Hertz, called for a Day of Fast and Prayer on Sunday 13th December.180 In his 
address at the service, Dr.Hertz observed that: 
“The decay of conscience in the years before the war…                           
helped to build a moral climate favourable to the Nazi                       
atrocities. What atonement, we ask are the United                                  
Nations prepared to make for their share in building up                              
that climate? Will they open the gates of their countries                                
to the refugees from the Nazi inferno and help the few                           
neutral states to receive them?”181 
On December 16th 1942, a deputation from the Council of Christians and Jews 
met with Richard Laws of the Foreign Office, to discuss the rapidly deteriorating 
situation of European Jewry.  They had prepared an agenda for discussion which 
included a request for a joint declaration from the United Nations condemning the Nazi 
atrocities and a public assurance that any refugee escaping from  Nazi persecution 
would be granted asylum in any part of the British Empire.182 In his response, Law 
informed the deputation that there was no doubt that the mass extermination of Jews in 
Eastern Europe was a fact, but he went on to say that there was a possibility, as 
suggested by some members of the deputation, that without irrefutable facts to support 
this information, a proportion of the nation would view the reports as atrocity 
propaganda, thus providing a further stimulus to increasing anti-Semitism in the country. 
He informed the committee that the Foreign Secretary would be making a statement to 
the House of Commons on the following day in the name of the United Nations. He 
circumvented the suggestion that the offer of granting asylum to refugees by members 
of the United Nations would be of greater assistance, by inferring, confidentially, that 
there had been problems in obtaining any help which might be offered to the refugees. 
He concluded the meeting with an assurance that the Government would welcome the 
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co-operation of the Council in continuing to inform the public through statements and 
sermons.183  
On December 17th 1942, in response to a question from Sidney Silverman referring 
to the Nazi policy of Jewish deportation and extermination in Eastern Europe, Anthony 
Eden, the Foreign Secretary, condemned the Nazi policies and promised retribution 
after the war.  The speech, which would become known as the United Nations 
Declaration, 184 was viewed by the government as a satisfactory response to the 
growing demand by the public and the various campaigning organisations to implement 
some assistance to the beleaguered Jews. The ensuing protests were to prove that their 
assumptions were incorrect. 
As a result of the speech, many individuals sent letters and petitions to the 
government demanding that constructive action be taken immediately to alleviate the 
plight of the European Jews facing extermination under Hitler’s policy of genocide.  The 
Ministry of Information reported that: 
“Widespread indignation, anger and disgust are reported                                                  
as a result of the recent revelations of Nazi atrocities,                              
particularly the disclosure of the policy for exterminating                                         
the Jews in Poland…The joint declaration of the Allied                                           
nations that the perpetrators will be punished has                                            
“caused great satisfaction.”185 
In contrast to this, the same report carried the following remarks under the anti-
Semitism section ‘I don’t care for the Jews, but this is terrible’ and it was noted there 
was little increase in sympathy for Jews resident in Britain.186 In the following weeks, 
similar sentiments were expressed, but there was a growing view, that although 
assistance should be given, they would not be welcomed in Britain ‘although we wish to 
help the unfortunate Jews in occupied zones, we don’t want any more over 
here.’187These remarks were followed in subsequent Home Intelligence reports 
containing widespread reiteration of the traditional views that Jews were different, 
ostentatious in their dress and behaviour, black- marketeers and military service 
evaders: 
“Reports from five regions refer to ‘an increase in feeling                                                  
against the Jews.‘This is again variously ascribed to                 
‘the number of black-market offences committed by                                                       
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people with Jewish names, their indifference and meagre                       
contribution to the war effort.’, and their success in      
getting houses in some areas where the demand is greatest…..                    
it is also suggested…. Any preponderance of Jews in any                  
particular industry or department does get an Englishman’s goat.”188  
“German and Austrian refugee business men are criticised for   
‘throwing their weight about’, and for running ‘flourishing               
businesses’ while their English competitors get called up.”189 
In an uncanny echo of accusations levelled against the Russian Jewish immigrants in 
the First World War, ‘The Russian shirkers were pinching food, jobs and businesses of 
the loyal Brits who had gone into the army.’190 A  commonplace accusation being made 
in 1942 and 1943 was the dominance of Jewish refugees in business  ‘running 
flourishing businesses whilst their English competitors get called up.’191  
A further development later in the month was the creation of a committee to 
focus solely on the problems of Jewish refugees. This new committee was formed as a 
result of a meeting in late December, between the Foreign Secretary and a deputation 
from the Board of Deputies of British Jews, to discuss the general situation of Jews.192 
The leaders of the deputation proposed that a possible rescue of Bulgarian Jewish 
children could be considered.193 The Foreign Secretary informed them that 4,000 
Bulgarian children had been given permission to travel to Palestine and the government 
was awaiting a reply from the Bulgarian Government via the Swiss Government  to 
reach an agreement. 194 In a meeting of the War Cabinet on the same day, this matter 
was raised by the Foreign Secretary, who stated, although no government commitment 
had been made, he believed that careful consideration should be given as to whether 
the government was able to offer any assistance. As a result of this, it was agreed to 
appoint a Cabinet Committee consisting of the Foreign, the Home and the Colonial 
Secretaries to consider what arrangements could be implemented for the reception and 
accommodation of any Jewish refugees who were able to leave enemy-occupied 
territory via either Bulgaria or Portugal.195  
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It may be argued that the the national press had a substantial influence on the 
public as they were confronted with the graphic news of the Nazi atrocities in Europe, 
but an analysis of the reporting clearly demonstrates how the reaction of the public 
could be manipulated. The first reports in July 1942 had evinced comparatively little 
reaction to the plight of the European Jews. This began to change in September 1942, 
when the focus of the reporting was directed at the brutal treatment of French Jewish 
children, which had resulted in various organisations approaching the government with 
possible recue schemes. Such a reaction is strongly reminiscent of the initial response 
to the reporting of Kristallnacht in November 1938. A further similarity to 1938 was the 
initial horror and disgust as the reports of the Nazi extermination of the Jews in 
December 1942 were reported in all the major newspapers. However, this initial 
response was short-lived and as Andrew Scharf states, in many ways the influence of 
the press was, and still is, transitory in its influence on the public.196 This argument is 
supported by A.J.Sherman who states that sympathy for the Jewish refugees dissipated 
rapidly, since they were viewed as presenting a major threat to employment, they were 
conspicuous in their appearance, and they threatened relations with Germany.197 In his 
support of this view, Tony Kushner examines the opportunities for employment offered 
to the Jews after Kristallnacht and as he states, the chance to bring 500 Austrian 
doctors into Britain was rejected by the BMA who granted permission for 50, since they 
feared both loss of employment and prestige.198  
A further argument, which neither Sherman nor Kushner allude to, is the 
similarity between the accusations levelled against the Jews during World War One 
when the young Jewish Russian males were accused of shirking their military duty and 
Jewish businesses were accused of profiteering at the expense of the nation. The 
perception that they had used the circumstances prevailing during that period were 
echoed again in the weekly reports produced by the Ministry of Information, even as the 
news of the Nazi extermination policy was publicly acknowledged by the government. 
The repetition of all  previous accusations levelled against the Jewish immigrants may 
be viewed as an unconscious reaction originating from that period, which contributed to 
the continuing antipathy of the public in its response to the possibility of more Jews 
entering the country from Europe. 
 In the latter half of 1942, the government had been inexorably faced with 
a series of reports detailing the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination in Occupied Europe, 
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which could no longer be withheld from the public domain, although strict censorship 
had been instituted by the government at the start of the war. These reports triggered 
the slow collapse in the belief that Germany was a nation divided between the German 
and the Nazis, a view supported by some of the leading campaigners. As the horror of 
the reports became public, various individuals and groups approached the government 
with a series of rescue schemes mainly focused on Jewish children, which included the 
possibility of settling them in various parts of the Empire. The insistence by the Home 
Secretary, that granting entry to Jewish refugees could lead to a growth of anti-
Semitism, ensured that there was to be no easing of the immigration laws and all the 
proposed rescue schemes were either refused or discredited with the exception of the 
government proposal to offer refuge to a limited number of French Jewish children. This 
scheme, which failed due to the prevarication of the British and the intransigence of 
Vichy France, would have been funded privately, thus offering a limited comparison to 
the Kindertransport scheme of 1938. In early December 1942, the Polish-Government-
in-Exile published an official report detailing the extermination of Polish Jewry. This was 
passed to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary. The publication of the report placed the 
government under extreme pressure from the religious leaders, Jewish organisations, 
various campaigners and public protest to alleviate the plight facing Polish Jewry. In 
order to deflect any criticism of its policy towards the refugees, the government, with the 
consent of the Allies, decided that an official announcement was to be made in 
Parliament by Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, on December 17th. This 
announcement would be used to reassure the nation that the perpetrators of the policy 
to slaughter Polish Jews would face punishment when victory was achieved. 
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Chapter Three. The Government response to the campaigners.  
    January – March 1943 
In the aftermath of the United Nations Declaration, the public, the Churches and the 
various campaigners continued to demand visible proof that the government intended to 
implement some form of assistance or rescue for the European Jews under Nazi rule. 
This pressure was intensified with the publication of a short pamphlet issued by Victor 
Gollancz, at the end of January 1943,entitled Let My People Go.1  In a series of Cabinet 
meetings, it was realised that some form of further action was required to demonstrate 
that there were actually moves under consideration to provide some sort of assistance 
to the European Jews. This resulted in the Foreign Office decision to modify its current 
policy towards the refugees by considering their situation as an international problem, 
which required the co-operation of America and the Dominions in order to resolve it.2 
The consequence of this decision was to have a direct bearing on the next major 
attempt to rescue Jewish children in Europe. Finally, it was agreed in early February, to 
approach the United States Administration with a proposal to hold informal talks. As the 
diplomatic machinations on both sides slowly progressed, agreement was finally 
reached at the end of March to hold these talks in Bermuda.                                                             
This chapter will consider the initial response of the government to the public and 
to the campaigners. It will examine the reasons for both the implementation and the 
failure of the Bulgarian rescue scheme instituted by Oliver Stanley, the Colonial 
Secretary. The purpose of the scheme was twofold: it would alleviate the pressure 
exerted by the different campaigners by offering settlement in the Palestine Mandate to 
a substantial number of children, without exceeding the fixed quota for Jewish 
immigrants and it would lend credence to the façade of humanitarianism promoted by 
the government. It will analyse the unity of the religious groups with a focus on the 
growing division between Rabbi Schonfeld and the Board of Deputies, which hampered 
the unity of the Jewish community and focused on the lingering fears, that unless the 
Jews assimilated and displayed total loyalty to the government, anti-Semitism would 
continue to increase.  It will examine the reasons for the decisions made by the War 
Cabinet to include the Jews as part of the overall refugee problem, rather than as an 
exceptional case, thus circumventing the possibility of large scale settlement in either 
Palestine or Britain in the post-war era; it will assess the reactions of the government 
departments involved in the policy decision taken by the Cabinet to decide that an 
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international conference with America could provide an acceptable solution to the 
Jewish situation in occupied Europe. It will analyse the political manoeuvring on both 
sides before an agreement was reached to hold the Bermuda talks. It will consider the 
individual aims of the campaigners, to ascertain any common links. Finally, it will 
scrutinise the feasibility of the proposals presented to the government by the various 
groups in order to ascertain their practicability. 
 The influence of Victor Gollancz  
At the end of 1942, the prominent campaigners, who included Eleanor Rathbone and 
the members of the Parliamentary Committee for Refugees, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Cardinal Hinsley and the other church leaders and the leaders of the Jewish 
community, were joined by the left-wing book publisher Victor Gollancz. He was 
renowned for founding the Left Book Club in 1936, a movement which had provided 
access to political literature for the man-in-the-street at an affordable price.3 The horrific 
news of the Nazi slaughter had a profound effect on him, since, although of Jewish 
descent, he had shown little inclination to participate in activities associated with 
Judaism during the Thirties, apart from providing help to individual Jewish refugees.4 His 
attitude started to change, as the news of the Nazi policies towards the Jews became 
known during 1942. In December, as a result of Eden’s speech in Parliament, he wrote 
Let My People Go5 over the Christmas period and published it early in January 1943. 
The popularity of the pamphlet resulted in the sale of 100,000 copies almost 
immediately with a further 50,000 sold by the end of January and in total, 250,000 
copies were sold in three months.6The options offered in the pamphlet would be quoted  
in a debate on the European Jews  in the Canadian House of Commons in July 19437 
and they would be used in a May 1943 appeal on behalf of the Jews in The Advertiser 
(Adelaide S.A.).8  
The contents of the publication summarised the events in Europe and  set out a 
series of proposals for resolving the continuing policy of Jewish slaughter. Included in 
his suggestions was the use of the United Nations to organise a concerted plan of 
rescue. This envisaged the use of appropriate intermediaries to approach Germany, 
                                                          
3 Ruth Dudley Edwards, Victor Gollancz.A Biography (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1987), pp.228-236 
4 Ibid. 
5 Gollancz, Let My People Go  
6 Ibid., pp.371-375 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination. , p.177 
7 Canada  House of Commons Debates, ‘Supply External Affairs’ Mr S.H. Knowles (Winnipeg North 
Central)19th Parliament, 4th Session: Vol 5, July 9,1943 p.4605-4608 
8 The Advertiser (Adelaide S.A), ‘Appeal On Behalf Of The Jews’, 15th May 1943 available at 
http://trove.nla.goc.au/newspaper/article/48912740? accessed 8 February 2017 
 
 
123 
 
with the aim of negotiating permission for the Jews under their control, to either 
emigrate, or be given exit visas and transportation to frontier posts, from where they 
could be moved to areas of refuge.9He proposed examining  the possibility of 
exchanging  Jews for enemy nationals; he suggested  encouraging  neutral countries to  
grant  entry to  refugees who were able to escape the Nazis, by guaranteeing food and 
cash for their maintenance and evacuation to countries prepared to accept them as 
soon as practicable. He further proposed the establishing of temporary camps in the 
Empire prior to settlement in a permanent home and he stated that all these suggestions 
were to be conducted under the auspices of the International Red Cross. He stressed 
the importance of granting immediate entry to escaping refugees into Palestine and 
pointed out that there were still 35,000 unused immigration certificates 
available.10Finally, he argued that the easing of the immigration laws into Great Britain 
would ensure that any refugee, who managed to escape, was given the right to enter 
the country.11 In the ensuing months, Gollancz never wavered in his original demands 
as he campaigned around the country. 
The Gollancz publication galvanised a substantial proportion of the population to 
protest at the inhumane treatment being inflicted on the European Jews. This gave rise 
to numerous letters sent to the government and the national press, demanding that the 
European Jews should be aided by any means. In January 1943, various members of 
the government including Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, Oliver Stanley, the 
Colonial Secretary and the Prime Minister, received numerous letters all suggesting that 
the government should provide assistance to rescue the beleaguered European Jews. 
The variety of correspondence, which included letters from The Theosophical Society in 
Wales, The Amalgamated Engineering Union, The Association of University Teachers, 
The Huddersfield & District Free Church and The Women’s International League,12 
demonstrated a unity in their demands that the government should provide assistance to 
the refugees. Under this duress, officials in the Foreign Office discussed a standard 
reply which would intimate that plans were being discussed but could not be publicised, 
since this could prove to be disadvantageous to the plight of the refugees.13 Lady 
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Reading, President of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, wrote an 
impassioned letter to Winston Churchill, pleading for the right of unlimited entry into 
Palestine for any Jews who were able to escape from Europe.14 The representatives of 
Polish Jewry in Israel sent a cable to Oliver Stanley, requesting the granting of 
temporary asylum within the Empire.15  
In a further letter to the Prime Minister, the Archbishop of Canterbury raised the 
possibility of financial assistance being offered to neutral countries who provided safety 
for refugees who had escaped from the Nazi regime, together with a pledge that the 
right of asylum would be given to the countries who accepted the refugees, by both 
Britain and other members of the United Nations. The response from Anthony Eden was 
non-committal.16 In a subsequent letter to him, the Archbishop advised that a statement 
would be issued to the press, supported by all the Christian leaders, suggesting that 
refugees in neutral countries should be granted entry into territories of the Empire, thus 
creating room for other refugees to reach safety. 17 
This suggestion was based on a series of proposals, which had been discussed 
by the Council for Christians and Jews early in January 1943.18 The Council, which had 
been formally announced on October 1st 1942, had issued a clear declaration of its main 
aims:19  
“That since the Nazi attack on Jewry has revealed that                   
anti-Semitism is part of a general and comprehensive                                     
attack on Christianity and Judaism…the Council adopts                                 
the following aims: 
   a) To check and combat religious and racial tolerance. 
   b) To promote mutual understanding and goodwill between                                                     
        Christians and Jews. 
  c) To foster co-operation of Christians and Jews in  
        study and service directed to post-war reconstruction.”20 
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The statements, emanating from the religious leaders, were published in The Times on 
the 25th, 26th and 27th January 1943.21 
In his assessment of this period, Tony Kushner suggests that it was only after 
the news of the Nazi massacres in December 1942 became public, that the Council 
finally took action. He points out that there was still considerable doubt as to the veracity 
of the reports, hence the request to the Foreign Office to provide tangible proof.  He 
argues that, because of these doubts, the Foreign Office was able to manipulate the 
deputation at its meeting with them in December 1942, into believing that there was 
sympathy for the Jews within  government departments. He further argues that, in 
reality, none of the religious organisations wanted to create an embarrassing situation 
for the government, hence their acquiescent attitude.22 
In his analysis of the foundation of the Council of Christians and Jews, Marcus 
Braybrooke argues that William Temple, as the major force behind its creation, viewed 
the ethos of Nazism as a symptom of a deep evil which presented a problem to 
civilisation, rather than for the relationship between Jew and Christian. Based on this 
approach, he stated that there should be no specific mention of anti-Semitism in its 
general aims. It was to be emphasised that it did not support any form of discrimination 
and its main aim was to promote policies common to both Christianity and Judaism, in 
order to combat racial and religious intolerance.23 In his analysis of the Council, Tom 
Lawson, whilst supporting this argument, points out, that although, initially, attention was 
focused on the plight of European Jewry after the summer of 1943, little mention was 
made of the Jews as a specific group suffering under the Nazi regime.  The focus of the 
church emphasised the suffering of the Christian churches under Nazi domination. 
Lawson argues that the church hierarchy considered Nazism to be primarily an attack 
on both Christianity and Civilization rather than a deliberate policy of persecution and 
ultimately, annihilation of the Jews. As a consequence of this viewpoint, they considered 
that German Christians were the first victims of the Nazis. He further suggests that in 
promoting this view, the church was subscribing to the theory of the two Germanys – 
Christian Germany and Nazi Germany.24 Whilst the Council was advocating there 
should be no specific mention of anti-Semitism, the reports of Jewish persecution by the 
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Nazi regime continued to be published and these resulted in various approaches being 
made to the government with suggestions for assisting the European Jews under Nazi 
rule. 
Whilst accepting the analysis of Braybrooke as to the ethos behind the formation 
of the Council of Christians and Jews and supporting the arguments of Lawson, there is 
a further aspect to be considered. Without the active vocal support of the Council and 
various other religious leaders in publicising the Nazi atrocities as well as leading protest 
campaigns, the government would have been able to ignore the issue of the European 
Jews. Kushner may be correct in stressing the doubts voiced by some church leaders, 
but as Walter Laqueur suggests, it was beyond comprehension to accept that a 
deliberate policy of mass extermination was actively being pursued in Europe.25 In 
considering these various views, it is important to emphasis the new unity between the 
different denominations and their active campaigning, which ensured that the plight of 
the Jews remained in the public eye for some considerable time, rather than becoming a 
transient report in the national press. 
 The unity of the religious leaders 
Whilst the church leaders retained a spirit of unity in their approach to the government, 
the same cannot be said for the Jewish leadership. The diversity of the Jewish 
campaigners was reflected in the different organisations representative of the Anglo-
Jewish community. This section will analyse the responses of the different Jewish 
groups to the news of the Nazi extermination policy of Jews in occupied Europe, in order 
to ascertain why there was such a disparity of reaction at a time when a united approach 
to the European problem was required. It will consider whether the knowledge, that  its 
influence was beginning to weaken in the community, affected the relationship of the 
Board of Deputies with the other organisations, in particular The Chief Rabbi’s 
Emergency Council and how far the fear of possibly stimulating the growth of anti-
Semitism was a major consideration in its dealings with the government. 
 
There were deep divisions in the community, which had been created for a 
number of reasons, including support for the Zionist movement and a growing non-
acceptance, by the children of the Eastern European immigrants, of the traditional 
communal authority. In his analysis of this major shift in the community, David Cesarani 
charts the growing division created by the burgeoning middle-class together with the 
                                                          
25 Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), p.237 
 
 
127 
 
influence of Socialism and Zionism, on their attitude towards the Jewish leadership. He 
suggests that the growth and the consolidation of the middle and the lower-middle class 
together with elements of the bourgeoisie, developed a common link, resulting in a 
growing disregard for the upper-middle class which had tended to dominate the 
community prior to the First World War.26 In recent years, these differences have been 
analysed by various historians including Bolchover, Shatzkes and Sompolinsky.27 This 
has resulted in a substantial level of criticism of the attitudes taken by the Anglo-Jewish 
leadership in respect of the extermination of European Jewry. This section will analyse 
the differences in the responses of the different Jewish groups to the news of the Nazi 
extermination policy of Jews in their domain. 
 The reaction and policies of the Board of Deputies has been subjected to a 
growing level of criticism by several historians.  Richard Bolchover argues that the 
leadership of the community was sadly lacking in talent. He attributes this to the 
divisions in the community, which were exacerbated by the split between the Zionists 
and the non-Zionists. He suggests that the continuing fear of anti-Semitism ensured that 
the leaders maintained a low profile at all times, whilst reiterating the loyalty of the 
community to the country and this acted as a brake on their endeavours to persuade the 
government to provide concrete assistance to the European Jews.28 In his analysis of 
the Board reactions to the crisis facing European Jewry, Meier Sompolinsky argues that 
the ascendancy of the Zionists on the Board, had a profound influence on their reactions 
towards any proposed rescue schemes for the European Jews. He further suggests that 
this division between the Zionists and the non-Zionists exacerbated the differences of 
opinion in the community and that this dichotomy resulted in a variety of Jewish 
organisations approaching and negotiating, on an individual basis, with the government 
and the various embassies and legations in London.29 In contrast to these arguments, 
Pamela Shatzkes suggests that, at this crucial time, the main problems in the 
community were a lack of real political skills and a marked level of inadequacy in the 
leadership of Selig Brodetsky as the President of the Board of Deputies.30 In contrast to 
these criticisms of the community leadership, Amy Zahl Gottlieb examines and assesses 
the work of the Jewish Refugees Committee and the Central Council for Jewish 
Refugees from 1933 onwards.  She considers their relationship with the government 
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and their concentration of effort to provide practical assistance to the refugees 
throughout the period from 1933-1950 and she concludes that their work provided 
substantial assistance to the European Jews during this period.31 
The World Jewish Congress office, based in London, provided the only link 
between Switzerland and the headquarters of the organisation based in America.  It 
became a vital centre in the overall structure of the organisation, since London, 
effectively, became the diplomatic centre of the world.32 This was illustrated when it 
played a major part in exposing the Nazi atrocities in Europe, by forwarding  the report, 
which had been received by Sydney Silverman M.P. in London from the Geneva 
Section, detailing the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination, to Rabbi Stephen Wise in 
America.33 Alex Easterman, the London Congress Secretary, worked in close liaison 
with Sydney Silverman M.P. and consistently lobbied the Foreign Office on behalf of the 
European Jews. In a memorandum sent by him to Richard Law, at the Foreign Office, 
he proposed the establishment of an International Authority by the Allies to deal with all 
aspects of the refugee problem and having the power to provide the necessary 
resources to rescue and provide asylum for the European Jews.  He further suggested 
that this body should be adequately funded to provide the maintenance and transit 
arrangements required for the refugees and he stated that the World Jewish Congress 
would provide total co-operation in the implementation of any rescue operations 
mounted.34This memorandum was followed by a copy of a letter from him to the 
International Red Cross, requesting their assistance to establish refugee camps in 
neutral countries.35 He persisted in his lobbying and in February, in a letter to Anthony 
Eden, the Foreign Secretary, he suggested that the principles of the Lend-Lease Act 
might be used in the implementation of any rescue plans.36 His letters to the Foreign 
Office continued and in March he requested help to ensure that Yugoslavian Jews 
resident in Italy, were not passed over to the Nazis for deportation; this was followed by 
a letter of thanks when he was informed that measures had been taken to prevent this.37 
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It may be argued that the consistent lobbying by Easterman, which was in total 
contrast to the attitude of acquiescence adopted by the Board of Deputies, illustrates the 
move away from the traditional stance of the Jewish leaders, by the second-generation 
Eastern European immigrants. In his overall approach to the various government 
officials, Easterman displayed a clear determination to pursue a commitment on behalf 
of the World Jewish Congress to rescue the European Jews by any means available. 
In direct contrast to this positive approach, the Board of Deputies persisted in 
preparing and presenting long and detailed memoranda to the Foreign Office, both 
before and after every meeting, which achieved very little since the main content of 
these communications merely reiterated the demands of the other campaigners.38 Their 
diffident approach mirrored the strategy employed by the Board during the Thirties, 
when confronted by the rise of the Nazi party. At that time, they had pursued a 
deliberate policy of maintaining a low profile in the public domain, preferring to solicit the 
support of prominent Gentiles to speak on their behalf at public meetings, in order to 
counteract the possibility of stimulating anti-Semitism and they continued to employ this 
approach during the war.39  This was clearly demonstrated in their request to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury in September 1942, as more news of the Nazi extermination 
of the Jews was received. Brodetsky, in his capacity as chairman, asked the Archbishop 
if it would be possible for him to raise the issue of Jewish extermination in the House of 
Lords.40 
This policy of requesting positive assistance from non-Jewish organisations is 
further illustrated by their request to the Council of Christians and Jews, at a meeting 
held in December 1942, which discussed the extermination policy of the Nazi regime 
towards European Jewry. Brodestky, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of 
Deputies, requested that a deputation from the Council  approach the Foreign Office to 
ascertain the veracity of the reports emanating from Eastern Europe. He further 
suggested that the church leaders should raise the possibility of a United Nations 
declaration setting out both the present and the future position of the Jewish community 
and he asked them to consider the possibility of the Church announcing to their 
congregations, the actual facts appertaining to the European Jews, on an acceptable 
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day to be specified.41 Tony Kushner argues that the Board of Deputies favoured the 
stratagem of requesting representatives of the Christian Establishment to act on their 
behalf, since they felt that any approach on behalf of the Jewish refugees was better 
received by government officials, if representations were made by non-Jews.42 This 
argument is supported by  Pamela Shatzkes, who suggests that the Jewish leaders 
believed support from prominent non-Jews, offered a greater level of impartiality with the 
authorities. 43 
The only exception to this was the emphasis placed on the possibilities of 
settlement in Palestine, by a deputation from the Board to the Foreign Office in 
December 1942. They proposed that Palestine should be the obvious place of safety for 
the European Jews and it was recommended that the entire policy of entry into the 
Mandate should be reviewed. 44This suggestion that entry into Palestine should not be 
limited by the restrictions imposed by the May 1939 Palestine White Paper, was again 
reiterated in a further memo sent to Richard Law in March 1943.45 In a Foreign Office 
memo, issued after the December 1942 meeting, it was noted that the deputation had 
accepted the explanation, that due to security issues, it was not practicable to grant 
unlimited entry into Palestine for the refugees.46 This display of acquiescence by the 
Board was to be the traditional response of its members at subsequent meetings with 
various government officials.  
In considering the attitude of the Board of Deputies, during this period, it should 
be noted that, although, to a great degree, the arguments put forward by Bolchover, 
Sompelinsky and Shatzkes are an accurate depiction, they have overlooked the overall 
approach employed and supported by all the members of the Board to the Foreign 
Office. This approach displayed the mentality of the bureaucrat rather than the 
innovator. The acquiescent attitude displayed both before and after each meeting, would 
appear to reflect a determination to conform to the expected responses of petitioners 
rather than to the demands of active campaigners. This is best summed up by the 
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following comment made by F.H. Roberts of the Foreign Office, after a meeting with 
Brotman, the secretary of the Board in April 1943: 
“Mr.Brotman is very patient and helpful and it is, I am                                               
sure, in our interest to keep him and his moderate                               
organisation as contented as possible.”47 
The growth of anti-Semitism after the arrival of the Eastern European Jews at 
the turn of the century, had had an indelible effect on the leaders of the Anglo-Jewish 
community. In a determined attempt to combat its growth, they had employed a variety 
of schemes to encourage the new immigrants to assimilate as quickly as possible: 
education, evening classes for adults to encourage older immigrants to learn English, 
the publication of a Yiddish-English Lexicon in 1894 and Jewish Clubs for both sexes.48 
It was believed that these measures would help to deflect the general view that the Jews 
were different and as such did not conform to the prevailing mores of society. The 
advent of the First World War fuelled the public perceptions of Jewish support for 
Germany because of their links through banking and commerce.49 This view of the Jews 
as supporting the enemy, was further reinforced by the refusal of many of the Russian 
immigrants to serve in the armed forces. In the eyes of these immigrants, Russia was 
their enemy who had forced them to migrate.50 In a determined effort, the leaders of the 
community actively supported the proposed government conscription scheme for the 
Russian Jews and stressed the need to demonstrate patriotism in order to combat the 
growing hostility towards them.51 A further accusation levelled against the Russian Jews 
in the East End of London and Leeds, was profiteering.52 The determination of the 
leadership to encourage rapid assimilation into society was clearly demonstrated in the 
response of the community to the arrival of German Jews in the early Thirties, when 
their entry was monitored by the Central Council for Jewish Refugees, in their 
endeavours to ensure that there would be rapid assimilation by the newly arrived 
refugees.53 A further illustration of their attitude towards potential entrants was their 
support of the government decision to introduce a visa scheme for Austrian Jews after 
the Anschluss, in order to limit the number of Jews granted admission.54 Taking all 
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these factors into account, it is possible to sense the continuing influence of the 
problems created by the arrival of the Eastern European Jews at the turn of the century 
on the response of the Anglo- Jewish leaders as they confronted what appeared to be a 
seeminly insoluble problem: the growing number of Jewish refugees entering the 
country. 
In contrast to the work of the World Jewish Congress and the Board of Deputies, 
the approach of the Central Council for Jewish Refugees focused its efforts on providing 
practical assistance to Jews in occupied territories. After the failure of its proposed 
scheme to rescue children from Vichy France in September 1942, which the Council 
would have funded,55 they concentrated their efforts on practical measures to provide 
assistance to the refugees. They approached the government to discuss the possibility 
of sending food parcels to Jews in concentration camps and this resulted in talks with 
Sir Herbert Emerson of the Inter-Governmental Committee to further explore this idea. It 
was suggested that they would provide finance for the committee to purchase food in 
Switzerland, which would be sent to Theresienstadt and Birkenau; agreement was 
reached and the Council allocated £5,000.00.56 The practical approach of the Council to 
provide aid for the endangered European Jews where feasible and restricting its efforts 
to small-scale projects, ensured that it was able to achieve a modicum of success, 
which was aided by the close working relationship that Otto Schiff had developed with 
the Home Office. This had developed when, in his capacity as President of the Jews 
Temporary Shelter, he had discussed with Home Office officials, the status of 
immigrants wishing to settle in the country. This contact had expanded with the arrival of 
the first German Jewish refugees in 1933, when Schiff had been instrumental in 
founding the Central British Fund for German Jewry.57 
Dr.Joseph Hertz who had worked unceasingly to promote Zionism since his 
appointment as Chief Rabbi in 1913,58 refused to support the idea of Zionism as a 
solution to the Jewish tragedy unfolding in Europe.59 He accepted, that from a 
diplomatic viewpoint, any proposals to rescue European Jews which mentioned 
Palestine, would not be welcomed by the Foreign and the Colonial Offices.60 This 
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stance on Palestine was a further cause of the disunity within the Jewish community.61  
In July 1938, Hertz founded the Chief Rabbi’s Religious Emergency Council to provide 
assistance to European Jewry. The driving force behind it was Rabbi Solomon 
Schonfeld, his son-in-law. The main concerns of the Council were to provide assistance 
to predominantly orthodox Jews trapped in Europe but as the news from Europe, 
relating to the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination, reached Britain, this agenda was 
amended to encompass all European Jews trapped in Nazi- occupied territories, by 
emphasising the humanitarian rather than the political aspects of the situation.62 
In January 1943, Austin Hudson M.P. for North Hackney, wrote to Anthony Eden 
informing him of Schonfeld’s intention to lobby members of Parliament, requesting them 
to present a resolution in the House which would focus on the apparent lack of political 
activity since the government declaration of December 17th 1942. 63The proposed 
resolution stated:  
“That in the view of the massacre of the Jews and of                                          
other nationalities by the Nazis, and of the admirable                           
statements made thereon in both Houses…                                                         
H.M. Government should declare its readiness, in                              
consultation with the Dominion Governments, to                                                      
co-operate with the Governments of the United Nations                                         
in finding a place of refuge in territories within the British                                    
Empire, as well as elsewhere, for all persons threatened                                       
with massacre who can escape from Axis lands It should                        
appeal to the Governments of neighbouring neutral      
countries to offer temporary sanctuary in transit to all                                        
such persons.” 64    
                    
This change of tactic upset the Board of Deputies, who insisted that they, alone, 
were the main representative of Anglo-Jewry. They insisted that Schonfeld had no 
authority to lobby members of the Parliamentary Committee for Refugees, in order to 
introduce a resolution in Parliament which might exert pressure on the government to 
institute some form of rescue for the European Jews.65 Schonfeld argued that, as the 
religious head of his own community, he had the right to pursue any positive action that 
he felt was relevant, without having to consult with other organisations in the 
community.66 
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This response paved the way for a succession of letters between the Board of 
Deputies and Schonfeld, exposing the depth of the divisions within the community.67 In 
a strongly worded letter to Brodetsky, which supported the efforts of Schonfeld, the 
Chief Rabbi emphasised that, since the December declaration by Anthony Eden, 
nothing had been done to alleviate the situation facing the Polish Jews.68 This was 
followed by a letter from Schonfeld to The Jewish Chronicle describing his efforts to rally 
support for a petition to be discussed in Parliament, which was strongly opposed by the 
Board of Deputies.69 In a significant move, Schonfeld canvassed various M.P.’s and a 
draft motion was drawn up stating:  
“That in the view of the massacres and starvation of                                          
Jews and others in enemy and enemy occupied countries,                                    
this house desires to assure H.M. Government of its fullest                            
support for immediate  measures, on the largest and most                        
generous scale compatible with the requirements of military                
operations and security, for providing help and temporary                         
asylum to persons in danger of massacre who are able to                       
leave enemy and enemy-occupied countries.”70   
 
This petition was never presented to Parliament. It may, however, be argued that 
Schonfeld did achieve a measure of success through the tabling of a motion in the 
House of Lords by the Archbishop of Canterbury in March 1943. The motion requested 
that government assistance be given to the Jews trapped in Europe.71 
 In examining the opposition of the Board towards the possibility of a petition as 
suggested by Schonfeld, Geoffrey Alderman has argued that it was the refusal of the 
former to include the possibility of offering refuge to the European Jews in Palestine, 
which created the problem. He maintains that this omission incurred the unconditional 
fury of the Zionist lobby among the Boards’ members.72 Whilst Sompolinsky supports 
this argument, he also suggests that Schonfeld believed that, by stressing the 
humanitarian aspect of rescue, more would be achieved than by advocating the 
scrapping of the quota system emanating from the Palestine White Paper.73 In contrast 
to these arguments, Chanan Tomlin suggests that the opposition towards the actions of 
Schonfeld may be viewed as a result of  misunderstandings combined with a lack of 
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concerted co-operation, rather than a series of sectarian manoeuvres to assert control.74 
When considering the various Jewish organisations involved in the different attempts to 
rescue the European Jews, it may be argued that the pragmatic approach taken by 
Schonfeld, was far more practical and acceptable to the government. He did not stress 
the political connotations involved (settlement opportunities in Palestine) in any rescue 
operation, but by focusing on the humanitarian aspects, he was able to create a 
substantial body of support among the various campaigners. This, in turn, served to 
expose the deep divisions in the Anglo-Jewish community leadership, which effectively 
hindered many rescue proposals. 
In assessing the attitude of the Board of Deputies, during this period,a major 
influence on their reaction towards any display of independent action was beyond their 
control, was their determination to assert their dwindling authority in the community. This 
gradual loss of dominance may be traced back to the arrival of the Eastern European 
Jews arrival at the turn of the century, since it was their children who refused to accept 
the traditional attitudes of the Anglo-Jewish leaders. A further consideration is the 
underlying fear of stimulating anti-Semitism, which had pervaded the attitude of the 
nation towards the Jews since the turn of the century. This continual fear influenced the 
overall approach of the older leaders in their attitudes, with their insistence on total 
assimilation by the community and a refusal to take part in any political activities, since 
they believed that this approach demonstrated their loyalty to the Government of Britain. 
 It may, therefore, be argued that their response to the events unfolding in 
Europe did not galvanise them into radical action, since they believed that their primary 
aim during the war was to demonstrate their loyalty to the country. In viewing this as 
their main objective, their policy of requesting support from influential Gentiles, whilst 
pursuing a subdued approach to the lobbying of the government, ensured that, apart 
from a growing awareness of the Nazi atrocities, they could maintain an aura of 
normality free from outside disruption. In contrast to this, both Alex Easterman on behalf 
of the World Jewish Congress and the Chief Rabbi, with the assistance of Rabbi 
Schonfeld, adopted a determined approach in their meetings with different government 
officials, as they proposed various schemes to either rescue or alleviate the 
beleaguered European Jews. They displayed a pragmatism in their approach to 
government, which was not influenced by the fear of anti-Semitism or the need to 
maintain a low profile.  
Ultimately, the disunity of the Jewish community leadership was in stark contrast 
to the continuing cooperation displayed by the church leaders who worked both together 
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and in conjunction with the campaigners. They did not hesitate to confront and criticise 
the government stance towards the plight of the refugees, whereas the Jewish 
leadership never achieved any real degree of unity in their approach to the growing 
refugee problem. The causes of this disparity were fuelled by a combination of factors 
which were dominated by the fear of stimulating anti-Semitism and a determination to 
display, at all times, the loyalty of the community to Britain which they equated with 
strong support for the government policies. It may be argued, that since the government 
wished to maintain its façade of humanitarianism towards the refugees, the non-Jewish 
religious leadership was in a position to exert a considerable level of influence on the 
public policy of the government, whereas the determination of the Jewish leaders to 
maintain a seemingly innocuous stance severely hindered their influence in the public 
domain.  
 
 The proposed rescue of the Bulgarian Jewish children 
In the aftermath of the debacle of the proposed rescue of Jewish children in Vichy 
France  government officials were aware that they were expected to display a visible 
response to the situation of Jews in Europe. This section will examine the proposed 
government scheme to rescue 4,000 Bulgarian Jewish children and settle them in 
Palestine. It will consider the  political implications for this scheme which still adhered to 
the rigid quota set in the Palestine White Paper of 1939, thus ensuring continued 
support from the Arabs in the overall war effort,whilst demonstrating to the Allies, in 
particular America, its compassionate attitude towards Jewish children trapped in Nazi-
occupied Europe. The reactions of the Bulgarian and Turkish governments will be 
considered to ascertain how far the initial problems envisaged by Oliver Stanley, the 
Colonial Secretary, contributed to the continuing difficulties in implementing the rescue. 
 Early in December 1942, Oliver Stanley, the newly appointed Colonial 
Secretary, informed Churchill that the Jewish Agency had been in contact regarding a 
request to rescue children in Axis and Axis-dominated countries. He cited Bulgaria as an 
example and he suggested that, since the High Commissioner had agreed to allow a 
limited number of children to enter Palestine, this should be given serious consideration. 
He stated that, in reality, it was thought  little could be done to effect a mass rescue, but 
by opting to rescue a limited number of children, the government whilst retaining control, 
would benefit from the opportunity to display a façade of humanity towards the plight of 
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the refugees.75 The matter was discussed by the War Cabinet and it was noted that the 
High Commissioner had agreed, in principle, to allow the entry of a number of Bulgarian 
children into Palestine as part of the first immigration quota for 1943. Stanley was 
authorised to implement the necessary steps to set the scheme in motion.76 In 
retrospect, this decision was in complete contradiction to the previous stance of the 
Colonial Office who had been unwavering in their decision to refuse entry into Palestine 
to the passengers on board The Struma in February 1942.77 They had insisted that the 
passengers, whom they classified as illegal immigrants attempting to reach Palestine, 
must be forced to return to their port of departure, Constantia, Romania.78 In their efforts 
to put a halt to desperate Jews attempting to enter the Palestine Mandate, the Colonial 
Office, until the Stanley proposal of rescue, insisted on adhering to the conditions laid 
down in the 1939  Palestine White Paper, when any suggestion of allowing the 
European Jews trapped in Europe to enter the country was mentioned. This attitude had 
been strongly supported by Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, who had 
consistently argued against accepting Jewish adults and had stated that with regard to 
admitting adults from Bulgaria: 
“The door would then be thrown open to any number                                        
and condition of Jews whom any Axis country felt disposed                   
to get rid of.”79 
In the light of this statement, it should be noted that Jewish children were not considered 
to pose the threat that adults would.The belief that the Axis countries would implement 
such a policy was a reiteration of the ideas expressed both prior to and during the Evian 
Conference, when the concern was that Hungary, Poland and Romania would attempt 
to force their substantial Jewish populations to emigrate.80 Taking this attitude into 
account, it would appear that the apparent volte-face of the government in the overall 
policy towards the Jews at this juncture, may be considered as one of promoting a 
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compassionate façade to the world rather than implementing a successful rescue 
operation. 
       In late December, in a meeting with the Foreign Secretary, a similar proposal was 
made by a deputation from the Board of Deputies of British Jews during a meeting to 
discuss the general situation of Jews in Europe.81 The Foreign Secretary informed them 
that 4,000 Bulgarian children had been given permission to travel to Palestine and the 
government was awaiting a reply from the Bulgarian Government, via the Swiss 
government to reach an agreement. 82 In a meeting of the War Cabinet on the same 
day, this matter was raised by the Foreign Secretary who stated that, although no 
government commitment had been made, he believed that careful consideration should 
be given as to whether the government was able to offer any assistance. As a result of 
this, it was agreed to appoint a Cabinet Committee consisting of the Foreign, the Home 
and the Colonial Secretaries to consider what arrangements could be implemented for 
the reception and accommodation of any Jewish refugees who were able to leave 
enemy-occupied territory, via either Bulgaria or Portugal.83 This offer of help for 
Bulgarian children was acknowledged by the deputation in their letter of thanks, together 
with a draft of the points raised at the meeting of December 23rd with the Foreign 
Secretary.84 
The creation of a committee solely to deal with the refugees, was not made 
public. In a further meeting held early in January 1943, the reference to Jewish refugees 
was removed and replaced with ‘Refugees’ in the title of the Cabinet Committee when 
the following conclusions were agreed: - 
“A) That no differentiation should be made as between Jewish  
  and non-Jewish refugees, and that the refugee problem should                   
   be dealt with as a whole. 
B) That the problem should be regarded as a United Nations          
responsibility in respect of which each nation should agree to                     
make a definite contribution.”85 
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This decision was to act as the template for all future government discussions which 
reviewed both the general and individual situation of European Jews in Nazi-occupied or 
Nazi-dominated countries. 
The rescue scheme was announced in Parliament by Oliver Stanley, the 
Colonial Secretary, on February 3rd 1943. He stated that the Governor of Palestine had 
agreed to admit 4,000 Bulgarian Jewish children with 500 adults to accompany them on 
the journey. He assured the Commons that the negotiations had been successful and 
arrangements were now being made to arrange transport. He qualified this by stating 
that the practical problems of arranging the transport could be considerable and time-
consuming. He informed the Commons, that since some of the 270 Rumanian and 
Hungarian Jewish children, who had been given visas for Palestine, were now in transit, 
it had been decided to admit a further 500 children from these countries. He then 
announced that, subject to transport being available, Jewish children accompanied by a 
proportion of adults, would be given entry into Palestine. He qualified this statement by 
indicating that approximately 29,000 visas were available for entry into the Mandate. 
This equated to the agreed number of immigrants permissible as at 31st March 1944, 
stipulated in the Palestine White Paper of 1939.86  He reiterated the major problems of 
arranging transport together with the strain of providing food and accommodation for 
large numbers in Palestine.87 In examining this proposal, various points need to be 
considered. Did the government believe that the rescue of the Bulgarian children would 
succeed?   Was the main reason for their endorsement of the scheme a political 
strategem to display an element of humanitarianism? Was the aim to alleviate the 
growing pressure from the campaigners after the failure of the Vichy rescue?  
The problems Stanley mentioned in his speech to the Commons, had already 
been encountered by the British Ambassador in Turkey. In early January, he had 
informed the Foreign Office of the difficulties encountered by Jews wishing to travel 
through Turkey. The Turkish authorities refused to grant any transit visa unless the 
applicant were in possession of an entry visa into territory beyond Turkey. It was also 
noted that there was a strong degree of anti-Jewish feeling in the country.88 Corry 
Guttstadt examines the ramifications of an amendment, in January 1941, to a decree 
relating to transit visas for Jewish refugees coming from the Balkans. In effect, this 
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limited the number of transit visas available to Jews from Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania with a quota of transit visas set by Ankara for the respective consulates. The 
main condition of the visa was that the refugee had to possess a ticket for travel across 
Turkey, leaving within two weeks of entry and a stay in Istanbul was restricted to twenty-
four hours.89 In contrast to this, Stanford J. Shaw, whilst listing the entire contents of the 
decree, maintains that any European Jews subject to persecution would be allowed to 
travel through Turkey, providing they possessed an entry visa to another country.90  
 In March 1943, the British Embassy informed the Foreign Office that Bulgaria 
was prepared to allow two coaches per train to depart three times a week, to transport 
Jewish children to Istanbul, under the proposed scheme to allow entry to Palestine for 
5,000 children. This agreement would result in approximately 450 children arriving in 
Istanbul on a weekly basis. As the Turkish railway system was not adequate to deal with 
this number, it was proposed that the children should be transported from Turkey by 
ship.91A further problem was initially identified by The Jewish Agency For Palestine in 
February, when they suggested that, in order to advance the scheme, the visa 
procedure should be simplified. 92 This request was followed by a letter in March, 
restating the request93and subsequently reiterated by Lord Melchett in a letter to Lord 
Cranboune later in the month. He pointed out  the current system of issuing visas in 
Bulgaria through the Swiss Consulate was having an adverse effect on the proposed 
rescue plan. He stated that the entire system needed to be simplified in order to 
facilitate the process of granting the visas, since the current system could prove to be an 
impossible barrier, ultimately condemning the children to the mercy of the Nazis. In her 
analysis of the prevailing problems, Dalia Ofer argues that the procedures applied by 
the Foreign and the Colonial Offices in arranging permits for the children, were still 
based on those applied during the pre-war era. The process, which involved various 
officials in Palestine, Bulgaria and Turkey, had normally taken at least nine weeks for 
completion, but this was lengthened due war-time conditions. She maintains that the 
relevant sections of the departments involved did not take this into account, hence the 
apparent lack of urgency displayed by the Foreign and the Colonial Offices. She 
concludes that the rigid adherence to the routine procedures for compiling the relevant 
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detailed lists, in conjunction with the various other organisations involved, in Palestine, 
Sofia and Istanbul, created immense problems, which ultimately hampered the whole 
process, as pointed out by The Jewish Agency and Lord Melchett.94 
 On the other hand, the officials involved in the entire process, justified their 
actions in a lengthy memorandum prepared by Randall of the Foreign Office. He pointed 
out, in order to simplify the general procedure, it was necessary to consult with the 
Home and the Foreign Office, the Swiss government, the Bulgarian government 
(passing through Switzerland), the Embassy and Passport Control Officer in Angora and 
Istanbul and finally, the High Commissioner in Jerusalem.95 Randall stated that, in 
tandem with this five-way consultation, various questions were raised which focused on 
transport, the identification of the Bulgarian Jews to be granted permits and transit 
permits to be granted by the Turkish authorities. He emphasised the importance of 
ensuring that there was no public criticism of the Turkish Government although the 
refusal of the Turkish Consul in Sofia to issue any transit visas on an individual basis, 
without authorisation from his government, had to be overcome. In conjunction with this, 
the Bulgarian Government insisted that the organisation of transport must be resolved 
prior to any discussions appertaining to lists of Jews selected for emigration. Further 
difficulties included the refusal of the Turkish authorities to permit the first group of 
Bulgarians to pass through Turkey until a group of Romanians had completed their 
transit through the country by the middle of April.96 
He suggested Lord Melchett should be advised that the Angora Embassy was 
endeavouring to resolve the transport problems with the use of both the railway and 
shipping and finally, the government was raising the possibility of Turkey granting entry 
to children in possession of visas for whom immediate transport was not available. He 
concluded his brief by pointing out that, since Turkish agreement was vital in achieving 
the rescue of Jews in the Balkans, it would not be politic to have any public discussion 
of the current situation, nor would it be fair to level any public criticism of the British or 
Palestinian procedures, since any response would inculpate the Turkish authorities and 
this would not be in the best interests of the Jewish refugees.97 
In examining these arguments, it may be argued that the Foreign Office was 
hidebound by red tape, but consideration must also be given to the involvement of the 
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Bulgarian and the Turkish governments in the overall arrangements, appertaining to the 
various types of documentation required for the children, since both countries 
maintained an official status of neutrality throughout the war. It may be argued that, 
initially, the attitude of the Turkish authorities towards the scheme displaying a 
determination to ensure that the Jewish children would be given no opportunity to 
remain in Turkey, was driven by the possibility that they would not be allowed to enter 
Palestine. However, as Corrie Guttstadt points out, even after entry permits were 
granted by the Mandate authorities, the Turks still displayed an attitude of indifference to 
the plight of the refugees and continued to refuse any assistance from the Allies in 
alleviating the problems.98  
 The Turkish authorities continued to raise problems which only exacerbated the 
situation even before the refugees could leave Bulgaria. In two telegrams sent from the 
Turkish Embassy to the Foreign Office, they were summed up as follows; the Foreign 
Minister refused to consider allowing the establishment of transit camps, citing lack of 
health facilities, inadequate water supplies and difficulty in providing sufficient food; he 
declined to accept any offer of external administrative assistance and he stated that, 
due to a lack of transport, the offer of extra food supplies from Great Britain and America 
was not a practicable solution. He did, however, point out, given their limited resources, 
they were prepared to provide maximum help in transporting the refugees from the 
Bulgarian frontiers to either Istanbul or to another port on the Marmaris coast, for 
onward travel in shipping provided by either Britain or America. He explained that 
transport through Anatolia to Syria and Palestine, could only be offered to approximately 
150 persons per month and this facility was already being used to capacity by other 
Jewish children.  The embassy informed London that the International Red Cross was 
prepared to sponsor safe conducts  on reliable shipping, but it was qualified by the 
observation that the current shipping available was limited and it might be more 
practicable to obtain shipping from other sources.99 In response to this information, the 
Foreign Office decided to approach the Admiralty and the Ministry of War, to discuss the 
feasibility of chartering two Romanian liners to transport the refugees.100 
As the situation deteriorated, Oliver Stanley wrote to Anthony Eden, pointing out 
that no progress had been made in implementing the practical arrangements of rescuing 
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the children. He suggested the problems might be resolved by appointing one person, 
with ministerial responsibility, to oversee the situation, thus resolving all the issues as 
quickly as possible. In his response, whilst giving the impression of agreeing with 
Stanley’s suggestion, Eden raised various objections, but he did agree to contact the 
Ambassador for his views on the proposal.101 In a summary of all the events produced 
by the Colonial Office in May, it became apparent, that, apart from the intransigence of 
the Turkish authorities and the problems of transport through Turkey, there were also 
major differences between the Bulgarian government and the High Commissioner for 
Palestine. These centred on who should be responsible for selecting the eligible children 
and adults to use the visas granted by the British Government. Finally, in early May, the 
Bulgarians insisted that they would designate which Jews could travel to Palestine. It 
was further noted that, although it appeared that the Bulgarians would still allow 
individual Jews to leave, the likelihood of being able to implement the scheme for mass 
immigration was fading, due to increasing pressure from the German authorities to halt 
the departure of Jews. It was also noted that the embassy in Angora did not feel the 
appointment of one person to oversee the scheme, as suggested by the Colonial 
Secretary, was of practical use until the refugees started to move.102 In a telegram from 
Berne to the Foreign Office, it was confirmed that Germany had exerted considerable 
influence on the Bulgarian government to deport the Jews and an agreement had been 
reached between the government and members of the Nazi hierarchy, detailing how the 
deportations would be implemented.103 The original scheme was only implemented for 
Jews from the annexed territories of Thrace, Macedonia and Eastern Serbia but it 
appeared that there was now little hope of a large exodus of refugees from the 
country.104 The scheme totally collapsed in the middle of May. The Swiss Charge 
d’Affaires informed the British representative in Berne that they had been told by the 
Bulgarian Minister of the Interior on the 18th May, that it had been decided to close the 
Bulgarian-Turkish frontier to all Jews. In the light of this, they stated that they were 
unable to provide any more assistance to rescue the children.105 
In a final twist to the whole sorry saga, the Foreign Office sent a detailed 
telegram to America with copies to Berne, Angora and Jerusalem. It reported the 
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decision of the Bulgarian Government to close the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier to all Jews, 
but it instructed the British ambassador in Switzerland to ascertain whether the 
Bulgarian Government was denying passage to all Jews or was there still a possibility of 
some individual exceptions being granted permission to leave the country? It also 
contained a response to a suggestion made to the Swiss authorities by the German 
Government. The Germans had indicated that they might consider approving the 
departure of a number of Jews to enter Palestine from certain countries controlled by 
them, but they wanted German internees in exchange for this concession.106 The 
proposal was viewed as blackmail and it was not considered feasible, since it would 
mean negotiating with Hitler and this could be viewed as giving preference to the enemy 
over Allied nationals. It was accepted that by refusing this offer, there would be much 
dismay and dissatisfaction from Jewish “pressure” groups and, no doubt, both the British 
and the American Governments would be blamed for the impasse of the scheme to 
rescue Jews from German-controlled countries. The telegram concluded by requesting 
the American State Department to ascertain whether they had any suggestions or 
contacts which could facilitate the departure of the Jews from Bulgaria.107 The Times 
carried a brief report which stated that 20,000 Jews had been expelled from Sofia to 
other parts of the country, as a potential first step towards deportation to Poland. The 
report stated further that 14,000 Greek and Yugoslavian Jews in Bulgarian territory, had 
already been deported and that in the rest of Bulgaria, there remained approximately 
45,000 Jews.  These facts were confirmed by the Foreign Office in a letter early in June 
1943, which substantiated the news report carried in The Times. It stated that the 
government still hoped that there might be a slight chance of rescuing the children, 
since it was understood that there was a fair degree of opposition to the expulsion of the 
Jews.108 
 Ultimately, the problems facing the different organisations in their attempts to 
rescue Jewish children in Bulgaria, were virtually insurmountable. The intransigence of 
the Bulgarian authorities in their refusal to allow any neutral body to select the adults 
who would accompany the children on their journey was compounded by their decision 
in early May to close their frontier with Turkey, thereby halting any possibility of a mass 
departure of Bulgarian Jews.The limited co-operation of the Turkish authorities in 
permitting the Bulgarian children to have transit visas together with their refusal to 
accept any assistance from the Allies, created a further hindrance to the proposed 
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scheme. The aim of the British to display a humanitarian approach, after the debacle of 
The Struma, was severely hindered by the delay in granting Palestine entry visas to the 
children. The rigid adherence to the rules governing the issue of the permits and the 
numerous foreign departments involved in the process,  was to ultimately delay any 
movement of the children until all the numerous procedures had been resolved. The 
requirements for any of the proposed schemes was determined by the attitude and 
adherence to clearly-defined policies in both the Foreign and Colonial Offices towards 
the Jews. There was a belief in different, government departments that the Jews 
themselves had a tendency to exaggerate the persecution of their fellow compatriots in 
Nazi Europe - ‘As a general rule Jews are inclined to magnify their persecutions.’109 This 
resulted in an initial refusal to acknowledge that it was predominantly the Jews who 
were being exterminated, even as factual reports were received during the latter part of 
1942.110 The government was adamant that the European Jews should be treated as 
nationals of their respective countries rather than being viewed as a separate race, 
since, apart from a fear of increasing anti-Semitism, they were determined to adhere to 
the restrictions of the Palestine White Paper in order to placate the Arab population. 
These attitudes, together with an insistence that to ease the entry requirements to enter 
Britain, could lead to an increase of anti-Semitism, dominated the behaviour and 
thinking of the Civil Service. This resulted in a strict adherence to the prevailing 
immigration laws in both Britain and Palestine, culminating in their refusal to ease the 
entry regulations for refugees into either country.  
In his analysis of the Bulgarian rescue scheme, Wasserstein suggests that the 
main reason for the determination of Oliver Stanley to implement it, was because it was 
the only practical rescue scheme that the government had proposed, but he does state 
that the efforts of Stanley and the government did show a level of good faith and 
determination in the rescue attempt, which sadly failed.  He examines the suggestion by 
the German Government of the possibility of an exchange of German internees for 
Bulgarian Jews, which was based on the refugees being granted entry to Great Britain 
rather than Palestine. This proviso was stipulated in order to satisfy the Mufti of 
Jerusalem (who, as an exile in Berlin, was a strong supporter of Hitler).111 This 
argument is supported by both Richard Breitman and Frederick B.Chary.  Breitman 
states that in May, the Swiss Government approached Germany for permission to be 
given for 5,000 Jewish children from Eastern Europe and the General Government of 
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Poland, to travel to Palestine and quotes the clearly defined  basic requirements for any 
agreement laid down by Himmler together with the conditions demanded by the German 
Foreign Office: 
 
“We cannot agree to the emigration of Jewish children                          
from the German sphere of power and from friendly states.                                     
He (Himmler) considers that he might change his view with                              
respect to emigrating from the German sphere only if, in                                  
return for the release of Jewish children….young interned                                           
Germans be permitted to return to Germany, on a scale                                        
not yet determined. As a scale one Jew for four Germans.”112 
 
Whilst Chary states that the British rejected the plan on the basis that they would not 
exchange German-prisoners-of war for non- British citizens,113 Klaus Gensicke 
maintains that the Germans were referring to ‘the exchange of Jews for Germans who 
had been unable to return to the Reich due to the war situation’ and their proposal was 
subject to the refugees being settled in Britain with British nationality, in place of being 
able to immigrate to Palestine.114 Anthony Bevins disputes the claim made by Gensicke 
that the Germans specified the proposed exchange should be dependent on the 
Bulgarian children being settled in Britain.115 He tends to endorse the conclusions 
reached by Wasserstein that Stanley had made a determined attempt to rescue the 
children.  
  It may be argued that the responses of both the Foreign and the Colonial 
Offices towards the rescue schemes would appear to be at variance with the attitude 
towards the actions instigated by the Cabinet. However, a detailed examination of the 
government proposals suggests that the real purpose was to present a façade of 
humanitarian action to the free world, whilst deliberately refusing to acknowledge 
publicly that the European Jews were being exterminated by the Nazi regime. In similar 
fashion, Oliver Stanley had also considered the humanitarian factor when raising the 
prospect of rescuing Jewish children from Bulgaria. A further point is that the proposed 
rescue scheme would enable the government to display a degree of compassion 
towards the plight of the children whilst it would, in part, stem the criticism of the 
Palestine policy based on a rigid quota system, without changing it. This seemingly 
benevolent attitude could be employed to deflect any criticism raised by the 
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campaigners and the American Administration, whilst adhering to the agreed quota 
system. The deployment of the scheme would be used by Anthony Eden in his meeting 
in Washington in March, when the fear of facing a large influx of Jews from both the Axis 
countries and Nazi-occupied Europe, was discussed.116 In effect, it would seem that the 
scheme was doomed to failure through the intransigence of the Bulgarian Government 
but consideration should actually be given to the underlying purpose of the government 
policies. As at the Evian Conference, which had considered the refugee crisis in July 
1938 and the initial response to Kristallnacht in November of the same year, the 
government of the day paid lip service to the plight of the Jews whilst enforcing a policy 
of rigidly controlled entry for Jewish refugees into Great Britain and the Colonies. In 
effect, they ensured that their attitude towards the Jews remained as it had been since 
their original entry into the country at the turn of the century. The xenophobia displayed 
during that period could be viewed as still exerting a lasting reaction on the policies of 
the government which ensured that whilst tangible aid for the European Jews was 
minimal a public façade of humanitarianism was displayed.  
 
 The aims and goals of the Bermuda Conference in April 1943 
 
Throughout the first months of 1943, demands to provide tangible assistance to the 
refugees were raised by members of the public through letters to the government and 
the press117and through deputations to meet government officials,118as well as the 
campaigners raising a succession of questions in Parliament. 119 Eleanor Rathbone 
became a major driving force behind the campaign to rescue the beleaguered Jews, by 
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her consistent lobbying of various members of the government with suggestions to 
provide assistance and possible rescue. These included letters to Herbert Morrison, 
Richard Law, Clement Atlee and Anthony Eden, drawing their attention to the continued 
plight of the Jews and the refusal to grant visas to alien refugees.120 The differing aims 
of the campaigners were, to a degree, encapsulated in a resolution from the Council of 
Christians and Jews, which included the proposal that temporary asylum should be 
granted in both the Empire and Palestine, to any refugees escaping from Nazi 
persecution.121 Other similar letters, resolutions and suggestions came from various 
sources including Lord Lytton, Chairman of the League of Nations Union 122 and the 
Inter-University Jewish Federation,123 all of whom reiterated the ideas proposed by 
Gollancz and the church leaders.  The common denominator in the letters was the 
suggestion that the government should grant temporary asylum, either in the Empire or 
the Palestine Mandate, to any refugees who were able to escape from the Nazis. This 
demand, which formed a major part of the campaigners’ consistent requests to the 
government on behalf of the Jews, to provide tangible assistance to the refugees, was a 
complete contradiction of government policy which maintained that  Jewish refugees 
were not acceptable in either the Empire where they were viewed as ‘Outsiders’  or 
Palestine,  where the driving force  was to appease the Arab population by restricting 
entry of Jews. In March 1943, as a result of continual pressure from a group of 
determined campaigners including Eleanor Rathbone M.P., Victor Cazalet M.P., Victor 
Gollancz, the left-wing publisher, William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews and the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, 
an agreement was reached between Great Britain and the United States to hold a 
conference in Bermuda in order to discuss the growing problem of refugees in 
Europe.124  
In order to assess why the government decided to approach America with the 
suggestion to hold informal discussions about the growing refugee problem, a number of 
factors need to be considered. What were the reactions of the various government 
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departments involved in the policy decision taken by the Cabinet that an international 
conference with America could provide an acceptable solution to the Jewish situation in 
occupied Europe? Did the departments take into account the reactions of the American 
Government to this proposal? What were the long-term government policies towards the 
persecuted Jews? How strong was the influence exerted on the government, by both 
the campaigners and the public, in their response to the Nazi policy of Jewish 
extermination  being implemented in Europe? Were there any common links between 
the aims of the campaigners and how practical were the proposals that they presented 
to the government? This section will examine and discuss these issues to ascertain the 
underlying factors that gave the impetus to the proposed government policy. 
The negotiations between the British and the American Administrations 
commenced in January 1943 and were to prove extremely frustrating for the Cabinet 
even before they were able to reach an agreed response to the growing refugee 
problem in occupied Europe. The historiography relating to the aims of the British 
Government is somewhat limited in its scope and is dominated by Bernard Wasserstein, 
who focuses on the issues relating to the entry of Jews into the Palestine Mandate 
during the war period of 1939-1945. In his analysis of the aims and the achievements of 
the government, he states that the agreement reached with the American 
Administration, prior to the Bermuda Conference to limit any discussion appertaining to 
Palestine, was successfully maintained throughout the conference. 125 Monty Penkower, 
while supporting this analysis, points out that the State Department Near- East Division 
stressed that Palestine should not be considered as a place of refuge for fear of 
upsetting the Arab and Moslem worlds.126 In her analysis of the conference, Louise 
London maintains that the government decided to limit the 29,000 remaining visas under 
the Palestine quota for Jewish children, thus ensuring that the entry limit to the Mandate 
as laid down in the Palestine White Paper, was adhered to. This effectively ensured, an 
overall ban was placed on the entry of adults. In their creation of this apparent 
humanitarian response, London argues that the government calculated few children 
would be able to take advantage of the offer.127  
Pamela Shatzkes argues that Eden never anticipated the UN Declaration would 
have, as he stated ‘a far greater dramatic effect than I expected’ and that, ultimately, the 
expectations aroused by it would force the government into discussing the refugee 
                                                          
125 Wasserstein, Britain and the Jew.,,p.348 
126 Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable. Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p.108 
127 London, Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948., p.221 
 
 
150 
 
problems with America.128 She further argues that the demand by the Jewish Agency 
and the Zionist faction of Anglo-Jewry, that Palestine should become a Jewish 
sanctuary, was viewed by the government as obstructiveness. The complex situation in 
the Middle East had created a situation which made it impossible to ignore the legalities 
and constraints of the Palestine White Paper.129 Kushner propounds a similar argument 
as he states it had been hoped the promise of post-war retribution in the Declaration 
would remove the demands for a rescue operation to be mounted for two specific 
reasons. The general government assumption was that, in reality, a wide-scale rescue 
scheme was not feasible and would result in disappointment, but more importantly, the 
fear that, if such a scheme were successful, the end result could result in an influx of 
Jews into Britain, Palestine or the Empire, which it was feared, would generate an 
increase in anti-Semitism. 130 A further argument made by W.D.Rubinstein is that the 
majority of Jews trapped in Europe were unable to leave, thereby negating any 
possibility of rescuing them from the Nazis, whilst Jews who had reached the safety of 
neutral countries were not at risk. Rubinstein maintains  the only feasible option was the 
possibility of exchanging refugees for ‘Axis  nationals,’ but, as he admits, these would be 
extremely limited due to the intransigence of the Nazi negotiators and the limited 
number of ‘ Axis nationals’ who wished to be repatriated.131  
In his history of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, Tommie Sjoberg 
not only traces its creation, but also examines how it was employed by the British and 
the American Governments at the conference, to demonstrate their compassion and 
concern for the refugees, as a result of the pressure exerted by various  campaigners  to 
rescue the European Jews in Nazi –occupied territory. He concludes that narrow 
political concerns overrode humanitarian issues and he argues there was a major 
difference between the rhetoric used and the practical proposals implemented towards 
the refugees from 1938 onwards.132 The major considerations for the Cabinet were 
focused on maintaining the status quo in Palestine by adhering rigidly to the agreed 
quota system implemented in the 1939 Palestine White Paper and the underlying fear 
that granting admittance to a large influx of foreign Jews might create a similar scenario 
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to the social and economic problems experienced by the indigenous population at the 
turn of the century, which had been attributed to the arrival of the Russian Jews. 
 Government response to the growing Jewish refugee problem 
In the course of a discussion by the Committee on the Reception and Accommodation 
of Jewish Refugees at the end of December 1942, certain observations made by both 
the Home Secretary and the Colonial Office reiterated the continuation of current 
government policy being applied to the Jewish refugees in Europe. Morrison, the Home 
Secretary, regretted that Britain was viewed as the only refuge for the refugees. In his 
response to the proposal that the overall refugee problem should be viewed as a United 
Nations problem with a shared responsibility and that Britain would be prepared to 
accept a specific number of refugees, on the basis that America and the Dominions 
shoulder a proportionate number, he stated that he would accept a very limited number 
of refugees (approximately 1,000-2, 0000) on condition they were settled on the Isle of 
Man for an indefinite period. He refused to allow entry for uncategorised Jews, citing 
accommodation problems and the fear that a substantial increase in the number of 
Jewish refugees would increase what he termed ‘The considerable anti -Semitism under 
the surface in this country’. Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, reiterated that entry into 
Palestine would be reserved for children from Eastern Europe, accompanied by a 
limited number of women, but adult males would be excluded, as a security risk.133 In 
his reference to these arguments, Stanley was adhering to the maintenance of the 1939 
Palestine White Paper with its rigid entry quotas, thus effectively precluding any mass 
migration by Jews to the Mandate and he suggested that ‘there should be no 
differentiation between Jewish and non-Jewish refugees.’134 At a subsequent meeting, 
two major decisions affecting the growing problem of Jewish refugees in Europe were 
reached: it was agreed that the committee title should be changed, with any mention of 
Jews omitted and the plight of the European Jews in Nazi -occupied Europe would no 
longer be viewed as an exclusively British concern.135  
At the end of January, Alec Randall, Head of the Refugee Section in the Foreign 
Office, prepared a memo to the Cabinet summarising the British position, both at Home 
and in the Colonies, towards the problem of the refugees and the exceptional pressure 
emanating from the campaigners after the United Nations Declaration of December 17th 
                                                          
133 CAB95/15 Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Jewish Refugees, Minutes of 
meeting,31st December,1942, pp.3-4 
134 Ibid., p.5 
135 CAB95/15 Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9th January 1943 p.1 
 
 
152 
 
1942.136 The demands of the campaigners, that the government should provide 
assistance to the refugees, was emphasised in a series of letters to the press  from 
influential people including the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Cardinal Hinsley 
and John S.Whale, Moderator of the Free Church Federal Councils . 137 Further 
pressure was applied to the government in February when Sir William Beveridge 
published two articles in The Observer that offered various proposals for government 
consideration in order to assist the Jews who had reached the neutral countries. 138 
Randall informed the Cabinet that, unless new policies were introduced or the current 
policies relating to the refugee problems were modified, it would seem that there was no 
easy solution to the growing issues. In his brief, he noted that admittance into the 
country was only granted by the Home Office on practical grounds. No adults of enemy 
nationality were admitted and the only grounds for the entry of Allied adults were either 
compassionate or usefulness to the war effort. He advised that the Colonial resources 
were stretched to full capacity by the arrival of Polish refugees, British evacuees and 
prisoners-of-war. As a result of this, even if shipping were available, there was a minimal 
possibility of re-settling the 10,000 to 12,000 refugees currently resident in Spain and 
Portugal, in the Colonies.139 
He emphasised that Palestine was a unique situation, since it possessed a 
substantial number of visas to be allocated to refugees of friendly nationalities and the 
government had just agreed to grant entry to 5,000 (Bulgarian) Jewish children. He 
suggested, providing this scheme worked, it would be feasible to consider a further 
movement to the Mandate.140 He made various suggestions for consideration by the 
Committee, including the proposal to treat the refugee problem as an international one 
and he suggested that an obvious solution would be to involve America in solving the 
growing refugee crisis. This would, in effect, create an Anglo-American venture which 
would demonstrate that Britain was working towards achieving a lasting resolution to the 
continuing refugee problems.141  
The Foreign Office was requested to prepare a draft telegram to communicate 
these ideas to Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington.  The Joint 
Secretaries of the committee were requested to draft a policy statement in order to 
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provide guidance on a suitable approach to be made to the American Administration. 
The main objective was to suggest that a viable response to the growing urgency to 
provide relief for the European refugees, should be under the auspices of the United 
Nations. 
 It was further agreed that Britain would be prepared to accept a specific number 
of refugees based on the proviso that the United States and the Dominions were 
prepared to accept a similar proportion. In a separate comment, the Home Secretary 
reiterated that he was not prepared to grant entry to an unlimited number of Jewish 
refugees, since there were almost 100,000 Jews already in the country. He further 
stated, that due to the already acute housing shortage, he believed the acceptance of 
more would exacerbate this situation in the event of air attacks being renewed in the 
future.142 In his determination to justify his continuing refusal to amend the immigration 
laws, Morrison concluded with the observation that: 
“There was considerable anti-Semitism under the surface                                        
in this country. If there were any substantial increase in                                                                 
the number of Jewish refugees or if these refugees did                                      
not leave this country after the war, we should be in for                                     
serious trouble.”143  
 
These comments may be considered to reflect a pattern of response which was 
created by the housing problems which had been attributed to the arrival of the Russian 
Jews at the turn of the century, when the East End of London was being redeveloped for 
industry rather than for the benefit of the indigenous population. The government was 
again faced with an acute housing shortage, due to the Blitz, but the fear was,that any 
substantial entry of Jewish refugees might lead to an increase in anti-Semitism if they 
were seen to be obtaining housing comparatively easily. 
 As a result of this meeting, Alec Randall prepared a draft telegram to be sent to 
Lord Halifax, the American Ambassador in Washington. In his review of the problems 
arising from the current situation in Occupied Europe, he made three main points: the 
refugee problem was not totally Jewish; there were as many non-Jews who were 
suffering great hardship in the Allied countries; any preferential treatment shown 
towards the Jews by attempting to rescue them from the Nazis could result in an 
increase in anti-Semitism from the Allies. 144 It may be argued that this refusal to accept 
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that the European Jews were in a far worse position than the non-Jews, was a 
deliberate diplomatic ploy to encourage the American Administration to demonstrate a 
willingness to participate in a joint effort to resolve the growing refugee problem. In his 
analysis of the telegram, Wasserstein suggests that such an approach on a joint basis, 
could provide the means to approach the various allied governments, the British 
Dominions and the Latin American countries, to obtain their agreement to take a 
proportion of the refugees.145  He maintained that any announcement of possible 
destinations which were beyond the capacity of rescue by shipping, would only raise 
false hopes which could not be fulfilled and he suggested that there was a possibility 
that the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination might be changed in favour of a policy of 
extrusion.146 In this final point, he was referring back to the pre-war policies adopted by 
the Nazi hierarchy of attempting to flood other countries with alien immigrants in the 
hope of embarrassing them into the acceptance of unlimited numbers of Jews.147 It may 
be argued that this supposition of a possible reversion to a pre-war policy was highly 
unlikely, since, in various speeches made  in 1939, 1941 and 1942, Hitler had clearly 
announced his intention to exterminate all the Jews under his control and the Foreign 
Office was aware of his speeches in 1939, and 1942: 
“Today I will once more be a prophet: If the international                        
Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in                              
plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the                      
result will not be Bolshevization of the earth, and thus the                          
victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.”  
Reichstag Speech January 30th 1939. 
“In my speech before the Reichstag on the first of September                      
1939, I spoke to two matters… if world Jewry launches another                      
war in order to destroy the Aryan nations of Europe, it will                              
not be the Aryan nations that will be destroyed but the Jews.”            
Winter relief Fund Speech 2nd September 1942.148   
   
 Further points reiterated the continuing contributions made by both Britain and 
the Colonies towards the resolution of the refugee problem, at the same time stressing 
the problems of providing both food and accommodation under the prevailing wartime 
conditions. In a diplomatic move, the efforts of the United States in helping to resolve 
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the refugee problems, were acknowledged with a specific mention made of the 1938 
Evian Conference, which had been convened by President Roosevelt, in a final attempt 
to provide a solution to the growing problem of Jewish refugees after the Anschluss in 
Austria in March 1938. It was noted that this initiative had resulted in San Domingo and 
other areas offering to accept the refugees. These comments were followed by an 
acknowledgement of the generous offer from America to admit large numbers of refugee 
children from Vichy France in 1942. 149 The draft concluded with the suggestion that 
Britain and America should have an informal meeting in the near future, in an attempt to 
resolve the growing refugee situation.150 
In subsequent discussions held by the committee to review the draft presented 
by Alec Randall, it was agreed on the 7th January, to omit any reference to the Jews in 
the committee title. It was thus referred to as the Committee on the Reception and 
Accommodation of Refugees. In a further comment, Morrison stated that he believed the 
only solution to the problem was to find one area in which the refugees could be 
settled.151 The omission of Jewish from the title of the committee and the remarks by 
Morrison provided a clear indication that there would be no preferential treatment for the 
European Jews.  They were to be treated as a part of the overall refugee problem 
because it was felt that an excessive number of foreign Jews settled in one area could 
lead to an increase in anti-Semitism. Kushner argues that this fear was based on a 
distrust of both the British population and the Jewish refugees and he cites comments 
made by Morrison during the Thirties. These included the accusation that the Jews still 
operated a sweated labour system, they were bad landlords and they employed dubious 
economic practices.152 He points out that Morrison was highly critical of Jewish black 
marketeers, whom he viewed as alien and commented, ‘these (foreign Jewish black 
market offenders) people (were) creating the anti-alien feeling.’153 A further 
consideration is that Morrison as the Home Secretary was determined to maintain the 
rigidity of the immigration laws and his employment of a threatened increase in anti-
                                                          
149 Public papers of the President 1938 Book 1: Franklin Roosevelt available at 
http://www.residency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?=15614&st accessed  30 March 2011.,p1 
Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt (General Eds.) Jeremy Noake (Ed.), British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs. Reports and Papers From The Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II from the First to the Second 
World War. Series F Europe Vol.49 Doc.114 (C5609/1667/62) (America: University Publications of 
America, 1994), p.89 
150 FO371/36668 (43)2 Foreign Office draft telegram from AW.G. Randall to Lord Halifax Washington, 
January 1943. pp.2-3 
151 CAB/95/15, Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees, Minutes of meeting 7th 
January,1943., pp.,13,14 
152  Kushner, The persistence of prejudice., pp.155,156 
153  Ibid.,P.156 
 
 
156 
 
Semitism could be used to maintain the law. In considering these remarks, it may be 
argued that the description of foreign Jews as aliens reflected the general perception of 
the Jews as outsiders, intent on dominating trade and finance at the expense of the 
indigenous population. 
 The final draft for the telegram was agreed on the 9th January in a meeting 
chaired by Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, who again stressed that no 
differentiation should be made between Jewish and non-Jewish refugees: 
“The refugee problem is not wholly Jewish and there are                                    
as many non-Jewish refugees and so much acute suffering                             
among non-Jews in  Allied countries that Allied criticism                                          
would probably result if any  marked preference was shown                                      
in removing Jews from territories in or threatened by enemy                                       
occupation; there is also the distinct danger of stimulating                         
anti-Semitism in areas where an excessive number of                          
foreign  Jews are introduced.” 154  
 
 The lingering fear that the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination might change to 
one of extrusion, thus creating a major problem for the Allies, was alluded to: 
 “There is the possibility … that the Germans or their satellites                     
may change over from the policy of extermination to one of   
extrusion, and aim as they did before the war, at embarrassing            
other countries by flooding them with alien immigrants.”155 
It was proposed that the entire refugee problem should be considered as a 
United Nations responsibility with each nation making a definite contribution to its 
solution. It may be argued that the origin of this proposal may be traced back to a 
memorandum sent by Philip Noel Baker, an influential Parliamentary campaigner, to 
Richard Law in the Foreign Office in early January, which had included a series of 
suggestions, all of which were now being reiterated by the Foreign Office.156 Great 
emphasis was placed on the efforts of both Britain and the Colonies to provide 
assistance to the refugees, whilst struggling to cope with a limited supply of food and 
housing. The government acknowledged the generous reception given to the refugees 
by America, together with their efforts to provide other areas of settlement such as San 
Domingo.157 The telegram was sent to Lord Halifax in Washington and to the 
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Dominions, in the middle of January.158 The contents reiterated the draft prepared by 
Randall with the emphasis placed on certain observations, including the determination 
not to view the refugee problem as wholly Jewish. 
In a deliberate move to forestall the  awkward questions being raised by the 
various campaigners as to what measures were being taken to provide for the European 
Jews, Clement Atlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, informed the Commons that the 
government was in  confidential consultation with other governments to create a series 
of practical proposals to be implemented by the United Nations, although he did stress 
the only real solution to the problem was to achieve an Allied victory over the Nazis.159 
In a further move to elicit a reply from Washington, a copy of Atlee’s statement 
was sent together with an emphatic reminder to Lord Halifax to obtain a response to the 
original suggestion of considering the plight of the refugees as an issue to be dealt with 
by the United Nations.160 The committee held a separate meeting to consider what the 
response should be to an All-Party deputation to be received on the 28th January. Its 
main conclusions centred on stressing that mass immigration to either Britain or the 
Colonies was not feasible; emphasis should be placed on the contributions Britain and 
the Colonies had already made and this should be substantiated by providing a detailed 
list of our efforts; no reference should be made to the Palestine quota since the Colonial 
Secretary stated that he was waiting for agreement from  the High Commissioner of 
Palestine to allocate the remaining places to Jewish children and accompanying adults 
from enemy occupied territories.161 
In their overall consideration of the Jewish refugees, little sympathy was shown. 
The Home Secretary stated that: 
“We should be thinking now of what could be done after the             
war to solve the Jewish problem in Europe by large scale                               
transference to some suitable home.”    
 whilst the Foreign Secretary thought: 
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“The solution of the Jewish problem in Europe after the war  
 lay in making Europe fit for Jews to live in and not by large  
 scale transference.”162 
It was also agreed by the committee that any mention of an exchange of German 
Jews for other nationals in Britain was not acceptable, on the grounds of security; there 
was no reason to consider granting entry to Jews from Spain since they were not 
thought to be in immediate danger and it was agreed that any settlement should be part 
of the United Nations remit. Finally, it was decided that the Deputy Prime Minister 
should be the main representative of the government at the proposed meeting of the All 
Party Deputation on the following day.163 The deputation led by A.Greenwood and 
compromising Lord Melchett, Eleanor Rathbone, Professor A.V.Hill, Quintin Hogg, 
S.Silverman, Graham White and H.Holdsworth, was subsequently assured by Eden, 
Morrison and Stanley that the government was doing its utmost to help the refugees.164  
In examining the individual responses of the ministers towards the plight of the 
Jews, various considerations need to be taken into account.   As noted by Kushner, 
Morrison viewed the foreign refugees as untrustworthy aliens; Wasserstein argues that 
for many of the government officials, the Jewish situation in Europe was almost beyond 
their comprehension;165 London maintains that the rescue of the Jews was not viewed 
as a British problem.166 A further consideration  is that the government believed that a 
large Jewish influx could result in problematic consequences resulting in the growth of 
anti-Semitism across the country. 
In February, it transpired that, whilst Lord Halifax was consistently attempting to 
elicit a response to the government suggestion of early January, there was little 
appreciation in America of the urgency of the problems,as well as administrative 
difficulties in ascertaining under whose remit the refugees came.  A major difference 
was noted between the approach of the vociferous campaigners in Britain and the 
negligible campaigning in America. 167  
In another meeting in February, the Home Secretary reiterated that, although it 
might be possible to admit between 1,000 and 2,000 refugees, he did not favour this, 
unless it were part of a joint effort by the United Nations. In the ensuing discussion, as 
various options were considered, it was agreed that, whilst maintaining the refugee 
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problem should be dealt with by the United Nations, the Foreign Secretary should 
continue to press for a response from the American Administration and a statement 
should be made in Parliament to publicise the number of refugees already admitted to 
British territory since the beginning of the war.168 Throughout these meetings and 
discussions, the committee was united in insisting that the refugee problem was not the 
sole responsibility of Britain; there was to be no differentiation between the Jews and the 
non-Jews in occupied Europe; there was to be no relaxation of the Palestine Mandate 
quota and no easing of the rigid immigration laws administered by the Home Secretary, 
since there was the underlying fear that granting entry to Jews, would stimulate anti-
Semitism. Ultimately, the government was in agreement that the European Jews were 
not to be granted any special assistance, which might be viewed as prejudicial to the 
other groups under Nazi occupation.  
These meetings and discussions culminated in an Aide Memoire being handed 
to the US Charge d’Affaires, in a further attempt to elicit a response to the original 
telegram sent in January. This summarised the current situation in Britain as regards the 
European Jews and stressed the demands for tangible assistance from various 
influential people, individual campaigners and organisations to rescue the Jews from 
extermination. It reviewed the level of aid already extended to the refugees both in 
Britain and the Colonies and mention was made of the proposal to settle thousands of 
South-Eastern Europeans in Palestine, regardless of the limitations of the quota system. 
Whilst it acknowledged the co-operation of the American authorities in dealing with 
localised refugee problems in Spain and North Africa, it stressed that the level of public 
interest in the situation of the European Jews was growing, with the expectation that 
every effort should be made to alleviate their plight. Whilst conceding that large-scale 
measures of relief and rescue were impracticable at the present time, the 
communication contained three major points: that a meeting should be arranged by the 
Americans and the British with the Allied governments, currently based in London to 
consider the refugee problem and possible solutions at a mutually agreed centre;  an 
agreed number of special visas should be used to encourage other countries to provide 
similar assistance and the American and the British Governments should provide 
assurance to neutral Governments that the responsibility for refugees at the end of the 
war would not devolve on them alone.169 The primary aims of this communication were 
to emphasise to the American Administration the generous offer of settlement in 
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Palestine for Balkan Jews, subject to transport being available and the continual efforts 
of the British Government to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees under 
extreme war-time conditions. The emphasis on these displays of assistance was to 
demonstrate that Britain was responding to a major catastrophe in Europe, whilst 
lacking access to major resources to provide the level of assistance demanded by the 
campaigners. It may be argued that the main aims of the communication were primarily 
to exert pressure on the American Government to reciprocate with some visible form of 
assistance, hence the stress placed on the British response to the overall refugee crisis, 
rather than the potential crisis created by the Jewish refugees. Government advisors 
believed that, the adoption of this approach and the creating of an international body to 
deal with the growing refugee problem, would assuage any American fear of preferential 
treatment being extended to the Jewish refugees. The creation of such an organisation 
would clearly demonstrate an international commitment to confront the growing refugee 
problem, thus satisfying the campaigners’ demands.  
 The American response 
The American response of 26th February, encapsulated the aid and assistance given by 
the American Government to the refugees. It cited the convening of the Evian 
Conference in 1938 which had been called in order to find a solution to the growing 
refugee problem at that time. It maintained that, as a result of the conference, the 
American Government had exerted considerable efforts to find areas of settlement for 
the refugees; it emphasised the liberal spirit of its immigration laws and its official 
condemnation of Axis policy towards racial and religious minorities. It stated that, from 
1933 until June 1942, it had issued 547,775 visas to nationals of countries dominated by 
the Axis powers and it stressed 5,000 visas had been granted to refugee children from 
France, Spain and Portugal, together with funds available for their maintenance. The 
Administration suggested, in order to resolve the growing refugee problem, serious 
consideration should be given to the revival of the dormant Executive Committee of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, rather than create a new organisation. It 
was suggested that in order to consider their remit, a meeting in Ottawa between Britain 
and America should be held to consider its future. In outlining this, it was stressed that: 
“The refugee problem should not be considered as being                                
confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi                                             
measures against minorities have caused the flight of                                        
persons of various races and  faiths as well as of other                              
persons because of their political beliefs.”170         
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This emphasis on refusing to accept that the European Jews were the most 
persecuted people under the Nazi regime, clearly echoed the attitude of the British 
Government, who refused to acknowledge that the Jews were a separate nationality, 
they were to be treated as being on a par with the Allies. Wasserstein argues that by 
adhering to this policy, the government did not have to provide effective assistance to 
the European Jews.171Whilst supporting this argument, London suggests further that 
other reasons included the determination that no discrimination should be shown to the 
Jews and the conviction that the rescue of the Jews was not a British problem. 172 Whilst 
accepting these arguments a further consideration is the government fear, as voiced by 
Morrison, that the admittance of a substantial number of European Jews would stimulate 
the growth of anti-Semitism. In his analysis of the American response to the European 
Jews under the Nazi regime, David Wyman argues that the Roosevelt administration 
feared that special assistance to the Jews would encourage anti-Semitism, which was 
widespread during this era, together with the accusation that Roosevelt favoured the 
Jews in his administration.173  He further argues the examples of assistance given by 
the American Government to the Jews, were a gross exaggeration and he cites the 
inflated figures quoted for the number of visas granting entry to the refugees from the 
Nazi regime since 1933.174 
In early March, the New York Times printed a detailed report of a huge rally held 
on the previous day in Madison Square Gardens, demanding that the European Jews 
facing extermination under Hitler, should be rescued.  The rally was addressed by 
various public figures including F. La Guardia, the Mayor of New York, Dr. Chaim 
Weitzman, President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Senator Robert Wagner and 
Governor Dewey. Many messages of support were received from foreign ambassadors 
including Britain, Belgium, Yugoslavia and Luxembourg and the main British religious 
leaders, Chief Rabbi Hertz, William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal 
Hinsley.175 In a detailed telegram from Washington, Viscount Halifax informed the War 
Cabinet that the crux of the resolution adopted at the rally had called for the German 
Government to allow Jews to emigrate and for admission to be granted for entry to the 
United States, Britain, Palestine and Latin America. He stated that he had been 
informed the State Department had received 1,600 telegrams in support of these aims 
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and, indeed, many more were expected, but the Department did not intend to be 
influenced by this level of protest. He advised the committee the State Department was 
firmly opposed to the British suggestion of convening a meeting of the Allied 
Governments to discuss the problems of the European refugees and the possibility of 
agreeing to a limited number of visas for refugees would not be considered under any 
circumstances. 176 
On the following day at a press conference, Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary 
of State, announced that the refugee situation was under discussion with Britain and he 
would be publishing the American Communication to London forthwith. He made no 
reference to the British Aide Memoire which had been submitted prior to the American 
announcement. It caused acute embarrassment to the British, since the proposal to hold 
a meeting in Ottawa had not been discussed with the Canadian Government, nor had 
they been invited to participate in it.177 When Welles was confronted by Sir Ronald Ian 
Campbell with a request to halt publication of the American note, he was informed that 
this was impossible, since the American Government reserved its right to publish any 
communication to a foreign government.178 Welles told Campbell that the American 
response had been sent to the British Government through the American Ambassador 
in London and although the State Department maintained this was incorrect, Alec 
Randall (Foreign Office) confirmed on 4th March, that the response had been received 
through the American Charge d’Affaires. He further noted the action taken by Welles 
could be viewed as an attempt to placate the Jewish vote.179 It may be argued that a 
major influence on the American response was their determination to demonstrate that 
they were initiating the possibility of a conference rather than the British. This was 
reflected in various American and British press reports of the announcement, which 
presented the initiative for a discussion as originating in Washington.180 This theory is 
supported by Wyman, who states that not only was Welles conveying the false idea that 
plans for a conference had originated from America, but also that his overall behaviour 
was a total breach of the diplomatic code of practice, since confidential negotiations 
were still taking place.181 
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The action taken by Welles resulted in an unsatisfactory meeting between 
Campbell and Welles, at which the former made it clear the publication of the American 
response had created an embarrassing situation for the government, particularly with 
regard to Canada, who had not been consulted. Welles was informed that his 
announcement had created an impression that Britain had been inactive in dealing with 
the growing refugee problem, whereas the British Government reaction had been the 
reverse.  In his response, Welles accused Britain of creating an impression that they 
were the only country attempting to resolve the refugee problem. He further stated that 
there had been a series of statements and propaganda from various British Government 
officials, which were viewed as being detrimental to America.182 Campbell considered 
that Welles did not regret the embarrassment caused to the British and he emphasised 
he publication of the announcement was designed to reinforce the impression that the 
overall initiative emanated from America: 
“It will be seen that Mr. Welles, who adopted the tactics                                               
of  counter-attack (which are not unusual with the State                     
Department) …in effect admitted that  the publication of                                         
the United State note was a calculated action designed                                    
to cast the United States in the beau role and to give the             
appearance of American initiative.”183 
In his analysis of the American proposals, Randall argued that their suggestions 
to hold a meeting in Ottawa and to employ the Intergovernmental Committee to resolve 
the growing refugee situation, could be viewed as a tactical move to embarrass the 
British. He considered the action of the State Department to be an attempt to placate the 
Jewish vote and he believed that:  
“The American action in publishing their memorandum and                      
their proposal about Ottawa, together with their quite                          
impracticable proposals about the Evian Committee, while                             
at the same time stalling on our chief practical proposal,                           
namely the establishment of a camp  will mean that if there                                 
is no spectacular result the blame will be passed to His                                 
Majesties Government.”184 
In considering the American response, it may argued, as David Wyman states, 
the main intention was to assert the supremacy of the American Administration in its 
reaction to the refugee problem. In pursuing this policy, it intended to gain the initiative 
in any manoeuvres to provide assistance for European refugees. The suggestion to 
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reactivate the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees would ensure that, as at 
Evian, little would be achieved, but its façade of humanity would be maintained. The 
publication of its response to the British request for a meeting, was designed to convey 
the impression that rather than the British Government, it had initiated the idea of a 
conference to discuss the growing refugee problem, thus placating the Jewish protest 
which had taken place in early March in Madison Square Gardens. 
 The British response to the American proposals – diplomacy and planning 
As a result of the American announcement, it was agreed in a Cabinet meeting held to 
consider a response to the American proposals, that a telegram should be sent to 
Washington accepting the suggestion of a preliminary meeting to consider the refugee 
problems. It was further agreed that the venue should be Ottawa, subject to its 
acceptance by the Canadian Government. The American agenda was accepted with the 
proviso that there should an examination of the problems relating to food and 
accommodation. It was, however, noted that the Executive Committee of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was not viewed as being adequate to take 
responsibility for any decisions relating to the refugees and it was felt that the creation of 
a suitable body should be included on the agenda. 185 
In a further move to smooth out any differences between America and Britain, 
Eden, the Foreign Secretary, visited Washington in mid- March. When Richard Law, at 
the Foreign Office, requested an indication as to any progress regarding the current 
refugee situation, he was initially informed by Lord Halifax that Eden would not raise the 
refugee question.186 This stance changed when Eden was informed that there was to be 
a major debate in the House of Lords on March 23rd, headed by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury on behalf of the campaigners, with Lord Cranbourne representing the 
government; it was imperative that some response to demonstrate the current 
government action in dealing with the refugee problem was forthcoming.187 
Subsequently, in various discussions concerning the refugee situation, Eden made the 
following comments: a major problem was the situation facing Jews in the Axis-occupied 
countries to which there was no quick solution; he informed the Americans that Britain 
was planning to move 30,000 Eastern European Jews to Palestine and discussions to 
achieve this were ongoing through the Swiss Government; he stated that there would be 
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no objections raised by the Arabs, since this number was acceptable under the current 
quota system applying to the Mandate.188 As a result of this meeting, Halifax informed 
the Foreign Office that deep consideration had been given by both governments to the 
persecution of ‘persecuted peoples in Eastern Europe’ and reference had been made to 
the evacuation and relief being offered to them in Palestine. It had been agreed that 
there should be further discussions between the two governments at a designated place 
to be announced in the immediate future.189 In a further conversation, Harry Hopkins, 
Special Assistant to Roosevelt, recorded that, when confronted with the possibility that 
between 60,00 and 70,00 Bulgarian Jews were  facing extermination,  Eden had said: 
“The whole problem of Jews in Europe is very difficult and                       
that we should move very cautiously about offering to take                      
all Jews out of a country like Bulgaria. If we do that, then                          
the Jews of the world will be wanting us to make similar                               
offers in Poland and Germany. Hitler might well take us up                             
on such an offer and there are simply not enough ships and                
means of transportation in the world to handle them.”190 
Yet again the fear that there would be a massive movement of European Jewry to 
Britain if large-scale assistance were offered to Eastern European Jewry, influenced the 
British response to the refugee crisis. The fear had been demonstrated at the Evian 
Conference and in various Cabinet meetings throughout the period, thus reflecting the 
xenophobia at the turn of the century which had culminated in the creation of the Aliens 
Act in 1905. 
Hopkins further recorded that Eden had informed the meeting that Britain was 
prepared to permit entry to approximately 60,000 Jews to Palestine, although transport 
was a major problem and it posed a great danger to security, since the Germans would 
attempt to infiltrate a number of their agents in this migration.191 This report of 60,000 is 
a total contradiction of the figures recorded in the previous meeting; in retrospect, it 
seems, it would have been highly unlikely for Eden to have made such a 
pronouncement since, as Bernard Wasserstein notes, the figure totally breached the 
quota limits imposed by the White paper for Palestine.192 A further factor for 
consideration is that Eden was utterly pro-Arab and did not like Jews. Oliver Harvey, the 
private secretary to Eden had noted in September 1941 that the latter had informed him 
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‘If we must have preferences, let me murmur in your ear that I prefer Arabs to Jews.’193 
This view of Eden was restated by Harvey in April 1943 with his diary note: 
“Unfortunately A.E. is immovable on the subject of                       
Palestine.He loves Arabs and hates Jews.”194 
In noting these comments from Eden, it is highly unlikely that he would have even 
considered breaching the Palestine quota for Jewish entry, which would have upset the 
Arab population. 
 The American announcement that the conference would be held in Ottawa, was 
not acceptable to the Canadian authorities. The Canadian immigration policy in respect 
of Jews was not welcoming. In a national poll held in January 1943, eighty per cent of 
the respondents voted against any large-scale entry of immigrants into the country.195 
With the Canadian Government unwilling to host a conference in Ottawa, 196it was 
agreed between America and Britain, that an alternative venue was required and finally 
Bermuda was agreed upon for various reasons, including its isolated position in the 
West Indies.197As a result of this decision, an inter-departmental meeting was held on 
the 25th March to discuss and formulate the policy to be presented at the forthcoming 
conference. 
The ultimate objective of the government departments was to create a policy that 
would be of assistance in responding to the campaigners’ demands without easing the 
immigration laws or granting admission to the Empire. Major emphasis was placed on a 
solution for the refugees in Spain and Portugal, since it was felt that, if they were 
transferred to camps in North Africa, this would satisfy the demands of the pro-refugee 
campaigners. The ramifications of such a proposal were discussed and included the 
finance required; the possible employment of the refugees in the war effort, which from 
the  Ministry of Labour’s viewpoint, appeared to be remote, owing to the age and sex of 
the refugees, thus precluding admittance into Britain;  the problems of food in the 
African Colonies which limited the possibility of settling the refugees there; the India 
Office stating that there was no possibility of India accepting any more refugees and the 
Dominions Office informing the meeting that no response could be given on behalf of 
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the Dominion governments, since they would wish to be represented at the conference 
as independent delegates. 
The Home Office stated there should be an agreement that in the post- war era, 
both refugees and stateless people would be returned to their country of origin. Alec 
Randall, of the Foreign Office, concurred that an Anglo-American guarantee for the 
return of refugees to their own countries should be a fore-runner to a United Nations 
guarantee and this would provide solid reassurance for the neutral countries.198 The 
Home Office intimated that the International Labour Office would appreciate contact with 
the post-war refugee organisations. This was agreed. The meeting reached three 
conclusions: 
“A) The Establishment of personal contact between the                          
British and American authorities concerned with the                                   
practical problems. 
B) The construction of some Anglo-American machinery                          
to be adapted to an international scope to organise                                
concerted action in respect of the refugees. 
C) An agreement between His Majesty’s Government                                                  
and the United States Government on the basis of a                                         
United Nations refugee conference and organisation. 
Any decision affecting immigration or foreign policy would                                       
be “ad. referendum.”199       
   These departmental comments were considered by the War Cabinet at a 
meeting to discuss the forthcoming Anglo-American conversations which were viewed 
as an American alternative to the original British suggestion of convening a United 
Nations meeting. The main aims of the government were encapsulated in this and 
included the proviso that: ‘The problem is not confined to persons of any particular race 
or faith’.  The other directives given to the British delegation stated that ‘In view of 
transport limitations, refugees shall be housed as near as possible to where they are 
now or to their homes’ and ‘plans should be made to maintain refugees in neutral 
countries in Europe’. It continued by submitting that the possibility of asylum in allied 
countries should be examined with the proviso ‘taking account of availability of shipping, 
food and accommodation’ and it suggested that the possible use of the Inter- 
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Governmental Committee needed to be taken into account, since it was deemed to be 
an inadequate  organisation in its current form.200 
 In a further meeting, it was agreed that assurances should be given to neutral 
countries that repatriation of refugees would be under the auspices of the United 
Nations when the war ended.  It was suggested, that since the United States had not 
filled their immigration quotas, it might be possible for them to receive refugees up to 
their maximum limit by using the example of Palestine, where Britain had stated that it 
was prepared to use the outstanding quota which was available until 1944, for the 
admission of refugees. It was noted that due to the serious food situation in the East 
African Colonies, it was not feasible to accept any more refugees.  A further 
consideration was the possibility the Americans might offer to accept a fixed number of 
refugees, providing a similar fixed proportion were settled in the Empire. This suggestion 
was discussed and it was agreed a maximum of 2,000 could be accommodated in 
Britain but the Empire could not receive more than a total of 500 and Canada could be 
asked to accept 2,000 refugees; overall the total number of refugees would not exceed 
5,000. The final decision taken, stated that: 
“A most important objective to aim at was to return large   
 numbers of refugees to their country of origin…. It would  
 be worthwhile for the Bermuda Conference to investigate  
  the possibility of allocating some suitable area of large size 
  as a place of settlement for Jewish refugees after the war… 
 since the Jewish element in the population of Poland was  
  proportionately higher than was healthy.”201  
These aims clearly illustrated the government’s adamant refusal to acknowledge 
the Jews as a separate entity in Europe. Their intention was to ensure that the 
European Jews remained in Europe rather than settling elsewhere in the world, thus 
determining that the limitations of the Palestine White Paper were adhered to. This 
limited response to the continuing problems of the refugees, illustrates the determination 
of the government to maintain a rigid control in granting admittance to Jews both in 
Britain and the Empire. The views propounded by the Home Secretary and the Colonial 
Secretary mirrored the responses of their departments prior to the Evian Conference in 
1938. They had insisted then that there were no suitable areas for German Jews to 
settle in 1938 and in 1943 they maintained the limited resources of the Empire could not 
provide support for the entry of Jewish refugees. In 1938, identical views had 
demonstrated the government determination to adhere to the immigration laws, the fear 
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of a substantial influx of Eastern European Jews from Poland and Romania and the 
refusal of the Colonies to accept a substantial number of Jews since they were viewed 
as outsiders who did not conform to the mores of society.202 Whilst Kushner argues that 
this approach was influenced by the liberal ambivalence towards Jewry as a whole,203 a 
further consideration is that anti-Semitism had long roots which were apparent with the 
arrival of Russian Jews at the turn of the century and this was reflected in  the 
government  policies towards the refugees during this period. 
Working towards a common goal 
With the basis of unofficial discussions agreed by both governments, the focus turned to 
the composition of the delegations. At the end of March, Roosevelt appointed Justice 
Owen Roberts, Senator Lucas and Congressman Sol Bloom as the American 
representatives for the Bermuda Conference. In their summary of the three individuals, 
the Foreign Office noted that: 
 “Mr. Bloom, although Jewish and representing a largely  
   Jewish district of New York, plays no part in Zionist affairs.  
  He does not even sign their manifestoes…and does not appear 
   to belong to any Jewish organisation.”204 
It was agreed by the committee that the British Delegation should consist of the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs accompanied by A. Randall (Foreign 
Office), Sir Frank Newsam (Home Office) and Sir Bernard Reilly (Colonial Office). It was 
further agreed that, if required, a Ministry of War Transport representative in New York 
would be available.205 In a further meeting, Richard Law, Under Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, was appointed to lead the delegation and a further two delegates were included, 
Osbert Peake, Under Secretary in the Home Office and G.H.Hall, Admiralty Financial 
Secretary.206 
As the final planning for the conference proceeded, there remained two separate 
problems to be resolved – newspaper reporting of the proceedings and private Jewish 
representation at the conference. The Colonial Office had indicated that there should be 
limited publicity issued by the resident Information Officer in Bermuda, whilst the Foreign 
Office was amenable to a press officer being attached to the American delegation. The 
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government was adamant that excessive publicity was to be avoided, since it would 
raise exaggerated hopes and this could result in either side passing the onus to the 
other, which would, ultimately be of little benefit to the refugees or to Anglo-American 
relations.207 In his reply, Halifax informed London that the Administration, whilst wishing 
to restrict press representation to the conference, was aware that this could create 
considerable protest. It was believed that they would be accused of preventing the press 
from reporting the conference. In the search for a face-saving compromise, they 
informed the American News Agencies that they would need to make their own travel 
arrangements to attend it.They would, however, provide assistance should any 
difficulties be experienced and this facility was to be offered to British agencies wishing 
to attend.208    
As a result of this agreement, the American press, who feared that their reporting 
would be subject to censorship, were reassured that this would not be the case. This 
was circumvented by the Colonial Office who informed Bermuda that, since agreement 
to American press representation had been given, they would be asked to limit the 
number wishing to attend, in order to ensure that there would be no difficulty in their 
transmittance of reports.209 A further instruction to Washington indicated that it was vital 
to provide a press officer for Bermuda, who knew the various press representatives, in 
order to facilitate matters during the course of the conference. Such a tactical move 
effectively ensured that press reportage would be limited and as Halifax made known, 
press interest in the conference was diminished once it became apparent that there 
would be no attempt to ban the press from attending the proceedings in Bermuda.210                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
The question of Jewish representatives attending the conference had been 
raised by the Board of Deputies, when they had approached the Foreign Office to 
discuss the possibility of sending a representative to attend. In an explicit telegram to 
Washington, the Foreign Office quoted its response towards the Jewish request:  
“They have been told that the Conference is really an informal  
exchange of views….and that their basis is that the refugee                              
should not be confined to persons of any particular race or                                                   
faith; it would therefore be embarrassing to admit Jewish                                
interest which although admittedly important, is paralleled                                               
with other interests (Poles Czechs etc.) which might claim to                              
have observers.”211 
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This stance was reiterated in a letter from Eden to the request of Sir Maurice 
Bloch to represent the Jewish community at the conference.212 It was noted that British 
Jewry feared their American counter-parts would persuade the State Department to 
allow them to attend the talks which would be viewed as discrimination. A further 
comment stated that: 
“Our interpretation of Mr. Sol Bloom’s proposed appointment                      
was that it was in virtue of his position in Congress and not                               
as a representative of Jewry.”213 
They concluded by insisting that the inclusion of representatives for special 
interests would give rise to various Jewish bodies claiming the right to attend.214 In his 
response, Halifax, whilst confirming that the current intention of the State Department 
was to exclude any private representation, advised that this stance might change, 
although the embassy would endeavour to hold them to it. It was also confirmed that the 
assumption of Bloom’s appointment was correct, since: 
“He has never been identified with Zionism or with any   
recognised Jewish pressure groups. But no doubt the                                          
President thought his  appointment would be a sop to                                           
Jewish opinion in this country.”215 
In a series of comments, A.Walker of the Foreign Office Refugee Section, stated 
that if American Jewish representatives went to Bermuda to cover the conference, there 
would be ‘heart-burnings and lobbying amongst Jewish organisations in this country’.216 
He noted that Dr.Brotman of the Board of Deputies had enquired as to the possibility of 
a representative attending the conference and had informed Walker that he had 
contacted Eden requesting an interview to discuss this. Walker then noted that, although 
the members of the American delegation had changed: 
 “It looks as if Mr. Bloom will be one of their number and   
   that there will be other Jewish representatives of some   
   importance present on the fringes of the conference if the  
              State Department “weaken.” When the names of the delegates 
   are published Mr. Bloom’s presence will undoubtedly cause  
              a renewal of pressure, but in the meantime think that we  
   should maintain our previous standpoint and reiterate   
   it to Dr.Brotman if and when he approaches us again.”217 
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The possibility of American Jewish representation, as voiced by A. Walker, 
became a reality when two additional assistants to the American delegation were 
announced. The representatives now included George Backer, a board member of 
Overseas News Agency (Jewish) and the former proprietor of the New York Post (now 
run by his wife). 218 This was an advanced Liberal paper with an active interest in 
refugees. In his comments, Halifax noted that: 
“While Backer is… a prominent Jewish philanthropist…he                                            
has not been nominated by Jewish organisations. His                                 
inclusion may represent a compromise by the United States               
Government between yielding   completely and opposing a                        
flat negative to insistent Jewish demand for representation.”219                                                           
    
 The government refusal to countenance any Jewish representation at the 
forthcoming conference may be attributed to their refusal to acknowledge the untenable 
position of Jewry in Nazi-occupied Europe, since the fear of an unlimited number of 
Jews being released by Hitler could lead to a major outburst of anti-Semitism in both 
countries. A further consideration is that Britian and America were aware that the 
proposed conference was not designed to provide any tangible assistance to the 
European Jews; its primary aim was to promote a combined display of humanitarianism, 
therefore the possibility of Jewish representation could prove to be embarrassing when 
this policy became public.  
 As with the Evian Conference of July 1938, which had been held in a final 
attempt to resolve the German Jewish refugee crisis at the time, the government 
reached an unofficial agreement with the American Administration as to the proposed 
contents of the talks.220 In a lengthy telegram from the Foreign Office to the 
ambassadors of the Governments-In- Exile, the agenda for the conference was 
formulated; it was agreed that the refugee problem should not be confined to persons of 
any particular faith or race; co-operation among governments should be employed to 
provide temporary asylum for refugees wherever practicable, with the proviso that they 
would be returned to their homeland  at the end of the war;  maintenance should be 
provided by the United Nations and private sources offered to the neutral countries 
providing assistance to the refugees together with an assurance from the various 
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Governments-In-Exile to ensure that the refugees would eventually return to their native 
countries; temporary asylum in other countries should be considered dependent on the 
availability of shipping in Europe and finally, the method to be employed in organising 
concerted action to achieve this aim. The conclusion of the telegram noted that, 
although America wished to employ the Inter-Governmental Committee: 
“His Majesty’s Government’s doubt whether this body in its   
present form, is suitable. The refugee problem can only be   
comprehensively and effectively dealt with by international           
co-operation, and they anticipate that steps will be agreed upon           
and to keep the Governments of the United Nations informed                  
regarding the progress of the forthcoming talks.”221 
                               
The agenda agreed between the two governments provided the British 
Government with a political ploy to satisfy the campaigners in the immediate future.  The 
various government departments involved in the planning had ensured that, as at Evian, 
there would be no change in the long-term policies in place for the reception of Jews 
whether in Britain, Palestine or the Colonies. The only major difference between Evian 
and the forthcoming meeting was that, whereas at Evian, thirty-eight different 
independent organisations, which had been represented by twenty-four delegates, had 
attended, but at the forthcoming conference, the government had ensured that no 
private organisations were granted permission to attend.222 
 Campaigning unity  
The differing aims of the campaigners were, to a degree, encapsulated in a resolution 
from The Council of Christians and Jews, which included the proposal that temporary 
asylum should be granted in both the Empire and Palestine to any refugees escaping 
from  Nazi persecution.223 Other similar letters, resolutions and suggestions came from 
various sources, including Lord Lytton, Chairman of the League of Nations Union 224and 
the Inter-University Jewish Federation,225 all of whom reiterated the ideas proposed by 
both Gollancz and the church leaders.  The common denominator in the letters was the 
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suggestion that the government should grant temporary asylum, either in the Empire or 
the Palestine Mandate, to any refugees who were able to escape from the Nazis. This 
demand formed a major part of the campaigners’ consistent requests to the government 
on behalf of the Jews, to provide tangible assistance to the refugees. They continued to 
raise their demands in Parliament for assistance to be given to the refugees and in 
March 1943, a new committee of The National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror 
was formed to maintain public interest. The main aims of the new committee were laid 
down in a draft statement prepared for a meeting to be held on March 16th and included 
the following points: 
“To act as a medium for co-operation between the  various  
organisations, groups and individuals concerned with the rescue                  
of victim of Nazi persecution…Favour immediate and adequate              
action by His Majesty’s Government and other governments of                
the United Nations, particularly the U.S.A. to provide rescue for                        
as  many lives as possible, subject to…not delaying the victor                                     
by impeding the war effort.”226    
 The other suggestions listed for discussion included the issuing of individual and 
block visas to representatives of the government in neutral countries, in order to 
maintain a steady flow of refugees, with the possibility of providing accommodation for 
them in the Isle of Man; to implement admission into Palestine for adults able to escape, 
rather than restricting entry to children only and to provide temporary residence for 
refugees in the Colonies and the Dominions. The final suggestion was that the proposed 
conference between Britain and America should be held as soon as possible with the 
opportunity for representatives of both Jewish and other expert bodies to address the 
conference with suggestions for possible rescue measures.227 In conjunction with this, 
William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who was a Vice President of the 
committee, presented a Resolution to the House of Lords entitled ‘German Atrocities: 
Aid for Refugees’228 on 23rd March, 1943. 
The main thrust of William Temples’ arguments and proposals made on behalf of 
the European Jews, centred on the continuing reports being received of the atrocities 
which the Nazis were committing against the Jews across occupied Europe. It was 
noted that, since the announcement of the United Nations Declaration on December 17th 
1942, very little progress seemed to have been made in respect of the alleviation of their 
plight. He referred to the announcement by the Colonial Secretary, earlier in February, 
of the proposal to rescue 4000 Bulgarian children but stressed that, subsequently, 
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nothing appeared to have happened.229 Having made these points, he then proposed 
the implementation of the following action by the government: a major revision of the 
visa requirements needed to enter the country, since it was not feasible to expect 
neutral countries to provide refuge if Britain refused to demonstrate a willingness to 
accept the Jews. He suggested that, offering to provide aid to the neutral countries 
which allowed entry to the Jews, would encourage them to offer on-going assistance to 
the refugees, but he argued assurances must be given to the neutral countries that the 
refugees would be re-settled in various countries including the British Empire as soon as 
it was practicable.230He considered further the possibility of negotiating through a neutral 
power, an agreement with the Germans, to allow an agreed number of Jews to enter 
territory within the Empire or travel to Eire, but he was adamant that he was not 
advocating any direct contact with the Nazi regime.231 He touched upon the issue of 
anti-Semitism (which he had acknowledged existed in a letter to Mary Sibthorpe after 
the acrimonious meeting with Herbert Morrison in November 1942)232 and insisted that 
this could be controlled by the government through the employment of the radio to gain 
peoples’ sympathy, particularly if it were focused on the possibility of rescuing 
endangered Jewish children. He further suggested the appointment of either a high- 
standing individual from the government or the civil service, to be solely responsible for 
the implementation of any rescue proposals deemed acceptable by the government. He 
proposed that, providing the United Nations were in agreement, they should either 
appoint a High Commissioner or widen the power of the current League of Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, to aid the Jews. In his closing remarks he strongly decried 
the apparent procrastination of the government to implement any visible action to rescue 
the Jews.233 
The arguments presented by the Archbishop were strongly supported by other 
members of the Lords; Viscount Samuel raised the possibility of granting entry into 
Palestine which he maintained would be of great benefit to both the Jews and the Arabs. 
He further argued Britain could not expect various neutral countries to provide 
assistance to the Jews, if it were not demonstrated that the same aid was being offered 
by the government.234 He confronted the issue of anti-Semitism and advised the House, 
that in his opinion, it was aggravated by the implication of Jews dominating the Black 
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Market as reported in the national press.235 In examining these arguments, it becomes 
apparent that the various proposals clearly demonstrated a growing agreement among 
the campaigners as to what they felt were feasible suggestions for rescuing the 
beleaguered Jews.  The suggestion to use the possible rescue of children in order to 
obtain public support for allowing Jewish refugees to enter Britain, clearly demonstrated 
that the influence of Kristallnacht, which had resulted in granting entry into Britain for 
10,000 children, had not been forgotten by the campaigners.   
  
The response of the government reaffirmed their refusal to accept that the 
persecution of the Jews was exceptional. Viscount Cranbourne insisted that ‘It would be 
a mistake to throw undue emphasis on the Jewish side of this question.’236 In effect, he 
was reiterating the decision made by the War Cabinet committee for the Reception and 
Accommodation of Refugees in January 1943, which had explicitly stated: 
 “No differentiation should be made as between Jewish and  
  non-Jewish refugees, and that the refugee problem should                                                     
  be  dealt with as a whole.”237 
He refuted the suggestion that the government had been somewhat slow in 
achieving any tangible results after the UN Declaration in December 1942. He stressed 
that, overall, the government had displayed a high level of humanity towards the 
refugees from 1933 onwards and cited the numbers who had entered Britain since the 
outbreak of the war. He emphasised that many were not viewed as a burden, since they 
were in the armed forces, whereas the ordinary refugees could be viewed as an 
encumbrance on the resources of the country. He insisted that the refugee problem was 
not solely a Jewish problem. He repeated the arguments that had been made in his 
discussion with the Chief Rabbi in September 1942 with regard to the Colonial territories 
– lack of resources, no room available for extra refugees and shortages of food.238He 
insisted that, since Britain was not self - sufficient, any large increase in the population 
could create major problems with food supplies and he stressed the drastic shortage of 
accommodation due to the destruction of housing during the Blitz. He advised the 
House that the country was still admitting over 800 refugees each month, but was forced 
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to agree  most of this number either joined the Armed Forces or were the wives and 
children of members of the Allied forces.239 
Viscount Cranbourne continued his defence of the government by reminding the 
House that the situation in Palestine was not sololy based on economics, but it was also 
political and it could not be assumed that allowing more Jewish refugees to enter the 
Mandate would not affect the Arabs.240 He concluded his speech by detailing the 
discussions between the government and the American Administration whereby an 
agreement had been reached to hold a meeting in the near future, to discuss the 
following: 
“Question of the plight of oppressed and persecuted                                     
persons in Europe has been taken up between Mr. Hull                                        
and  Mr. Eden. It has been decided that conversations                                  
in connexion  with this matter should take place in the                       
immediate future.”241 
 The proposals of the campaigners and the response of the government 
contained in the debate, defined the opposing views held in respect of the plight of the 
European Jews. In his analysis, Wasserstein tends to focus on the ramifications of 
granting entry into Palestine, whilst to a degree, the other suggestions put forward by 
the campaigners, are ignored.  It may be argued that the campaigners’ ideas presented 
by the Archbishop of Canterbury clearly defined their proposals which they believed 
could be implemented to aid and rescue European Jews. In contrast to the charitable 
approach of the Lords, the response by Lord Cranbourne epitomised the government 
attitude towards the European Jews and was encapsulated in his insistence that there 
should be no emphasis on Jewish suffering.  There was to be no acknowledgement that 
the treatment of the Jews under Nazi rule might be considered to be far harsher than the 
general policies applied across occupied Europe. The emphasis on the benevolent 
attitude of the government towards the refugees as a whole ensured that a façade of 
humanity could be displayed to the world. The citing of substantial numbers of refugees 
entering the country from 1940 onwards, demonstrated the disingenuous attitude of the 
government towards refugees stranded in Europe since, until they were challenged by 
the campaigners, they chose to ignore that the majority granted entry, consisted of 
potential fighters and their immediate families.   
                                                          
239 HL Debate German Atrocities; Aid for Refugees, 23rd March 1943, vol126 cc811-60, pp16-18 
240 Ibid., pp.1-,18 
241 Ibid., P.20 
 
 
178 
 
In the aftermath of the plea by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the Lords to 
rescue the Jews, letters from the public were sent to the government242 and the press 
with suggestions and requests that action be taken to ease the plight of the refugees.243 
In a further development by the campaigners, it was agreed at a meeting, that the 
creation of the new committee The National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror 
should be publicly announced.244 A pamphlet, which crystallised the aims of the 
campaigners, was published in April 1943, ‘Rescue The Perishing,’ written by Eleanor 
Rathbone on behalf of the newly created committee.245 The guiding ethos of the 
committee was as follows: 
“1. To act as a medium for co-operation between the various 
organisations, groups and individuals in the United Kingdom          
interested in saving victims of Axis persecution of whatever           
race or religion.                   
2. To consider what practical measures can be taken to this end.             
3. To establish and maintain relations with non-official   
organisations and groups in other countries working for               
the same.”246 
 The pamphlet contained a list of measures to be implemented immediately in order to 
rescue the Jews, in essence, reiterating the majority of the suggestions proposed by 
Gollancz in January.                                                                                                                                                            
 The main emphasis of this new pamphlet was based on what became known as 
‘The Twelve Point Programme for Immediate Rescue Measures’ which suggested that 
neutral countries such as Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden should be given 
guarantees by Britain and the United States that all refugees in their respective 
countries would either be removed after victory was achieved or sooner if it were 
feasible. They should be assured of being provided with both practical aid such as food, 
medicines and clothing, together with financial assistance where applicable.247 The 
different types of assistance would vary according to the individual countries:  for 
example, early evacuation from Spain and Portugal was essential but less so from 
Sweden and Switzerland. It was stressed that, in order to accelerate the evacuation of 
                                                          
242 FO371/36658/W5033 League of nations Union letter, 23rd March 1943;FO371/36657/W5034 London 
County Council letter,26th March 1943, pp.1-2;FO371/36657, Berne telegram no.1584 to Foreign Office, 
29th March,1943, pp.1-2;FO371/36657, Deputation from National Union of Teachers and Save the 
Children Fund to R. Law Foreign Office,2nd April,1943, pp.1-2 
243 ‘ A Policy For Refugees L.B. Namier’, The Times, April 7th,1943 p..5 Iss.49514; Future Of refugees 
Norman Bentwich, April 15th,1943, p.5 Iss.49521;‘ Rescuing The Jews, Charles Sturge, ‘The Manchester 
Guardian, April 1st,1943, p.4 
244 PCR/WHI/10/3/GW10/3/55Minutes of Executive meeting March 24TH1943, pp.1-2 
245 Eleanor Rathbone, Rescue The Perishing, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.,1943) 
246 Ibid.p.6 
247Ibid.p.7  
 
 
179 
 
refugees, both neutral shipping and empty troop and supply ships could be employed to 
move refugees from ports controlled by the British and the Allies. A further measure to 
resettle the refugees should be the establishment of temporary camps in areas under 
British or Allied control – Cyprus, Palestine, North and East Africa thus providing 
tangible reassurance to the neutral countries that the housing of refugees was a 
transient measure.248 This would be further supported by the suggestion that blocks of 
un-named visas should be issued for allocation to the British Consuls in the neutral 
countries with particular emphasis on Spain and Portugal, for any refugees, regardless 
of their circumstances. The quota provisions of the Palestine White Paper should be 
bypassed in order to facilitate the rescue of refugees currently resident in the vicinity of 
the Mandate.249 
Further suggestions included maintaining pressure on the German Axis 
countries to refrain from participating in the Nazi deportation measures; a possible 
extension of arrangements made with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for the release of 
refugees; an examination of exchanging civilian internees - German and Italian for 
Jewish and other possible victims under Nazi control; radio broadcasts and pamphlets 
to be dropped over enemy and enemy-occupied countries; the formation of a separate 
government department to focus solely on the refugee situation; the appointment of a 
High Commissioner acting on behalf of the United Nations to liaise with neutral and 
Allied countries, to ensure implementation of the suggested rescue measures.250 
In his analysis of the campaigners’ proposals, W.D. Rubenstein argues that their 
proposals were based on the conception of rescue as being directed towards providing 
areas of settlement for the refugees rather than the liberation of Jews trapped in Europe. 
He maintains that the different proposals put forward were impractical and misguided 
since he insists that to apply them would have been impossible in wartime 
conditions.251In contrast to this, Pamela Shatzkes states that the main focus of rescue 
by the Jewish organisations  centred on the possibilities of rescuing children in the 
Balkans and Hungary or the exchange of Jews in possession of Palestine certificates or 
similar ‘protective papers’ for German civilians held in Allied territory. The British fear 
that German agents might be infiltrated through such means, ensured that this proposal 
was not accepted.252 In her assessment of the possibility of rescuing the Jews, London 
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suggests that the government maintained the number of refugees granted entry into the 
country, had reached its limits, thus justifying its embargo on admission for humanitarian 
reasons being reinstated.253 A further argument suggested by Kushner is that the 
delaying tactics employed by the government to side-track the efforts of the 
campaigners, ensured that their initial momentum was lost in early 1943. The realization 
that, regardless of public pressure, there had been no alteration in government policy, 
was the driving force behind the establishment of the National Committee for Rescue 
from Nazi terror by Eleanor Rathbone and Victor Gollancz.254 
Overall, the Jewish organisations supported the aims of the committee, but their 
main emphasis for the rescue of Jewish refugees was based on the possibilities of 
settlement in Palestine. This had been initially suggested by a deputation from the 
Board to the Foreign Office in December 1942. They had proposed that Palestine 
should be the obvious place of safety for the European Jews and it was recommended 
that the entire policy of entry into the Mandate be reviewed.255 This suggestion, that 
entry into Palestine should not be limited by the restrictions imposed by the May 1939 
Palestine White Paper, was reiterated in a further memo sent to Richard Law in March 
1943256  and after the announcement of the Bermuda Conference in March 1943, when 
the Joint Foreign Committee, on behalf of both the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-
Jewish Association, drew up a list of resolutions for consideration by the Government.257 
These endorsed the proposals submitted by The National Committee for Rescue from 
Nazi Terror, although, as in previous communications, more emphasis was placed on 
the possibility of large- scale settlement in Palestine.  
    The leading campaigners, who were predominantly the religious leaders, 
members of the Houses of Parliament, the Establishment and the leaders of the Anglo-
Jewish community, supported a variety of schemes to provide assistance to the Jews 
which reflected the ideas propounded by Victor Gollancz at the start of 1943. The 
proposals, which they wanted to be discussed at Bermuda, were published by the newly 
created National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror in their pamphlet ‘Rescue  The 
Perishing,’  issued in April 1943.The main solution  was the concept of encouraging 
neutral countries to accept refugees by providing aid in various forms together with firm 
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guarantees that they would not become a permanent burden, since they would be re-
settled by the Allies, as soon as was feasible under the prevailing war-time conditions.  
 In his analysis of the Allies’ attitude towards the beleaguered Jews, Wyman 
argues that there was no intention of attempting to implement any of the proposals put 
forward by the campaigners. In support of this, he cites the evaluation produced by Sir 
Herbert Emerson, the director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, prior to 
the conference.258 This emphasised that any rescue operation should not impinge on 
the war effort, thus ensuring that if any rescue schemes were to be considered, they 
would be limited in the extreme.259  On the other hand, William D.Rubenstein refutes all 
the rescue schemes put forward by the campaigners. He maintains that the only 
possibility of saving the Jews was for the Allies to win the war as rapidly as possible, 
since all other proposals were totally impractical. In contrast to both these arguments, it 
may be, that in hindsight, the campaigners would not have achieved all  their aims but 
there is a reasonable possibility that they might have achieved an element of success, if 
their proposals to work with the neutral countries had been accepted and implemented 
by the government. This single idea in its various forms was truly supported by all the 
campaigning groups in their determined attempts to provide assistance and, wherever 
possible, the opportunity of rescue to the persecuted Jews in Nazi Europe. Tragically, 
this ran counter to the aims of the government who had no intention of providing any 
assistance or rescue schemes for the beleaguered Jews and was able to ensure that 
they were never seriously considered for implementation.  
  The aims of the government and the campaigners were diametrically opposed. 
The intention of the government had been to quell the campaigners’ demands to provide 
some tangible assistance for the endangered Jews trapped in Nazi-occupied Europe, 
with the UN Declaration by Eden on December 17th 1942. The leading campaigners, 
supported by small groups and individuals,260 continued with their demands in the 
national press, speeches in parliament and letters to the government. In considering the 
reaction of the government refugee committee, in early 1943, the evidence 
demonstrates that there was to be no exception made towards the plight of the Jews for 
a variety of reasons. These included the belief that the entry of Jewish refugees would 
actively encourage a rise in anti-Semitism, an insistence on maintaining the rigid 
immigration laws and the Colonial Office determination to adhere to the Palestine White 
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paper. These aims were emphasised by Lord Cranbourne in his response, on behalf of 
the government, during the major debate on the refugees in March 1943. In a calculated 
strategy to deflect the pressure of the campaigners’ demands, the Cabinet committee 
approached the American Administration with the proposal to hold an informal meeting, 
with an agreed agenda, to discuss the overall refugee problems. The agreement to hold 
a meeting in Bermuda provided the government with a feasible answer to deflect the 
campaigners’ requests for tangible assistance to assist in the rescue of the European 
Jews.  
In the early months of 1943, the government was confronted by a growing 
insistence from various campaigners, organisations and the public to provide visible 
assistance and aid to rescue European Jews wherever possible. In a determined effort 
to deflect criticism  of their policies towards the refugees, the Colonial Office set in 
motion a scheme to rescue 4,000 Bulgarian Jewish children and to re-settle them in 
Palestine. The scheme failed for a varity of reasons but the proposal to offer settlement 
in Palestine for children did maintain a façade of humanity. Finally, in March, as 
pressure from the campaigners grew more vociferous, the government approached 
America with a proposal to hold an informal meeting to formulate a plan to assist all the 
European refugees in Europe rather than just  the Jews. After a series of protracted 
discussions, an agenda was agreed that was acceptable to both sides to be discussed 
at a meeting in Bermuda on April 1943. This proposed meeting was used by the 
government to alleviate the pressure exerted by the campaigners to provide assistance 
to  European Jewry. 
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Chapter Four. The Bermuda Conference: Success or failure? 
    April – June 1943 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the government’s agreed objectives for discussion 
at the Bermuda Conference  and  to  consider whether they were achieved. It will 
examine the flow of communication between the British representatives and the Foreign 
Office during the course of the conference and consider how far the British delegation 
was able to ensure success within their aims. It will analyse the reaction of the British 
press to the limited news emanating from Bermuda and it will examine the approach 
agreed by the Cabinet when the proposal to hold a parliamentary debate on the 
outcome of the conference was considered and how successful this approach proved to 
be. The response of the various campaigners and the public will be examined in depth 
and finally it will consider how successful the government was in achieving its agreed 
goal to deflect the campaigners demands to provide assistance to the beleaguered 
Jews in Nazi-Europe. 
 The Government objectives at the Bermuda Conference April 1943  
On the 19th April 1943, representatives of the British and American Governments met 
for talks in Bermuda to discuss the growing problems of the refugee situation in Nazi- 
occupied Europe. The talks were closed to the public and no representatives of any 
charitable or campaigning organisation were invited to attend. These talks would 
become known as the Bermuda Conference and at the time, very little was publicised 
as to either the remit of the delegates or the agreed results. The reasons for convening 
the Bermuda Conference may be compared to those for the Evian Conference in 1938. 
In both cases, the intention was to demonstrate the humanitarian stance of both 
America and Britain to the suffering and persecution of the refugees. 
 The primary objective of the British Government was to silence the demands of 
the campaigners and individuals who demanded that some form of visible assistance 
should be offered to the Jewish refugees trapped in Nazi occupied Europe. The focus of 
the talks was to be on all refugees, thus deliberately omitting any mention of the Jews 
as a separate group, since the government considered that they were nationals of 
individual countries rather than a separate nationality. In her analysis of the dominant 
concerns of both governments, Louise London argues that a major consideration was 
the determination to maintain the legal limits imposed by both countries on immigration, 
since neither country wished to extend its admission of Jews in order to offer 
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humanitarian assistance.1 In contrast to this, Tommie Sjoberg suggests that the main 
objectives of the conference were to placate public opinion and to disabuse the public of 
the idea that the refugee problem was solely a Jewish one. 2  
 In his analysis of the government reaction, Monty Penkower suggests that there 
was a fear in the Foreign Office that Hitler might release the European Jews, thus 
swamping Britain with them and increasing anti-Semitism.3 In their separate 
examinations of the American policies presented at the conference, both Arthur 
D.Morse and David S.Wyman agree that the main aims of the administration were to 
ensure that no mention was made specifically of Jewish refugees and  no commitment 
was to be given to provide support for any rescue schemes. The American 
Administration was determined to ensure that no change to the immigration laws was to 
be envisaged.4  
 The refusal of the government to recognise the Jews as a separate nationality 
had been clearly stated by the Foreign Office in its response to the discussions that had 
taken place between Lord Cranbourne and the Chief Rabbi in September 1942, 
concerning the possible rescue of Jewish children in enemy-occupied territory: 
 “Again it is our constant practice to hold the Allied Governments 
   in London responsible for their nationals, Jews and non-Jews alike.”5 
This stance had been adopted in January 1943 when the Committee for the 
Reception and Accommodation of Refugees had stated: 
“No differentiation should be made as between Jewish and                      
non-Jewish refugees, and that the refugee problem  should                                              
be dealt with as a whole.”6 
It was emphasised in the Aide-Memoire handed to the State Department in 
Washington by the British Embassy: 
“The refugee problem cannot be treated as though it were a              
wholly Jewish problem…. There are so many non-Jewish   
refugees and there is so much acute suffering among non-Jews                      
in Allied countries that Allied criticism would probably result if              
any marked  preference were shown in removing Jews from                       
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2 Tommie Sjoberg, The Powers and the persecuted.,pp.130-131;-165-166  
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territories in enemy occupation. There is also a distinct                           
danger of stimulating anti-Semitism in areas where an                         
excessive number of foreign Jews are introduced.”7 
 It was reiterated by Lord Cranbourne in his response to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury during the major debate held in March 1943, when he informed the Lords: 
“The most reverend Primate himself and those Noble Lords                          
have painted a vivid picture of… the odious persecutions                               
being inflicted  upon the Jews, the Czechoslovaks, the Poles,                       
the Yugoslavs and other subject peoples. For I think it would                                           
be a mistake to throw undue emphasis on the Jewish side of                                                 
this question. We all admit it is perhaps the most horrible feature,                   
but it is only a feature of a much bigger problem.”8 
Tony Kushner maintains that, when the Allies were confronted with the Jewish 
catastrophe, they were, to a degree, in a cleft stick, since their offer of sympathy for the 
Jews’ plight was influenced by a feeling of aversion and national exclusivity against 
Jews generally. He further suggested that the Allies maintained, it would be of benefit to 
Hitler, if mention of the Jewishness of the refugees were made. 9 In a major speech to 
the Reichstag in January 1939, Hitler had blamed International Jewry for World War 
One and had stated that if there were another war, it would be at the instigation of 
International Jewry, hence the determination of the Allies to avoid providing either Hitler 
or Goebbels with an announcement that could be used for propaganda.10 A further 
government consideration for deliberately excluding the mention of the European Jews 
from the agenda was the accusation that the war was being fought on behalf of the 
Jews The idea of Jewish influence on war policies had been a longstanding anti-Semitic 
trope.11  
The British insisted, as at the  Evian Conference in July 1938. There was to be 
no mention of Palestine, since the entire Palestine issue was governed by a strict 
adherence  to the 1939 Palestine White Paper.  This had established a maximum quota 
of Jews to be granted entry into the Mandate between 1939 and 1944 of 75,000 at a 
rate of 10,000 per year.12 In his examination of the government attitudes in 1939, Tom 
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Segev argues that the comment of Neville Chamberlain “If we must offend one side, let 
us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs,” illustrated the dilemma facing the 
government, as the prospect of war grew nearer. The government considered that 
appeasing the Palestinian Arabs, maintaining the British presence in Egypt with control 
of the Suez Canal and retaining vital links with Iraq for its oil, was of vital strategic 
importance. On the other hand, it was assumed that the Jews would have no alternative 
other than to support Britain, but there was the possibility that the Arabs might opt to 
support Germany.13 This fear was reinforced by the fact that the Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem, who had organised the riots in Jerusalem in the Thirties, was known to be 
resident in both Germany and Italy from 1941 onwards, where he continued to inveigh 
against the British and the Jews.14 
In his assessment, Sjoberg argues a continuing theme of the German 
broadcasts to the Middle East and North Africa, was the accusation that the Allies were 
fighting the war on behalf of the Jews in a major attempt to alienate Arab opinion. The 
Germans believed that this would encourage the Arab leaders to offer their support to 
Germany. 15 In partial justification of this argument, Monty Penkower cites the 
objections raised by the Near- East Division of the State Department, who were worried 
that if Palestine were to be considered as an area offering temporary refuge to the 
refugees, “it would create serious disaffection, perhaps accompanied by outbreaks of 
protest in the Arab and Moslem world.”16In his analysis, Henry L. Feingold points out 
that the State Department, who wished to maintain good trading relationships with the 
Arab nations, was well aware of the potential problems that mention of Palestine could 
create, as a result of concerns expressed by both Egypt and Saudi Arabia towards the 
possibility of further refugee settlement there.17 In essence, it may be argued that 
neither Britain nor America wished to upset the Arab nations for either political or 
strategic reasons. The decision to exclude any mention of Palestine from the Bermuda 
agenda was viewed as a sensible precaution by both governments and as Martin 
Gilbert notes during the course of the conference, no reference was made to the 
possibility of Britain absorbing more refugees, nor was the conference informed there 
were still 33,000 immigration certificates available for Palestine.18 In his detailed 
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analysis, Bernard Wasserstein concludes that the conference agenda was based on the 
unspoken agreement in respect of immigration into Palestine, together with a quid pro 
quo that there would be no discussion of the limitations posed by the American 
immigration laws. This argument is supported by Tony Kushner.19  
A further government decision was that it should not be seen to accept 
responsibility for implementing any specific initiatives to either rescue the Jews or 
provide them with any area of refuge. The pervading fear of both the Foreign Office and 
the Colonial Office was that Hitler, or his Axis allies, might opt to release the Jews 
under their control, thus creating a potentially embarrassing situation for themselves 
and their allies. These fears were expressed to the American Government in the 
detailed telegram sent in early January 1943  to Lord Halifax in Washington, in which a 
meeting with the American Administration to discuss the growing refugee problems had 
been proposed: 
“‘There is the possibility that the Germans or their satellites                                       
may change over from the policy of extermination to one of              
extrusion, and aim, as they did before the war, of embarrassing            
other countries by flooding them with alien immigrants.”20 
This fear that Germany would swamp the Allies with predominantly Eastern European 
Jews, may be compared to the views expressed by the Foreign Office prior to the Evian 
Conference. Then, the likelihood to be faced, was the potential threat of forced Jewish 
emigration from Poland, Romania and Hungary.21  The fear expressed by the 
government of being overwhelmed by Jews may be attributed to the belief that their 
arrival could given rise to a string of accusations ranging from depriving the indigenous 
population of employment and housing to colonising complete areas which would 
become exclusively Jewish in character. The government was determined to avoid such 
a  situation occuring. 
In return for American agreement to these requests, the British consented to 
make no mention of the prevailing immigration laws of America, which ensured that 
entry into the country was severely limited owing to the immigration legislation which 
had been passed in 1917, 1921 and 1924. These laws had removed the right of asylum 
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for refugees fleeing from religious or political persecution.22 They  forbade an immigrant 
to obtain employment before entering the country (1917- Contract Labour Clause) and 
demanded proof of financial independence before entry was permitted ( 1917- Liable to 
become a Public Charge Clause).23 In the immediate post-war period, the 1921 Quota 
Act and the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act were instituted, stipulating strict entry quotas for 
potential immigrants based, respectively, on the 1910 and 1890 census. The original 
quota of 355,000 immigrants per annum in 1921 (based on the 1910 census) was 
amended to 150,000 per annum in 1924 (based on the 1890 census) and finalised in 
1927 with the National Origins plan, implemented in 1929.24 This final calculation 
ensured that the majority of potential immigrants would come from Great Britain, 
Ireland, Scandinavia and Germany.25 The control of entry visas to America was 
assumed by the European Consuls appointed by the State Department, instead of the 
customs officials at the port of arrival.26  
In his analysis of the British demands, Wasserstein argues that they are one of 
the clearest and most detailed statements of policy emanating from the government in 
respect of the refugees.  He notes that the government was quite prepared to be 
complicit in ignoring the restrictions of the American immigration quotas as a quid pro 
quo for no mention of Palestine being made during the ensuing talks.27 In her 
assessment of the British objectives, Louise London argues that the main aim of the 
government was to limit the scope of any action to aid the refugees. She maintains that 
the decision to focus on all  potential refugees, rather than the Jewish refugees, was to 
minimise any pressure to create a special initiative to save them, thus ensuring that the 
government would be absolved of any responsibility to find a safe refuge for a 
substantial number of homeless Jews.28 She further argues that it suited the British to 
ignore the restrictive quota system employed by the American Administration towards 
potential immigrants, since the British system was as restrictive, although it did not have 
an official quota system.29 In contrast to these arguments, Kushner maintains that, by 
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publicly limiting discussion to refugees rather than emphasising the Jewishness of the 
victims, the Allies avoided the Nazi policy of focusing on the Jews as the cause of a 
major problem.30 An alternative consideration is that, as a result of the influx of Jewish 
refugees at the turn of the century, the government was determined to maintain rigid 
control over the entry of Jews, thus limiting any mass protest particularly in a time of 
war. 
  
The Bermuda Conference April 19th – 29th April 1943 
 
The opening speech by Harold W.Dodds, the American Chairman, set the tone for the 
conference, which, while filled with platitudes and self-praise for the efforts of America to 
aid the refugees, stated that – ‘Complete and final victory, will, of course, afford a true 
and final solution to the refugee problem.’31 The delegates then proceeded to discuss 
the various options which had been agreed prior to the talks. The main points that the 
British considered to be the most relevant and practical, were the possibility of re-
settling refugees in Spain and Portugal on a temporary basis in the newly liberated 
areas of North Africa and their potential settlement  in friendly South American 
countries. These options  had been discussed in the preparatory inter-departmental 
talks prior to the conference and it had been agreed that a visible display of offering 
assistance to refugees situated in Spain and Portugal would both solve the problem and 
give a degree of satisfaction to the  pro-refugee campaigners and assuage public 
opinion.32 
Apart from the agreed government points for discussion, consideration was 
given to the proposals put forward by various Jewish organisations, including the World 
Jewish Congress, the Association of Jewish Refugees in Great Britain,33 the  Jewish 
Agency For Palestine, the Joint Emergency Committee For European Jewish Affairs, the 
Australian United Emergency Committee for European Jewry, the Committee for a 
Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews34 and various non-Jewish organisations 
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including the National Committee of Rescue from Nazi Terror and the World Council of 
Churches,35 all of which offered a number of options, including:     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
1) “That an approach should be made to Hitler to release Jews                      
from Germany and German-occupied countries. 
2) That the Jews in Germany or German-occupied countries                     
should be released in exchange for German internees or                
prisoners of war held by the United Nations. 
3) That the United Nations should send food through the                    
blockade to feed the Jews in Europe.”36  
 
In the ensuing discussion of these proposals, Congressman Sol Bloom, in what 
was perceived as an attempt to portray himself as a staunch rescue advocate, 
37suggested consideration should be given to the possibility of opening negotiations with 
Hitler to release an agreed number of refugees on a monthly basis, in an attempt to 
maintain a channel of communication. This was totally overruled by the other delegates 
and Bloom withdrew his suggestion. It was also agreed that there would be no 
exchange of Allied prisoners for refugees and due to the blockade, it was not possible to 
send food to potential refugees.38 
 The other areas under discussion included the possibilities of neutral shipping, 
the various categories of refugees and the possibility of them being settled in North 
Africa for the duration of the war. In a detailed telegram at the start of the conference 
from Richard  Law, the leader of the British Delegation, to the Foreign Secretary, the 
following observations were made: he did not think that Palestine or other British 
Colonies would be mentioned by the American delegation; he viewed the conference 
proceedings as going well since he believed  the American delegation was looking for 
British support when the unpalatable results of the conference were  made public to the 
American nation, rather than attempting to shift the blame for any failure onto the British. 
He suggested that,  in return, American support would be of considerable assistance 
when dealing with ‘our own Archbishops.’ 39 He intimated that the possibility of refugee 
settlement in North Africa would not be viewed favourably by Washington and he 
concluded that the most practical outcome appeared to be the American proposal to re-
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establish the Intergovernmental Committee with the proviso that the format was 
improved in order to ensure that it would be capable of dealing with the various 
problems associated with offering practical assistance to alleviate the refugee 
problems.40  
The possibility of re-settling refugees in Spain and Portugal on a temporary basis 
in the newly liberated areas of North Africa and the potential settlement of refugees in 
friendly South American countries, were discussed by Law in a succession of telegrams, 
sent to inform the Foreign Office of the relevant developments as the conference 
progressed. The British objective to re-settle refugees in North Africa was not viewed as 
acceptable in Washington due to military concerns, but Osbert Peake of the Home 
Office drafted an explicit telegram, on behalf of the British delegation to Washington, 
stating clearly the problems as follows: 
“Spain is the only effective channel of escape remaining in                          
Western Europe for refugees of all nationalities. It is of                             
supreme importance that this channel should not become                    
blocked as the consequence would be: - 
             1) That the admission of further refugees would be prevented                                                
   by the Spanish Government. 
             2) The Allies would be deprived of useful personnel. 
 3) Public opinion throughout the world would come to the                          
conclusion that the Allies were not making any serious                  
endeavour to deal with the refugee problem.”41 
 
The telegram discussed the number of refugees in Spain and the issues of transport. It 
was suggested that a temporary camp should be set up in an area selected by the 
American authorities under the auspices of a British Administration. The personnel 
would be provided by Britain who would be able to offer the expertise required to 
manage camps with a mixed body of men, women and children. It was further 
suggested that this camp could be used to house refugees prior to their re-settlement, 
under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Committee.42 In their determination to 
obtain agreement from the Americans to resettle the refugees in Spain, on a temporary 
basis, little mention was made of the Jewish refugees whilst great emphasis was placed 
on the French nationals, the Poles and the Czechs, all of whom were considered eligible 
for military service. The Jews, who were viewed as being of enemy nationality or 
stateless, presented a problem, but it was thought if they were placed in temporary 
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holding camps in North Africa,  it would ease the pressure of the campaigners’ demands 
for rescue.43 
As agreed prior to the conference, little mention was made of Palestine. The 
British informed the delegates that it had been agreed to arrange the admission of 4,500 
children and 500 adults from Bulgaria into the Mandate. They further stated that, overall, 
entry from the Balkans and Eastern Europe was governed by a quota system as laid 
down in the 1939 Palestine White Paper. As a result of this, the Palestine authorities 
were prepared to admit a further 12,500 Jews by the end of 1943 and it was envisaged 
that approximately 85% of this number would be children from enemy or enemy-
occupied territory. This would result in a further 16,500 places being available before the 
quota was completed in 1944, as laid down in the 1939 White Paper. 44  
It was finally agreed by both sides, to revive the Intergovernmental Committee. It 
was acknowledged that, in order for it to be effective, major changes were required in its 
organisation. In his analysis, Tommie Sjoberg argues that the American Administration 
viewed the employment of the Intergovernmental Committee as the ideal tool to deflect 
any criticism from campaigners.45 This argument was accepted by the British who noted 
that ‘the United States argument it was easier to revive an established body rather than 
create a new one was impossible to resist.’46 This resulted in the delegation sending a 
detailed telegram to the Foreign Office outlining the major changes required to ensure 
that it became a viable organisation. These were summarised as follows in its revised 
mandate: 
“The executive Committee of the Inter-Governmental Committee                       
is hereby empowered by the member States to undertake                       
negotiation with Neutral or Allied States or organisations…to                   
preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced                   
from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where                  
their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race,                     
religion or their political beliefs. The operation of the Committee                              
shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result                   
of the war in Europe… The executive Committee shall be   
empowered to receive and disburse…funds both public and private.”47   
 
 On the 28th April, agreement was reached between the delegations as to the 
wording of the final communique to be released to the public, which was to state that: 
“The delegates were able to agree on a number of concrete                                                                    
recommendations which they are jointly submitting to their  
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Governments…. Since the recommendations necessarily                     
concerning Governments other than those represented at                                                       
the Bermuda Conference, and involve military considerations,                           
they must remain confidential.”48  
 
The main announcement in the communique focused on the reconstitution of the 
Intergovernmental Committee in an enlarged capacity, with a broader remit to take 
responsibility for the refugee problem. 49 It was agreed that there should be no 
statements beyond the official communique but, if the government intended to make any 
other reference to the conference proposals in the forthcoming debate to be held in 
May, this would be done in conjunction with American agreement.50 The results of the 
conference were viewed with satisfaction by the government since, to a large degree, 
the objectives that had been set for the delegations had been achieved in a creditable 
manner. This is clearly illustrated in a long telegram from the Foreign Office to 
Washington in early May, which, whilst summarising the results of the conference, 
emphasised the assistance that had been and was still, being given, to Polish and 
Greek refugees and the large number of visas which had been available for the French 
children in Occupied France. It made no mention of the deteriorating situation faced by 
the European Jews. 51 
 
This stance is further illustrated in a detailed note from Richard Law to Anthony 
Eden, the Foreign Secretary, after his return from Bermuda, in which he pointed out the 
difference between the American and the British positions in respect of the Jewish 
refugees: 
“We are subjected to extreme pressure from an alliance of                             
Jewish organisations and Archbishops. There is no                                             
counter-pressure as yet from people who are afraid of alien                                 
immigration into the country because it will put their livelihood                            
in jeopardy after the war. I have no doubt in my own mind that                                 
that feeling is widespread in England, but it is not organised so                                  
we do not feel it. In the United States, on the other hand, there is           
added to the pressure of the Jewish organisations the pressure                  
of that body of opinion which, without being purely                     
anti-Semitic, is jealous and fearful of an alien immigration per se.” 52 
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Law continued by succinctly summarising the attitude of the American 
Administration towards the Jews as follows:  
“They want to appease Jewish organisations… If, however,                        
it came  to a show-down, Jew and Gentile, I am satisfied that…                                
they would have to tell the Jewish organisations to go to hell.”53 
 
He maintained that a similar attitude existed in Britain, although he considered 
that, at the present time, it was both dormant and unorganised, but he warned that it 
was not to be ignored. He emphasised this with his insistence that: 
“We must not make some magnificent gesture to the                        
Archbishops now only to find that in twelve or eighteen                                        
months’ time the average man, moyen sensuel, turns                           
and rends us.”54   
  
In considering his reference towards the clergy, Law was acknowledging the influence of 
the church leaders in their continuing demands to provide assistance to the European 
refugees, whilst demonstrating the prevailing government belief, that to grant admission 
to Jewish refugees, could create a substantial rise of anti-Semitism in the country. The 
fear of stimulating anti-Semitism had been an essential government ploy throughout the 
Thirties and had been successfully deployed at the Evian conference with the allusions 
to the possibility of large scale emigration by the Eastern European Jews to Britain and 
Europe.55 
The church leaders had been actively involved in approaching the government 
on behalf of the Jewish refugees from the mid Thirties onwards. In July 1938, the Bishop 
of Chichester had tabled a motion requesting details of the Evian Conference in order to 
emphasise the predicament facing the German and Austrian Jews.56 The Archbishop of 
Canterbury had been active in working with the other church leaders to maintain 
pressure on the government to provide some form of visible assistance for the refugees 
through numerous letters to the press and Anthony Eden, both prior to and after the UN 
Declaration. He continued to work closely with the major campaigners both inside and 
outside parliament. His leadership and determination had been crucial in leading the 
debate in the Lords prior to the Bermuda Conference, when further pressure was 
applied to the government to implement the recommendations of Victor Gollancz to 
rescue the trapped Jews.57 
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 In her analysis of the conference, Louise London argues that the rescue of the 
Jews was not the main objective of the government. She states that the position of the 
Home Office remained unchanged towards Jewish refugees: they were not wanted. She 
maintains that the government intended to use the conference and its conclusions to 
sustain its stance of public sympathy and compassion for the refugees . The main 
government objective was not to rescue the  Jews but to avoid any accusation of 
inaction towards them, thus lessening public pressure to aid them and deflect criticism 
of their tardiness.58 Tony Kushner points out that the problem facing the liberal ethos of 
the government was the dichotomy of reconciling universalism and sympathy for the 
Jews against nationalism and anti-Semitic sentiments. He argues that, by focusing the 
discussions on refugees rather than Jewish refugees, the government would achieve 
two objectives: the avoidance of the Nazi accusation that the war was being fought on 
behalf of international Jewry and59 the possibility of halting any increase in anti-
Semitism, which the government believed could occur if emphasis were placed on Jews 
rather than refugees.60 Wasserstein states that the government had achieved its 
objectives at the conference, particularly in respect of the Jewish refugees, whom it 
wished to be classified with all other refugees. The revival of the Intergovernmental 
Committee with a broader mandate, would be responsible for dealing with the refugee 
problem on an international basis. This would, effectively, provide the government with 
the means to maintain its concern towards the Jews and the non-Jews trapped in 
occupied Europe.61 
 There is a further argument to be considered which is ignored by the 
historians of the period. In analysing the discussions at the conference, it is apparent 
that, although great emphasis was placed on the possibility of Hitler extruding all the 
Jews of Europe, which in the eyes of the Allies could present a major problem, there 
was, apart from a brief allusion to the Jewish refugees in Spain, no mention of the 
European Jews at any point in the discussions. In the various communications between 
Law and Eden, much emphasis is placed on the government perception of anti-
Semitism in the country and the continual fear that either the arrival of Jewish refugees 
or the belief that a primary aim of the war was to rescue the European Jews, would 
encourage its growth. It may be argued that, although Kushner, London and 
Wasserstein examine these points in detail, they do not consider that the roots of these 
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fears may be traced to the public opposition at the turn of the century emanating from 
the arrival  of the Russian Jews fleeing persecution, which the government wished to 
avoid,  by minimising the possibility of further large scale immigration by European 
Jewry during this period.   
 
 The public reaction to the Conference communique 
 
Since the news of the Nazi policy had become public in December 1942, the 
government had deployed various tactics to deflect criticism of their lack of action by the 
church leadership, the various campaigning bodies and the general public. These had 
included the announcement of the UN Declaration in the House of Commons  by 
Anthony Eden on December 17th 1942. This was followed by the announcement of a 
scheme to rescue and resettle 4,500 Jewish children from the Balkans in Palestine in 
1943 and the statement to Parliament, that there was to be a meeting between 
government representatives and the American Administration in April, in an attempt to 
consider various ways to ease the refugee situation in occupied Europe. The pressure 
exerted by the campaigners continued. While the conference was in session, Victor 
Cazalet M.P. sent a letter to The Times on behalf of the Executive Committee of the  
National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror and he voiced  the following opinion: 
 
            “These speeches hold out no prospect of immediate decisions, 
    they adumbrate nothing but “exploratory consultations”- ‘laying 
    foundations” “working out tentatively some basis – with a view to” 
    &c. In phrase after phrase the government spokesman instead of 
    showing a vigorous determination seemed mainly concerned to 
     accentuate difficulties which have always been obvious and to                                              
     emphasise that, after all, very little could be done.”62  
 
Further critical articles appeared in the national press during the conference. The 
Observer noted the remoteness of Bermuda and suggested that the delegates had no 
intention of resolving the growing problems facing the European Jews under Nazi 
control. In its castigation of America and Britain, it noted that, during the conference:  
“We have been told that this problem is beyond the resource                        
of Britain and America combined…. If Britain and America cannot                          
help who can?... What is so terrible about these speeches is not                          
only their utter insensitiveness to human suffering. It is the    
implied readiness of the two greatest Powers on earth to   
humiliate themselves, to declare themselves bankrupt and                      
impotent, in order to evade the slight discomfort of charity                             
                                                          
62 ‘ The Bermuda Speeches. Victor A. Cazalet,’ The Times, 22nd April,1943, p.5 Iss. 49527 
 
 
197 
 
The Bermuda speeches evoke the agonising memory of                 
Geneva and Evian.”63   
 
In similar vein, The News Chronicle reiterated the sentiments expressed by The 
Observer with the observation:   
“The impression here is that a number of cautious gentlemen,                    
well-schooled in the doctrine of not giving much away, have  
conducted a series of  formal meetings in an atmosphere which                          
was defined in advance with the aid of such reliable political            
clichés as “exploratory conversations” and the “formulation of                
preliminary proposals.” …. It was like a song heard in a past                          
delirium: it was the outline for a too familiar nightmare. It was                
business as usual. With sudden clarity it recalled other                                
conferences… which began and ended with the solemn                                   
certainty that nothing was going to be done.”64 
 
The publication of the conference communique demonstrated that these 
forebodings were correct since there was no indication that any major decisions, which 
would offer relief to the refugees, had been reached between the two powers. In 
examining these comments, a strong comparison may be drawn with the results of the 
Evian Conference in July 1938 when the Nazi newspaper Voelkischer Beobachter 
published an article with the headline ‘No One Wants To Have Them,’ which had 
emphasised the various reasons offered by the delegates as to why their respective 
countries were unable to provide the possibility of settlement for the Jews.65  In the 
aftermath of the conference, The Jewish Chronicle concluded its lengthy editorial with 
the following observation: 
“Already even under the stress of the present emotion,                                
the ghost of Evian walks abroad. The distressing non possumus                            
is being uttered with almost indecent haste in country after                   
country. Once more a Jewish Palestine shines … as a sure         
haven…Must Jews alone, perhaps the worst sufferers of all from               
the Nazi nightmare, have no home to call their own.”66     
 
Towards the end of April, Eleanor Rathbone published her pamphlet Rescue the 
Perishing, which included a detailed twelve-point plan of rescue measures that could be 
implemented to provide assistance to the refugees stranded in neutral countries. These 
included the revision of visa regulations applied in Britain; increased transport for the 
evacuation of refugees from neutral countries; provision of new camps for the dispersal 
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of refugees; aid to neutral countries for the provision of refugees and unlimited entry into 
Palestine. 67In early May, Anthony Eden was questioned by a series of 
Parliamentarians, as to the outcome of the conference and whether there would be a 
discussion in the near future in the Commons. Eden refused to make any statement, but 
he did confirm that, at some point, there would a debate on the conference results.68  
The Manchester Guardian printed a scathing article on the results of the conference in 
the days preceding the parliamentary debate, questioning the actions of government in 
their attempts to accelerate the escape of refugees to safe havens and in particular the 
Colonial Office, in its endeavours to transport refugees from the Balkans to Palestine.69  
Further letters from campaigners included the observation from the Bishop of 
Chichester, that five months had elapsed since the UN Declaration in December 1942 
and to date, very little appeared to have been organised to rescue the refugees.70 With 
the realisation that some tangible evidence was required by the government to assuage 
the continuing criticism of its actions, it was agreed that an announcement would have 
to be made in parliament by the Under Secretary of State for the Home Office in the 
forthcoming debate on refugees which it was confirmed should take place on the 19th 
May. At the same meeting, it was further decided that:71   
“In view of the risk that a disproportionate number of                                              
speeches might be by members holding extreme views                          
in favour of the free admission of refugees to this country,                      
the Whips were invited to arrange that some members would                  
intervene in the debate who would put a more balanced point of                    
view.”72 
          
  In a further meeting, prior to the debate, the Foreign Secretary expressed his fears of 
the possibility that the main focus would centre on: 
“The facilities for refugees to escape from Nazi oppression  
  through Spain. There had been some public discussion of the 
  proposal to facilitate the transfer of Jewish refugees to  
  Palestine through Bulgaria.  Apparently as a result… the  
  Germans had now taken steps to prevent refugees from  
  leaving Bulgaria. If there were now similar discussions about  
  Spain, there was a danger that the Germans might take similar  
  action to close the Spanish channels.”73 
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The suggestion that the debate should be held in a Secret Session was considered 
since the government wished to avoid the possibility of Germany exerting influence on 
the response of the Spanish Government towards the possible closure of refugee 
escape routes. The Cabinet decided on a standard debate, but agreed that in a Secret 
Session prior to it, the Commons should be warned of this danger, in order to avoid a 
repetition of such behaviour.74 The government concern that the German regime would 
attempt to influence Spain to close the refugee escape routes, was emboldened by the 
British argument at the Bermuda Conference, which had maintained that the demands 
of the campaigners to rescue the refugees would be deflected by the apparent provision 
of assistance to the small number who reached the comparative safety of Spain; 
however, if this route were closed, the Allies would face further pressure from the 
campaigners to provide assistance and ease the entry of the predominantly Jewish 
refugees into Britain, Palestine or the Empire, where according to government thinking, 
they would be unwelcome.  
 
 The debate on The Refugee Problem 19th May 1943 
 
The debate was opened by Osbert Peake, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home 
Office, who had been a member of the Bermuda delegation. This section will analyse his 
address to the Commons with a particular focus on his deliberate attack on the 
suggestions and reports published by Eleanor Rathbone in her pamphlet Rescue The 
Perishing; Peake’s insistence that it was not only the Jews who were facing persecution 
and extermination in Nazi Europe; his defence of the published results of the Bermuda 
Conference with his emphasis on the purpose of the conference, which was primarily for 
discussion rather than formulating policy. It will examine the responses of the various 
participants, who, whilst acknowledging there was an element of anti-Semitism 
prevalent in the country, refused to accept this as the reason for adhering to the 
immigration laws which remained unchanged; finally it will consider the alternative 
proposals for both assisting the refugees and combatting the bias against Jews.  
 
 In his opening remarks, he gave the House a brief resume of the history of the 
refugee problems created by the Nazi treatment of Jews during the Thirties, which had 
resulted in the formation of the Intergovernmental Committee under the auspices of 
President Roosevelt. He emphasised that 300,000 Jewish immigrants had been 
admitted to Palestine since 1919, a substantial number of refugees had been settled in 
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the East African Colonies and 40,000 Poles, who had reached safety in Persia, were 
now protected and fed by Britain. He observed that, in the enemy-occupied areas, there 
were approximately 120,000,000 people who were the victims of Axis aggression. He 
emphasised that: 
“There can be no doubt that the policies of labour                                                      
conscription,of deportation and extermination are                                           
being applied, not only to the Jews, but to other                                                              
large sections of European peoples.”75 
  
thus implying the suffering was not exclusive to the European Jews, but could be 
applied to all the nations under Nazi domination. In his analysis of the government 
reaction to the events unfolding in Nazi-occupied Europe, Wasserstein argues that, to a 
degree, the various government officials involved in formulating  government policy in 
respect of the Jews, were influenced by ‘collective paranoia to which modern nations 
involved in total war are prone.’ He cites the belief of the Colonial Office, that Nazi 
agents might be smuggled into Palestine and he argues that, generally, it was beyond 
the imagination of the government officials to envisage the horrors being perpetrated in 
Europe.76 The alternative argument to this may be that government determination to 
minimise the suffering of the Jews under Nazi rule, was determined by a combination of 
factors: the policy of both  the Foreign and the Colonial Office to ensure the continued 
appeasement of the Arabs through the Palestine White Paper ; the determination to 
avoid any accusation that the war was being fought solely to rescue the Jews and the 
long-held fear that the country might be forced to grant assistance to a substantial 
number of Eastern European Jews. This fear had exerted a degree of influence on 
government thinking throughout the Twentieth century, but it had become more 
prevalent in the Thirties after Hitler gained power in Germany and initiated his 
persecution of German Jewry. 
He then turned his attention to the various campaigners who were demanding 
that tangible measures be implemented to assist the European Jews. He suggested, 
that even if an approach were made to the German Government to effect an exchange 
scheme, it was doubtful that it would work. He reminded The House of the rescue 
scheme announced in February to remove 4,500 Jewish children from Bulgaria to 
Palestine and he stressed that the delays for its implementation were not the fault of the 
government. He informed the House that between 1940-1942, Britain had admitted 
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63,000 refugees and a further 4,000 had entered the country since January 1943; he 
defended the refusal of the Home Office to grant block visas for security reasons.77 
 
He gave a detailed analysis of the contents contained in the pamphlet -  Rescue 
the Perishing written by Eleanor Rathbone and issued by the National Committee for 
Rescue from Nazi Terror, with a particular focus on one case in the pamphlet, which he 
quoted extensively: 
“An aged Jewish couple in Berlin had a son in Istanbul, a                             
naturalised Turk. On January 4th the son cabled to his sister                          
in London, saying he could get Turkish visas for parents if   
London told its Consulate in Istanbul that a United Kingdom                       
visa would be given. Asked for immediate reply, as parents                           
in danger. The sister…by advice from Home Office cabled…                 
British visa impossible while parents in enemy territory….                           
Her parents were deported to Poland about eight weeks                    
after refusal of British visas… She writes. I would feel better                           
if England had tried to help.”78 
 
Peake pointed out that he would be surprised if the couple had been deported since, 
although the description of the Home Secretary suggested that ‘he was devoid of all 
decent humanitarian feeling’,79what was not shown was the son in Turkey held an 
important position with an agency for Krupps of Essen, a major German armaments’ 
manufacturer. Peake continued his attack with the suggestion ‘No doubt, part of his 
business… is to obtain information about arms supplied by other countries and forward 
this to Germany.’80 In using this example, he successfully traduced the facts that she 
had quoted and concluded with the inference concerning the situation facing an aged 
couple in Poland as being totally incorrect. 81 He concluded his line of attack by stating 
that: 
“We at the Home Office cannot bring ourselves to believe                                
that the parents of a man occupying an important position             
in a firm which acts for Krupps in Constantinople are in                                  
serious danger or that we ought to facilitate their escape                          
from German territory  by promising them visas to this country.”82  
 
 He advised the Commons, that although there were major difficulties in providing 
transport for refugees, the government had decided to expand the categories for 
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persons eligible for special consideration to be granted entry into Britain. These would 
now include: 
1) “Parents of persons serving in His Majesty’s or Allied Forces, or                   
in their Mercantile Marines.   
2) Persons of other Allied nationality willing to join His Majesty’s           
Forces and who are certified to be fit and acceptable for them.  
3) Parents of children under 16 who are already here and                     
who came here unaccompanied.”83 
 
These new categories would only apply to potential immigrants who were deemed to be 
eligible for entry into Britain; they would be subject to security vetting with the possibility 
of being placed in internment; it was emphasised that entry did not convey the automatic 
right to remain in Britain at the end of the war.84  
 
Finally, in his dismissal of the campaigners’ demands, he informed the House 
that the purpose of the Bermuda Conference was not to make any decisions: 
“The purpose of the Conference was to confer, to analyse                          
the facts, to examine possible methods of relief and to reach                        
agreed conclusions and recommendations between the United                    
States and British Governments as a preliminary to wider                    
international collaboration.”85     
 
He  pointed out that the basis for the discussions had been announced in the press 
advice issued by the American Administration on 26th February, which, among other 
things, had stated :‘The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to 
persons of any particular race or faith.’86 In his emphasis on this point, it may be argued 
that he was reiterating the Government viewpoint that  Jews were not a separate group 
and therefore, did not qualify for any differentiation of assistance. He emphasised that 
the government considered that any practical form of help could only be offered to the 
refugees who were resident in neutral countries. He gave a detailed resume of the 
conference proceedings and he announced that, after considerable discussion, the 
government was in full agreement with the proposal that the most suitable body for 
dealing with the refugee situation was through an enlarged Intergovernmental 
Committee with ample means at its disposal to provide assistance where required: 
“His Majesty’s Government are in the fullest agreement                                                   
that the most effective way of planning the rescue and                               
settlement of persons who have had the opportunity of                                                                               
escaping the horrors of deportation, and, it may be death                                      
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in Europe would be through the Inter-Governmental Committee 
constituted on the widest basis and with all possible means                             
of action at its disposal.”87          
 
 As he concluded his address to the Commons, Peake conceded, that due to the 
nature of the discussions, he was not in a position to publicly state the entire 
proceedings of the conference, but he informed the House that the increased 
contribution of assistance provided by the Government together with the establishment 
of a permanent and effective organisation to work on behalf of the refugees, clearly 
illustrated that- 
“The Government are, and always have been in earnest on                                    
this matter, and that, while the United Nations press on to the                                 
day of retribution and victory, the Bermuda Conference was not                              
an expedient for delay, but a real step forward on the road that                          
leads to liberation.”88  
 
It may be argued that in the final sentence, the position of the government is 
clearly stated – victory and retribution. The plight of the refugees, whether Jewish or 
otherwise, was of secondary importance. In his analysis, Sjoberg maintains that there 
were many similarities between the Evian Conference and the Bermuda Conference, 
both of which he argues were a clear illustration of the desire by America and Britain to 
placate public opinion rather than to organise a  move to deliver assistance to the 
people trapped in Nazi-occupied Europe.89 
The response of the campaigners in the House was led by Eleanor Rathbone.  
She immediately stated that in his entire speech, Peake had divulged a minimum of 
information as to the actual result of the conference or the proposals presented by both 
the delegations as possible solutions and she likened the paucity of information to -‘The 
schoolboy who was asked to write an essay on snakes in Ireland, and who could only 
say that there were no snakes in Ireland.’90  She analysed the various points that had 
been made and questioned the lack of detail regarding the Intergovernmental 
Committee; she reminded the House that when it was created at the Evian Conference, 
all funding had come from private bodies. Was the new organisation to be guaranteed to 
have access to a substantial sum of money to fund its enlarged activities?91  She 
pointed out that Palestine was an obvious place to settle Jewish refugees and stressed 
that it was the Jews who were the target for the most severe persecution. She reminded 
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the House that – ‘We have a special responsibility for Jewish refugees because of our 
responsibility for Palestine.’ She queried the alleged lack of shipping available to remove 
refugees from Europe to areas of safety. She noted that the new concessions 
appertaining to entry into the country would be of minimal assistance to the majority of 
refugees. She reminded the Home Secretary of his attitude towards the Jewish refugees 
prior to the war, when he had attacked the Government entry quota for Palestine as 
being grossly unjust, bearing in mind  the growing plight of the German Jewish refugees 
fleeing from the persecution of the Nazi regime.92 As she had noted at the beginning of 
her response to the government statement: 
 “My right hon. Friend’s whole speech seemed to be a   
    plea for gratitude for what the Government have done  
    in the past and for what they vaguely foreshadow may  
    be done under the decisions of the Bermuda Conference.  
    That is ask for gratitude for very small mercies.” 93       
  
In the speeches that followed on from Rathbone’s response, numerous 
observations were made which repeatedly focused on the lack of government 
information in respect of the discussions and agreements reached at the 
conference.94Further remarks included the observation that the government attitude 
towards the persecuted Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe was uncaring.95 Much of the 
discussion centred on the issues surrounding the non-acceptance of the European Jews 
as a separate group. It was pointed out that the main victims of Nazi oppression and 
cruelty were the Jews;96 the long-term problem was mainly a Jewish one since it was 
doubtful that German Jews would wish to return to Germany after the war;97the situation 
for the Jews in Europe was different since they did not possess any status or have a 
country of their own;98 the entry of between 60,000 and 70,000 German and Austrian 
Jews prior to the war, was funded totally by private organisations, not the 
government;99there would be little difficulty in settling the Jewish problem after the war 
since few in Europe would still be alive.100The remarks referring to Palestine, focused to 
a large degree, on its capacity to accept more immigrants; it was noted that there was a 
shortage of man-power in the Mandate which, it was felt, could provide the opportunity 
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for the settlement in the region for either 30,000 families or 70,000 people; 101Palestine 
alone has the capacity to absorb as many refugees as is possible to rescue from 
Europe.102 The single dissenting voice was that of Mr Colegate, who stated that: 
“…Another 300, 0000 Jews going to Palestine…would                                  
be a gross violation of the pledges of this country and                              
would  mean grave injury to a very friendly race who have                     
provided considerable support in this war. It does harm…                                   
if suggestions of that kind are put forward without regard to                           
the sentiments of the Arabs whose land and houses would                          
be taken.”103 
 
A major part of the debate was devoted to the commonly held view, that if a 
substantial number of Jewish immigrants were granted admission, their arrival could 
increase and exacerbate anti-Semitism. Various speakers quoted a list of commonly-
held ideas and accusations directed towards the refugees. Mr.Ridley maintained that 
they  were considered to be a burden on the country;104Sir Lambert Ward pointed out 
that the Jews were always implicated as dominating the black market, an accusation 
that was not proven;105 in his response, Colonel Cazalet pointed out that when tens of 
thousands of Jews are being massacred in Europe, it is not news, but if a few Jews are 
implicated in the black market it instantly becomes news;106Mr.Mack suggested that 
legislation was required to eradicate anti-Semitism;107 Sir Austin Hudson made the 
observation that the solution lay in greater tolerance between Jew and Gentile, 
particularly on religious practices and cited the different attitudes and behaviour and 
non-observance of Sunday as a rest day. 108 In his comments on anti-Semitism, 
Professor A.V.Hill  stated:  
“It has been urged on the Home Secretary that a danger                                        
of  anti-Semitism will exist, if more Jews are introduced                        
here…Are the Jews so powerful and baneful an influence                     
that one extra Jew among 5, 0000 Englishmen will make                                     
the whole mixture unstable?...To suggest ….there is a                                    
serious danger of anti-Semitism here if an extra 10,000                                          
Jews are introduced from Europe, one in 5,000 of our people,                            
is a gross insult to the  intelligence, good nature and common                                           
sense of the normal citizen.”109 
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 In a total contradiction of the views expressed by many of the members, 
Mr.Butcher expressed his conviction that the refugee problem was not solely a Jewish 
one and he argued that any differentiation between Jew and non-Jew would lead to an 
increase in anti-Semitism: 
“This is not a Jewish problem. The Under-Secretary said                           
that  there are in Europe at present 120,000,000 potential                                
refugees. I can conceive nothing more likely to create                                         
anti-Semitism in this country than to let the feeling get                           
abroad that every Jew or Jewess is to have a special                                    
measure of relief which is not open to the Norwegian Pastor,                            
the Dutch politician or the French trade unionist…At all                            
costs, we must not allow anti-Semitism to increase,                
and it is going to increase if Jews receive special treatment.”110   
     
Strong support for this view was expressed by Mr. Colegate in the most 
outspoken remarks of the debate, which clearly supported the government policy that 
the increased entry of Jews would encourage the growth of anti-Semitism: 
“I must say a word about anti-Semitism, I think that the                                      
Jews  today in this country are suffering from the             
over-zealousness of their friends. Some of their                           
propaganda simply repels me and puts me against                                    
the Jews.”111   
 
 He cited the example of Jews employed in agriculture refusing to work after 4pm  on a 
Friday, thereby upsetting the other workers and he suggested that it was the 
responsibility of friends of the refugees to deal with these types of differences, rather 
than acknowledging that, for the Jews, it was the start of their Sabbath.112 
 
In his contribution to the debate, Sydney Silverman questioned why the 
conference had been limited to America and Britain, since, as he pointed out: 
“It is true that there has been the Bermuda Conference    
between this country and one other country. They                               
discussed what they could do themselves…Ought there                               
still not to be, belatedly, a conference of all the Powers                              
who are interested?”113  
 
He queried exactly who the Intergovernmental Committee would represent: 
“The right hon. Gentleman said something about an                                                   
Inter-Government committee. We would like to know,                                    
inter-what Governments? The two Governments                                        
represented at the Bermuda Conference, or others                                                
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as well?...If that committee is intended to be representative                        
of a great number of nations perhaps the right hon. Gentleman                  
who is to reply will clear up what ambiguity there may be?”114  
 
    Various other points were raised, including the suggestion that serious 
consideration should be given to arranging the settlement of Jews in North Africa, since 
there was already a reasonable number of indigenous Jews resident in Tunis, Algeria 
and Morocco. A further area for consideration was Cyrenaica, which was viewed by Sir 
A.Lambert Ward as being an eminently suitable area for settlement, now that it no 
longer belonged to Italy.115 This perception was endorsed by David Grenfell, who 
pointed out to Earl Winterton, that his suggestion of it not being politic to ignore the 
French presence in North Africa, was irrelevant, since the French government had no 
bearing on the territories under discussion. They had never had authority over the whole 
of North Africa and neither Cyrenaica nor Libya had ever belonged to them.116 
 
In the closing speech, Anthony Eden attempted to cover the main points raised 
during the course of the discussions. He agreed that, in some respects, if the debate 
had been in held in secret, there would not have been the limitations posed by holding it 
in public, but he believed it was preferable to hold the debate in public in order to relate, 
where possible, the results of the conference. He stressed this and linked it to the British 
tradition of racial and religious tolerance, which provided him with the opportunity to 
state:  
“One of the things we are fighting this war about is to                                                        
create conditions in this world where a man is free to speak,                                  
free to think, free to practice worship as he would.”117 
 
He informed the House that the government had created a separate committee to deal 
with the problem of the refugees; he neglected to inform them that it had been in 
existence since the end of 1942. 
In his response to the various suggestions centred on Palestine, he pointed out 
that, at the present time, there were 30,000 vacancies available in the Mandate which 
could only be filled if a neutral Power were prepared to negotiate for the release of Jews 
from one of the belligerent powers involved in the war. He pointed out that this approach 
had been used to no avail, since the country concerned (Bulgaria), after initially 
agreeing to permit a group of children to leave, changed its stance and had halted their 
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proposed departure. He briefly covered some of the other points raised, including the 
demands for an unlimited number of visas to be issued. He stated that there was no 
numerical limitation on the number of visas that a consul could issue, but there were 
limitations on certain categories. He informed the House that 4,000 people had arrived 
in the country during the previous five months which, he insisted, demonstrated a 
continuous flow of immigrants. 
 
Having covered most of the points raised during the debate, he finally informed 
the House of the discussions and decisions that had been taken at the Bermuda 
Conference. The information he divulged was minimal, since, as he said, it had been 
agreed for security reasons, to keep most of the recommendations confidential until 
agreement had been reached by both governments to implement the proposals. He 
confirmed that the War Cabinet had agreed to all the proposals and steps were being 
taken to implement them. He announced that assurances had been given to neutral 
countries, that after the war, they would receive assistance, both financial and practical, 
from the government and the United Nations. 
He explained why the government was prepared to support the re-establishment 
of the Intergovernmental Committee. The terms and conditions laid down at the Evian 
Conference would no longer apply; it had been agreed by both sides to broaden its 
basis, increase its authority and provide it with a suitable level of staff, funded by 
government to ensure a high degree of efficiency. It was further envisaged that the work 
of the Committee, on behalf of the refugees, would continue after the war. In his 
concluding remarks, he restated the government commitment to provide assistance for 
the refugees wherever possible, but, as he had pointed out at the beginning of his 
speech, which he reiterated in his closing comments: 
“The only real solution that can be found for this problem                            
is a solution of a final and complete Allied victory.” 
 
“We shall do what we can, but I should be false to my                                                       
trust if I raised the hopes of the Committee, because I                                      
do not believe that great things can be achieved. I do                               
not believe it is possible to rescue more than a few until                            
final victory is won.”118 
 
 The closing statement made by Eden demonstrated the futility of the debate to 
obtain any definite action from the government to provide firm assistance to the 
refugees. Ultimately, the government had no intention of deviating from its policy of 
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maintaining the immigration laws of the country. The campaigners had argued for 
admission into Palestine, North Africa and the Colonies but to a degree they accepted 
the government belief that an increased entry of Jewish refugees into Britain could 
stimulate the growth of anti-Semitism. It may be argued that in gaining the campaigning 
parliamentarians’ acceptance of this, the government had ensured that its policy 
towards the refugees would remain unchanged. 
 
 Was the debate a success or failure for the Government?  
  
Many of the speakers in the debate held on the 19th May, were either supporters or 
members of the National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror. Whilst they were 
prepared to concede that there was an element of anti-Semitism in society, which could 
be attributed to various causes, they refused to accept the government view that 
granting entry to a substantial number of Jews into the country, would actively increase 
anti-Semitism. This refusal suggests that they considered the threat of a possible 
increase in anti-Semitism as a government ploy in its refusal to ease the immigration 
laws. They emphasised the need to ignore the limitation set down in the Palestine White 
Paper and they castigated the government for its refusal to accept that the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews was far harsher than the overall treatment of the other 
nationalities in occupied Europe. In his response to these criticisms and suggestions, 
Eden pointed out the difficulties of transporting Jews from Axis Europe to Palestine and 
cited the proposed government scheme for the rescue of Jewish children in the Balkans, 
which was being obstructed by Bulgaria. He insisted that the war was being fought for 
universal freedom of speech, religion and thought. The one area of contention that he 
by-passed, was the discussion focusing on the possibility of anti-Semitism in Britain. His 
emphasis on the need to achieve a total victory in Europe effectively summarised the 
policy of the government towards the refugees, whatever their nationality. 
The reactions to the debate in the national press were diverse; The Times 
supported the government in its approach and stressed that little actual information 
regarding the resolutions agreed at the Bermuda Conference could be made public, due 
to the constraints of security. The report noted Anthony Eden had assured the House 
that  the government ‘fully shared the horrors perpetrated by the enemy but…stated that 
the only real help for the victims was complete victory for the allies.’ 119In contrast to this, 
The Manchester Guardian noted that little information was divulged. It deemed the 
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criticism by Osbert Peake of a case cited by Eleanor Rathbone (the provision of visas 
for the parents of a naturalised Turk in the employment of an agency linked to the 
German armaments company Krupps of Essen) as unnecessary and it described the 
attitude of Anthony Eden as being slightly sympathetic towards the refugee problem. It 
further pointed out that, although the government had cited transport as the major 
obstacle to the rescue of the Bulgarian children, this did not appear to have the same 
effect on the movement of prisoners-of-war.120 
One of the longest reports on the debate, which appeared on the front page of 
The Jewish Chronicle, attempted to maintain a balanced approach in its reporting, 
although the underlying sentiment reflected a certain level of disappointment at the 
government attitude. It noted that, in his opening speech, Peake immediately attacked 
the critics of the government policy towards the refugees, whilst defending the 
government stance towards the refugees since December 1942. The report noted that in 
his general remarks, Peake insisted that no refugee who had reached Britain, had been 
refused entry. He had informed the House that the various suggestions reached at 
Bermuda were now under consideration by both governments, hence the reason for 
limited information being available and he concluded by restating that: 
“The Government was in earnest in this matter,                                                   
The Bermuda  Conference was not an expedient for                            
delay, but a real step towards liberty.”121 
 
The report stated that the reply given by Anthony Eden at the close of the debate 
appeared to give a certain level of satisfaction. He had summarised the government 
attitude towards the refugees and announced that there was a specific committee for 
dealing with the numerous problems and obstacles surrounding the options for providing 
assistance and aid for them. In his concluding remarks, he had reassured the House 
that the Government was not insensitive to the plight facing the refugees under Nazi 
control, but he had reiterated that little could be achieved for them until the final victory 
was won.122 
In his analysis of the debate, Kushner argues that the initial advantage the 
government gained from the acknowledgement by Eleanor Rathbone that it was only 
total victory over the Nazi regime that would halt the killing, was lost through the 
comments of several backbench members, in their enthusiasm to support the 
government policy of restricted entry (for Jewish refugees) into the country. He notes 
that a major part of the debate focused on the government allegation that a new influx of 
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Jewish refugees would increase the level of anti-Semitism in the country but he makes 
no mention of the other points raised during the course of the debate.123  London argues 
that, since the Government divulged very little solid evidence of the conference 
proceedings, it successfully obstructed a concerted effort by the various individuals and 
organisations to sustain a campaign against the preferred policy of the government 
towards the refugees.124 
In a detailed examination of the debate, Wasserstein argues that it was 
parliamentary pressure that forced the Government to hold a debate on its refugee 
policy. He focuses on the determination of the government to ensure that the debate 
was not dominated by the campaigners who advocated free admission of refugees into 
the country and he agrees with Kushner that this concern was not best served by the 
speeches from several supporters of  government policy towards the refugees. He 
points out that in his closing speech, Eden created an impression of enthusiasm for the 
various suggestions in respect of the provision of aid to the refugees, whilst displaying a 
scepticism of the viability of any substantial assistance. He concludes with the 
observation that the debate achieved little to satisfy the pro-refugee lobby.125 
In considering the success or failure of the debate, it may be argued that, 
initially, the pro-refugee movement, whilst under attack from Osbert Peake, was able to 
counter his accusations with some success. In their detailed remarks appertaining to the 
threat of increased anti-Semitism, if a substantial influx of Jews were granted entry into 
the country, they successfully focused on a facet of reaction in the country, which, 
although social, rather than political, was employed by the government. The threat of 
stimulating anti-Semitism provided the government with the justification to reinforce a 
rigid determination to control and limit the entry of Jewish immigrants. They also 
emphasised the anomalies of the Palestine White Paper which had and continued to, 
limit entry for the Jews into the Mandate. In these two areas, the debate may be viewed 
as a success for the campaigners. In considering the long-term results, however, it may 
be considered a failure for the campaigners as support for their efforts to rescue the 
refugees lost its impetus. 
 In his closing speech, Eden, whilst appearing to agree with the demands of the 
campaigners, emphasised that, until total victory were achieved in the war, little could be 
done to provide assistance for the refugees trapped in Europe. He did, however assure 
the House that the re-establishment of an enlarged and re-organised Intergovernmental 
Committee would have both the staffing and the finance required, to work on behalf of 
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the refugees wherever it was deemed to be practicable. In the coming months, as 
Kushner points out, the Committee was to be deployed by the government to stave off 
any criticism of its apparent inertia towards the refugees.126 It may be argued that the 
deployment of the Intergovernmental Committee as a political tool was a repetition of 
the government policy after the Evian Conference, when it was used in order to deflect 
criticism of its attitude towards the refugees between August 1938 and September 
1939.127 
The disagreement between Osbert Peake and Eleanor Rathbone continued 
after the debate and Peake sent a lengthy letter of detailed criticism to her at the end of 
May. He refuted the observations and suggestions included in the pamphlet Rescue the 
Perishing and suggested that the title was misleading. He argued that it created the 
impression there were measures which, if adopted by the government, would lead to 
the rescue of many refugees. He concluded his lengthy critique of the points raised in 
the pamphlet with the following comments: 
“Nor, I am sure is the cause of the refugees likely to                                           
be forwarded by attributing to the Government of this                                    
country and to that of the United States a policy of sluggish                             
inaction….without waiting to learn the results of the Bermuda 
Conference,(some of which for reasons known to you,                         
cannot yet be made known).”128   
 In the initial aftermath of the debate, letters and petitions were sent to both the 
government and M.P.’s; these included a variety of suggestions, but the main theme 
which dominated, was the request to provide immediate assistance  to rescue the Jews 
trapped in Europe,129 for, as the Aberdare Christian Fellowship Group stated: 
“We agree with His Majesty’s Government in deploring                                             
the atrocities perpetrated against the Jews in Europe.                                      
But we ask,will the Jews now dying thank us for                                                 
post-war retribution?”130  
On the other hand, there were also a number of letters expressing dismay at the 
government reaction to the refugees, as a result of the agreement reached at the 
Bermuda conference. In a lengthy letter of criticism addressed to Anthony Eden from 
the Vancouver News-Herald in British Colombia, the following points were made: 
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“Your government’s admission that…permission for any                                              
more of that unfortunate race (Jews) to gain freedom in                                 
Palestine, their“homeland” would strain to the utmost the                    
goodwill of the Arabs –has shocked me to the very depth                                        
of my heart. Furthermore, reference to the 120,000,000                                           
victims of the Nazis who would also like to escape if they                                       
could – seems to me proof of wanton brutal                
misrepresentation…it is not a matter of life and  death for                            
them…. as it is for Europe’s Jews. I have come to the                                     
conclusion that Great  Britain has in no way lived up to          
expectations in her handling of  this problem. The cruel                       
joke of the Bermuda Conference…. Empty words, stupid                 
arguments were used to prove that nothing could be          
done, as if…the matter was under consideration at all.                                 
Let me assure, Sir, that Great Britain is losing rapidly the              
friendship of many…which  hurts deeply, because the only                 
faith we have left is our faith in the part British Empire should,                 
but unfortunately is not, playing in the building of a better world.”131
  
The campaigners continued to press their case and requested Anthony Eden to 
receive an informal deputation led by Eleanor Rathbone. The meeting organised for the 
1st June was, however, postponed as a result of a War Cabinet meeting which agreed 
that: 
“The general feeling of the war Cabinet was that it was   
unreasonable that a request for a deputation to be                                    
received so soon after the matter had been fully debated                                                    
Parliament.”132 
Not to be deterred by this refusal, Eleanor  Rathbone visited A.W.G. Randall to 
stress that it was of the utmost importance to issue a stern warning to Bulgaria, since 
The Times had reported on the 29th May, that all Bulgarian Jews were facing 
deportation to Poland. In the ensuing discussion, she observed that, what was required, 
was an official warning to the Bulgarian Government comparable to the UN Declaration 
of December 1942, rather than an anonymous Bulgarian announcement on the 
European Radio broadcasts.133In the departmental discussions which followed this 
proposal, various points were made, one of which raised the question as to ‘whether a 
promise of retribution for the general Bulgarian action against the Jews will do good or 
harm.’134 It was decided that, until there was no hope of rescuing the Bulgarian children, 
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a warning should be issued through the wireless service to Bulgaria and South-Eastern 
Europe.135In a further meeting between Randall and Lord Perth, the former reiterated 
the various measures the government had taken to complete the rescue of the children 
and he advised that it would not be appreciated if public criticism were levelled against 
either the Turks or the United States for their involvement in the proposed scheme. In 
his reply, Lord Perth indicated that a possible solution to this problem was for Eleanor 
Rathbone to be appointed to the newly convened Intergovernmental Committee. This 
would, in effect, provide her with a greater insight into the numerous problems 
surrounding the feasibilty of providing assistance to the refugees. It would also provide 
a valuable link with the National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror.136This 
suggestion was finally discarded when Sir Herbert Emerson refused to countenance it, 
thus destroying any possible collaboration between the two organisations working on 
behalf of the refugees. The final government comment on the possibility of her 
involvement was clarified in a Foreign Office memo issued by Richard Law, in 
September, which stated: 
“The reconstitution of the Intergovernmental Committee                               
is very important…. refugee enthusiasts can now be                                     
turned to Sir Herbert Emerson and his vice-director,                               
Mr. Patrick Malin….We are being pressed to get Jews                                                
and enthusiasts like Miss  Rathbone appointed to the                  
committee….I’m convinced that we can’t use Miss Eleanor                                  
or any of her kidney as ‘assessors’. Assessors are                                
concerned with facts.  Miss Eleanor is interested in policies                             
(and) would just sit there trying to force her particular     
views down the throats of the others.”137 
The government continued to maintain its stance that little could be done for the 
refugees until final victory, but in the meantime, as with the outcome of the Evian 
Conference, all problems appertaining to the refugees could be referred to the newly 
constituted Intergovernmental Committee. 
Following this initial response, the public support for the campaign to rescue the 
refugees gradually dwindled and this loss of interest was reflected in a number of 
remarks and letters by Eleanor Rathbone, who noted ‘the position seems extremely 
unsatisfactory. We seem to have reached a stalemate or a dead-end.’138 In a further 
comment, she observed that: 
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“The government has little sense of urgency over the                          
whole matter, very little hope of doing anything for rescue                              
except on a small scale, and a strong desire to avoid pressure.”139   
The statement by Eden that little could be achieved until final victory was 
obtained, resonated with the public; it may be argued that if a statement is subsequently 
reiterated, it will eventually convince the listener of its veracity, or as Joseph Goebbels 
had said ‘If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come 
to believe it.’140 In the long-term it may, therefore, be argued that the debate ultimately 
achieved success for the government who refused to deviate from their agreed policy 
towards the refugees and this is encapsulated in a memo issued by Richard Law in 
September 1943: 
“Fundamentally the refugee problem remains within                                
the same limitations and the persistent propaganda of                                      
large-scale ‘rescue’ remains as unreal as ever short                                 
of victory.”141  
 There are, however, other factors to be considered regarding the loss of 
interest in the plight of the European Jews. The tide of war was turning in favour of the 
Allies in Europe with the defeat of the Nazi’s at Stalingrad in January 1943, victory at 
Tunis and Bizerte in May 1943, the surrender of Italy in July 1943 and the recapture of 
Kharkov in August 1943. There was a degree of scepticism towards the reports of 
Jewish suffering, since a proportion of the nation could still recall the atrocity 
propaganda of the First World War which had been exposed as a fabrication.142 A 
further consideration is that for many people, it was almost impossible to envisage the 
wholesale extermination of a single group. In his afterword to Story of a Secret State, 
Andrew Roberts notes that it was the lack of photographic evidence in support of 
Karski’s report on the German atrocities in Poland during 1943, that influenced the 
scepticism displayed by Judge Felix Frankfurter when he challenged the accuracy of 
Karski’s report on the German atrocities in Poland, with the comment ‘… I did not say 
this young man is lying. I said I am unable to believe him. There is a difference.’143 In 
his analysis of the Press during this period, Andrew Sharf notes that the distinction 
between the alleged black-marketeers and the victims of the Nazi policies, became 
blurred when reported and a proportion of the nation believed that the Jews were their 
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own worst enemies.144It may be further argued that the national press could exert a 
strong influence on the perceptions and opinions of its readers. This is demonstrated by 
two separate articles that appeared in the Daily Mail in 1938. The first article reported 
on the number of aliens allegedly entering the country illegally in August 1938:   
“The way stateless Jews from Germany are pouring in                                 
from every port of this country is becoming an outrage. …                                   
In these words, Mr. Herbert Metcalfe… referred to the                             
number of aliens entering this country… a problem to                        
which The Daily Mail has repeatedly pointed.”145     
On the other hand, the report on the arrival of the first children to enter the 
country on the Kindertransport scheme, sympathised with their plight: 
“As the bleak dawn of a winter’s day broke over England                                                                                  
this morning more than 200 boys and girls between                                      
12 and 17  woke from days and nights of terror and                    
deprivation to a new life that holds for them freedom,                             
happiness and careers.”146  
Finally, public opinion tends to be fickle and as new events were reported, with a 
growing focus on the Allied victories in Europe which would ultimately bring an end to 
the war, interest in the refugees diminished rapidly. This loss of interest combined with 
the government determination to adhere to its long-term policy towards the refugees 
contributed to the rapidly diminishing support for the pro-refugee campaigners in their 
continued efforts to provide assistance to the European Jews. 
The aims of the government at the Bermuda Conference may be compared to 
the aims of the Evian Conference in July 1938. The conference was to demonstrate to 
the Allies that Britain and America were working together to provide assistance to the 
beleaguered refugees in Europe, whilst stressing the obstacles which halted any real 
assistance being given. The revival of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees 
was the only active decision reached, but its remit would still be limited, although it 
would provide the façade of humanity that they wished to portray. Neither government 
was prepared to accept a substantial number of Jews and in order to circumvent any 
possible accusation of anti-Semitism, the entire conference focused on all refugees with 
minimal mention of the Jewish situation in Nazi-occupied Europe. In the aftermath of 
the conference, the government maintained its stance towards the European Jews by 
stating categorically in Parliament that the only solution to the refugee problem was to 
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achieve total victory in Europe. In obtaining acceptance of this policy by the 
campaigners and the public, the government ensured that its rigid enforcement of the 
immigration laws and its adherence to the conditions laid down in the Palestine White 
Paper, remained untouched. The outcome of the conference may, therefore, be 
considered to have been a complete success for the government since it had achieved 
its stated aims. 
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Conclusion 
The reaction of the British towards the flight of the German Jews had not been one of 
welcome when they began arriving in 1933.  A limited number of mainly professional 
people, had been granted admittance after the leaders of the Anglo-Jewish community 
gave a written guarantee to the government that they would provide all the financial 
support for the refugees, thus assuring the government that the new arrivals would not 
be a financial burden on the public purse. This situation changed radically after the 
Austrian Anschluss of March 1938 when the guarantee was withdrawn and a visa 
system was instituted, thereby ensuring that entry was rigidly restricted to specified 
groups of useful immigrants. This attitude was encapsulated in the speech delivered by 
the British delegate Lord Winterton at the Evian Conference in July 1938. The position 
was clearly stated, Britain was not a country of immigrants, there was high 
unemployment, limited opportunities and whilst certain professionals were accepted, 
the majority of refugees were not. These government views, which reflected the general 
mood of the country, were supported by the Anglo-Jewish leadership who feared that 
an increase in the Jewish population would fuel anti-Semitism. It may be argued that 
this fear of encouraging anti-Semitism, which had arisen as a result of  prevailing  social 
and economic problems attributed to the arrival of the Russian Jews at the turn of the 
century, still exerted a considerable influence on the general response of the Anglo-
Jewish leadership towards the Jewish refugees.  
The declaration of war in September 1939 brought to an end any possibility of 
Jewish refugees trapped in Europe, from entering the country, for the duration of the 
war. After the initial scare that the refugees resident in Britain presented a threat to 
national security, life resumed its normality. The advent of rationing in January 1941 
soon gave rise to numerous accusations that the Jews were hoarding foodstuffs and 
profiteering at the expense of the housewife. These imputations were to grow 
throughout 1941 and 1942, when further accusations were made that young Jewish 
men avoided military service; that Jewish businessmen were totally unscrupulous in 
their business dealings with non-Jews and generally, the Jews were cowardly. Similar 
accusations had been made during World War One when Russian Jews were 
considered to be active supporters of the Bolshevik Revolution; young Russian males 
had been accused of refusing to enlist whilst Jewish businessmen had profited from the 
absence of non-Jewish counterparts.  
These accusations, together with the emphasis on a shortage of housing (which 
Herbert Morrison admitted was a result of the Blitz), were used by him in his capacity as 
 
 
219 
 
Home Secretary, to deflect any suggestion of easing the immigration laws to facilitate 
the rescue of Jewish refugees. The reference to an accommodation shortage resonated 
with the public. One of the main accusations levelled against the Russian Jews at the 
turn of the century was that their arrival had created a major housing shortage, when in 
effect, the real cause had been the massive redevelopment in the East End.  
The first official reports in June 1942 of the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination, 
galvanised various campaigners and church leaders to propose a number of rescue 
schemes which were mainly centred on the rescue of children. The campaigners were 
aware, that in the aftermath of Kristallnacht, the public had been vocal in their demands 
for government assistance to be provided to the German Jews  and they had actively 
supported the Kindertransport scheme which had been set up in order to rescue Jewish 
children upto the age of eighteen. Thus the campaigners believed that an emphasis on 
the rescue of children would resonate with the public without stimulating anti-Semitism, 
as feared by the government who dismissed all the proposed schemes with one 
exception, the rescue of children in Vichy France. The government acceptance of the 
scheme, which was to be funded by the Anglo-Jewish community, was rigidly limited by 
Morrison and ultimately failed, due to the intransigence of the Vichy government. The 
campaigners were quickly disabused of any belief that there would be any charitable 
actions coming from the government and Morrison, influenced by the weekly reports 
produced by the Ministry of Information, maintained throughout the period, that to grant 
entry to Jewish refugees, would exacerbate the growing levels of anti-Semitism in the 
country. The government was finally forced to confront the reality of the Holocaust when 
the Polish Government-In-Exile presented a detailed report of the Nazi extermination of 
Polish Jewry to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, at the beginning of December 
1942. With the pressure mounting from the various campaigners, Eden announced the 
UN Declaration in Parliament on December 17th 1942.  The main contents, whilst 
denouncing the atrocities being committed by the Nazis, stated categorically that when 
total victory was achieved, the perpetrators of the atrocities would face judgement as 
war criminals. The government assumed that this declaration of intent would satisfy the 
campaign groups and individuals who were demanding that assistance should be 
provided for the refugees. 
The pressure for the government to provide assistance to the refugees 
continued to grow and in February 1943, it was decided to approach the American 
Administration to organise an informal discussion regarding the refugees. In the 
negotiations between the two sides, the government stressed  that there was a genuine 
fear that Hitler would change his policy of Jewish extermination to one of extrusion. The 
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inherent concern that Britain might be forced into dealing with such a problem, may be 
attributed to the effect of the Russian-Jewish influx at the turn of the century, which 
created a reactive pattern of response when faced with the possibility of a similar 
scenario. Neither side was prepared to provide tangible assistance for the European 
Jews, since there was a degree of anti-Semitism in both governments They did, 
however, wish to demonstrate their humanitarianism to their allies. In order to achieve 
this, the two sides, in a repetition of the diplomatic manoeuvres prior to the Evian 
Conference, reached an agreed agenda before the talks, which were held in Bermuda. 
The main emphasis  was to deliberately focus on all the Europeans in Nazi occupied 
Europe, thus excluding any reference to the European Jews as a separate entity. The 
outcome of the talks was very similar to the Evian Conference in July 1938; a large 
display of sympathy; minimal action but an opportunity to display the humanitarian 
beliefs of the government. In a speech to the Commons on 19th May 1943, Eden 
reiterated the government stance that nothing could be done for the refugees until total 
victory was achieved. There was to be no assistance for the Jews trapped in Europe. 
 Throughout the Thirties and the Forties, a major concern of the government was 
the possibility of being swamped with a further large influx of Jewish refugees, similar to 
the Russian Jewish exodus that had been experienced by Britain between 1880 and 
1905. This is best illustrated in the speech by Lord Winterton at the Evian Conference, 
with his allusion to the possibility of some Eastern European governments forcing their 
Jewish populations to emigrate en masse. The fear of Jewish extrusion by Hitler 
presented a major concern for the government both prior to and during the war. This 
underlying fear which was referred to in numerous discussions, may be considered to 
reflect a response based on the long roots of anti-Semitism which were clearly present 
during the early years of the century. 
 There is no denying  that there was an element of anti-Semitism throughout this 
period in Britain, but it was never a political movement as exemplified by the Nazis. The 
nearest comparison was the British Union of Fascists which established a foothold in 
the Thirties but never attained any political significance and by the beginning of the war, 
its influence was minimal. The main form of anti-Semitism may be described as a social 
phenomenon. This was exemplified with the usual references to the Jews as being 
different, intent on making money, loud, intrusive and not restrained in their attitude to 
life. It manifested itself in job discrimination, non-entry into golf and tennis clubs, 
restrictions in hotels and in some cases, a quota system in Public schools.  The most 
notable area within the government which displayed a manifestation of an anti-Semitic 
bias, was the Colonial Office where various civil servants and the Colonial Governors 
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indicated a definite antipathy towards the Jews in general. The Colonial Office, which 
was constrained by the limitations of the Palestine White Paper, considered the Jews to 
be demanding and difficult to deal with. The Colonial Governors and the dominant white 
hierarchy in the Colonies viewed the possibility of large-scale entry for Jewish 
immigrants as unacceptable. They were not Protestant; they were business people who 
presented a threat to the status quo; they did not assimilate and in some circles, they 
were viewed as Eastern or Oriental which was not truly acceptable within the confines 
of the prevailing social mores. 
 There is, however, a further type of anti-Semitism to be considered. This may 
be interpreted as an unwitting condemnation of the Jews based on an unconscious 
association with certain conceptions of Jews in general during this period. This form of 
anti-Semitism has long roots and may be traced back over centuries. It should not, 
therefore, be a surprise that it still existed, since it had been present in the response to 
immigrant Jews in the near past of 1905 and 1917. 
 In current historiography, minimal consideration is given to this concept, in their 
different approaches to the period. Sherman traces government policy towards the 
arrival of the German Jews in 1933 upto the declaration of war in 1939. He makes little 
mention of anti-Semitism, although both he and London highlight the influence of high 
unemployment, the intransigence of some professional bodies towards foreign 
professional qualifications and a widespread reluctance to accept a substantial number 
of foreigners, regardless of their nationality or creed. He concludes that, in comparison 
to other countries, government policy was comparatively compassionate.  London 
analyses the political manoeuvres and responses to the arrival of the refugees. She 
focuses on the fear of an increase in anti-Semitism if the refugees presented a 
seemingly foreign attitude and did not appear to assimilate. Little allusion is made to the 
problems emanating from the influx of the Eastern European Jews at the turn of the 
century.  She argues that the Anglo-Jewish response to the German Jews was based 
on the assumption that the refugees would either emigrate to Palestine or other areas 
worldwide and that entry into Britain was on a transitional basis. Whilst Wasserstein 
concentrates his focus on the political implications of the Palestine White Paper in 
respect of the response of the government to the refugees, he argues that the anti-
Semitism prevalent during the war was based on the inherent xenophobia of the British 
towards all foreigners.  In contrast to these approaches, Kushner examines the 
dichotomy created for the government, of a society based on a liberal ethos as a result 
of Hitler’s Jewish policies. He argues that the Nazi persecution of the Jews presented a 
major conflict in government policy which, whilst adhering to the prevailing immigration 
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laws, wished to present a façade of humanitarianism based on liberalism whilst not 
willing to provide tangible assistance for the European Jews.  
In examining this alternative form of anti-Semitism (unwitting condemnation), it 
may be argued that the responses of  the public and the leaders of the Anglo-Jewish 
community were influenced by the multiplicity of problems originating from the anti-
Semitism which was prevalent at the start of the century, whilst the government used it 
as a political tool to maintain its immigration laws created in 1905 and amended in 
1914,1919 and 1920. 
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